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COMMENTS
ADJACENT AIRSPACE IN THE LAW OF
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Cuicunque Aliquid Conceditur, Conceditur Etiam et Id Sine
Quo Res ipsa Non Esse Potuit*
Whether a tenant's right to space extends beyond the exterior of the
walls bounding the premises demised must appear at first glance, even to
the serious student of the laW of landlord and tenant, a purely academic
query. Even to raise the question may strike some as foolhardy since the
field is already heavily laden with technical, indeed, hypertechnical con-
cepts. But the question no longer may be regarded as one wholly within
the realm of scholarly speculation. Like many recent vexations of the law
it is a child of the material inventiveness and creativity of the twentieth
century. In eras blessed with fewer gadgets, the tenant's right might
safely be assumed to stop at the exterior of the walls, though there were
some who doubted this at a time comparatively recent in the development
of this phase of the law.1
With the cornucopia of science issuing forth a steady stream of new
contrivances and devices, it has become commonplace to find a new legal
problem created by nearly every invention. The television antenna, a
fixture of the American landscape, has been a fruitful source of litigation.
How far an air-conditioner may protrude into the airspace outside the
tenant's window has been before the courts. The right to hang signs, or
restrict them, has always been a problem, but one resolved on the basis of
possession of the wall, and without a consideration of conflicting claims
to adjacent or contiguous airspace.
Rather than wait for science to spring new surprises, and hence prob-
lems, it may be well to consider the question of the tenant's rights to
adjacent airspace in advance. This in itself may seem revolutionary in a
system of law slavishly addicted to solution by precedent. But the lack
of cases in point must not deter the search for the answer to a problem
destined to provide litigation in ensuing years. In assessing the problem,
perhaps it would do well to bear in mind Holmes' observation:
Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at
bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy;
most generally, to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious
Shep. Touch. 89.
1 See arguments of plaintiff's counsel in Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N.H. 503, 16 Am. Rep.
688 (1873).
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result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less
traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis.
2
THE SIGN OR WALL EXTERIOR CASES
Notwithstanding the dearth of cases in point as to the right to adjacent
airspace, the landlord and tenant relationship has given rise to one prob-
lem that literally ends where the immediate problem begins. The prob-
lem, distilled to its essentials, is whether the tenant, without agreement
one way or the other, has the possession and right to use the exterior of
the walls bounding the premises leased. An unbroken current of author-
ity, both in the United States and England, holds that he does. A brief
examination of the cases so holding is in order in that it is here that im-
portant clues exist indicating which way the courts will hold when ulti-
mately they decide who has the right of enjoyment and possession of
adjacent airspace outside the walls of the tenant's premises.
In the leading case of Riddle v. Littlefield, it was squarely held that the
tenant, "by the terms of the lease of 'a certain store,' acquired the right
to the use and occupation of the outside of the walls belonging to that
portion of the tenement which included the store."a The court went on
to point out that the tenant took the outside walls as a "parcel of the
demised premises proper, and not as a thing technically appurtenant
thereto. The outside wall of a building leased or conveyed passes by the
lease or deed as much as the inside of the same wall."'4 Quoting with ap-
proval from a recognized authority,5 the court held that "whatever ease-
ments and privileges legally appertain to property pass by a conveyance
of the property itself, without any additional words. The grant of a thing
passes the incident as well as the principal, though the latter only is men-
tioned; and this effect cannot be voided without an express reservation."
6
The court added:
A grant of a thing will include whatever the grantor had power to convey,
which is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the thing granted .... If a
house or a store be conveyed, everything which belongs to it or is in use with
it, and whatever is essential to the enjoyment passes as an incident, unless spe-
cially reserved. Whenever anything is granted, all the means to attain it, and all
the fruits and effects of it are also granted, and will pass inclusive .... 7
Fourteen years later, an English court indicated its agreement with the
Riddle case, citing it by name and approving its rationale.
s The contro-
2 Holmes, The Common Law, Lec. 1, 35 (1881).
8 53 N.H. 503, 509, 16 Am. Rep. 688 (1873). 4 Ibid.
5 Smith and Soden, Landlord and Tenant, 86-88.
6 Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N.H. 503, 509, 16 Am. Rep. 688 (1873).
7 Ibid.
8 Carlisle Cafe Co. v. Muse, 77 L.T. (Eng.) 515, 46 W.R. 107, 67 L. J. Ch. 53 (1897).
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versy in the English case arose, as has so often been the case, over the
right to hang signs. Defendant tenants leased the premises relying upon
representations that they would have the right to use the outer walls for
the purpose of advertising their business. Plaintiff, also a tenant, erected a
sign that covered by some two and a half feet, the lower portion of the
outer wall of the defendants' story. Defendant tenants of the upper floor,
evidently inclined to seek summary relief, tore down the sign below,
whereupon a suit was brought for an injunction to restrain the defendants
from removing the sign or erecting one of their own. In defense, the
Riddle case was urged upon the court as authority for the proposition
that a tenant has the right to use both the outside and inside of the walls
bounding the space he rents. The High Court of Justice, Chancery divi-
sion, concurred with defendants' position, holding through Byrne, J.:
The premises let ... constitute a little dwelling by itself .... It is said on be-
half of the plaintiff, that the letting did not include the outer walls of the house.
I think that it did include them, so far as they were solely appropriate to the
rooms let .... If, then, the defendants had a right to use the outer walls at all,
they had a right to use them in the way they have done. I think they had that
right, and that the signboard put up by the plaintiff was in derogation of that
right.9
Similarly, the Massachusetts courts have repeatedly held that the tenant
is not restricted to the inside of the walls bounding the space rented.
In Lowell v. Strahan, the court said there is no reason the landlord should
be regarded as having one set of rights on the outside of the wall and
quite a different set on the inside.10 The court defined the rights of the
landlord, stating that where he retains control of an upper tenement, he
has the right in the whole wall for support, but that otherwise the tenant
retains control and has the right to give a license to affix a sign to the
wall to another without breaching a covenant against "underletting,""'
In a Massachusetts case of more recent vintage, where a landlord
sought to enjoin the maintenance of a sign by the lessee, the court refused
to grant relief even though the lease provided for the necessity of the
lessor's permission before any sign could be erected.12 It was held that
the landlord was estopped to deny the lessee's right to hang the sign since
it had hung on the wall for some two and one half years, pursuant to the
landlord's oral permission. The court restated what has been a recurrent
theme in the cases:
Ibid., at 516.
10 145 Mass. 1, 12 N.E. 401 (1887).
11 Ibid., at 405.
12 Levin v. Rose, 302 Mass. 378, 19 N.E. 2d 297 (1939).
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A lease, unless otherwise providing, includes the control of the outside walls
adjacent to the demised premises with the incidental right to such walls for
such purposes as they are usually and ordinarily employed .... Is
A similar statement was made where it was held, in denying relief in
a tort action against the landlord, that an awning overhanging the store
of a lessee was not shown to be in control of the landlord who occupied
the floor above the demised premises, merely because the awning was
attached to the outside of the wall. 14 Blanchard v. Stones, Inc., another
Massachusetts tort decision, held that where plaintiff was injured on a
sidewalk as the result of ice formed thereon from water dripping from
a sign hung by lessees, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show
that the sign was under the lessor's control.' 5 The court noted:
The fact that it was entirely, or almost entirely, located above the store
premises is not enough to fasten liability upon the defendant [lessor]. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that the portion of the exterior wall to which
the sign was attached was in the control of the owner rather than in that of the
tenants upon the second floor. Ordinarily, the control of such portion of this wall
would be in the tenants of the second floor, who were occupying the premises
adjacent to the wall, in the absence of anything to the contrary. 16
And, in a relatively recent decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed an injunction preventing a first floor tenant from
erecting a sign that extended on the wall of the building a mere fifteen
inches above the floor level of the second floor.
17
The Riddle case has received recognition in other jurisdictions.' 8
Forbes v. Gorman, a frequently cited Michigan decision, held that the
lease of a building, or of one floor or story thereof, conveys to the lessee
"absolute dominion over the premises leased, including the outer as well
as the inner walls."' 9 It was said that the tenant acquired the right to use
the walls for all purposes not inconsistent with the lease. Hilburn v.
Huntsman, a Kentucky decision, affirmed denial of relief to a ground
floor tenant stating that although a lintel upon which a sign was attached
hung slightly below the tenant's ceiling line, there was no showing that
the sign itself extended below the ceiling.20 The court noted however:
The principles of law governing a case of this kind are well settled. In the ab-
sence of a contrary provision in the lease, the lessee has the exclusive right to the
1 Ibid., at 298. Note also 265 Tremont Street, Inc. v. Hamilburg, 321 Mass. 353, 73
N.E. 2d 828 (1947).
14 Hannon v. Schwartz, 304 Mass. 468, 23 N.E. 2d 1022 (1939).
15 304 Mass. 634, 24 N.E. 2d 688 (1939).
16 Ibid., at 691.
17 265 Tremont Street, Inc. v. Hamilburg, 321 Mass. 353, 73 N.E. 2d 828 (1947).
Is Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N.H. 503, 16 Am. Rep. 688 (1873).
19 159 Mich. 291,123 N.W. 1089, 1090 (1909).
20 187 Ky. 701, 220 S.W. 528 (1920).
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use of the outside walls of the portion of the building covered by his lease, for
advertising purposes, to the exclusion of a lessee of another part of the same
building.
21
In Smith v. Jensen, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that in the
absence of an express provision to the contrary, the lease of a building,
"or a portion thereof," for business purposes, gives the lessee "the exclu-
sive right to the use of the outside walls of that portion of the building
embraced in his lease for advertising purposes. '22 The court held that
where there are different tenants of several floors of a building, a tenant
on one floor has no right to prevent a tenant on another floor from
placing signs upon the walls outside the other tenant's story. In a 1951
decision, the Rhode Island Supreme court restated the rule,23 and the
court of last resort in North Dakota has taken a similar position.2 4
Illinois apparently has adopted the doctrine of the Riddle case. In 400
North Rush, Inc. v. D. ]. Bielzoff Products Co., plaintiff lessor brought
an action against lessee under the state forcible entry and detainer act
to oust the defendant from possession of a wall upon which the defendant
had painted a sign.25 Holding that the action could not be maintained,
the court said that authorities in other states hold that "the exterior walls
of leased premises are part and parcel of the demise to the lessee; and if
that be the rule (as we think it is), there could have been no tres-
pass. .... -26 In a subsequent case, the same Illinois Appellate court was
called on to decide whether plaintiff lessee of two floors of a building
could maintain an action of forcible entry and detainer to recover pos-
session of the exterior surface of the walls of the floors which it had
rented.27 Defendants contended that the sign which they had painted on
the walls was there by virtue of a license from the landlord, and that as
mere licensees, the action of forcible entry and detainer, being in nature
possessory, could not be maintained against them. Holding that the action
could be maintained, the court said:
Defendants' claimed rights as licensee were with plaintiff's lessor, who it was
determined... had no right to enter into the agreement. Defendants by painting
a sign advertising a product of one of plaintiff's competitors on the outside wall
of the building disseized plaintiff from its paramount right of possession to its
portion of such wall. As long as defendants' sign remained, plaintiff was dis-
seized and deprived of the possession to which it was lawfully entitled.
28
21 Ibid. 22 156 Ga. 814, 120 S.E. 417, 419 (1923).
2 3 Moretti v. C. S. Realty Co., 78 R.I. 341, 82 A. 2d 608 (1951).
24 Platou v. Swanton, 59 N.D. 466, 230 N.W. 725 (1930). See also Kratovil, Real Estate
Law S 654 (2d ed., 1952).
25 347 l. App. 123, 106 N.E. 2d 208 (1952). 28 Ibid., at 210.
27 D. J. Bielzoff Products Co. v. James B. Bean Distilling Co., 3 111. App. 2d 530, 123
N.E. 2d 135 (1954).
28 Ibid., at 137.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
A Massachusetts decision defines in some detail the limits of the tenant's
spatial rights.2 9 The case involved an action in contract to recover the
expenses of replacing a plate glass window broken by a third person,
the window forming a part of the outer wall of the plaintiff's office.
The lessee plaintiff was specifically forbidden to affix or paint any sign
on the outside of the building. In holding that the lessor was under no
obligation to replace the window, the court opined:
It is manifest that the tenant of a room possesses the incidental right to use and
decorate the interior walls, floor and ceiling in accordance with his own taste
and needs so long as he does no harm to them. His lease covers not merely the
cubical space bounded by the inner planes of walls, floor and ceiling. Such a
tenancy implies the right to attach carpets or rugs to the floor .... Painting and
papering are within the natural uses by the tenant of a room. These factors lead
to the conclusion that, prima facie and in the absence of agreement, the lease in
the case at bar included the whole of the plate glass window .... 0
Most of the foregoing cases were concerned with relatively small
buildings in which the competitive interests of several tenants were not
in conflict. But there have been at least two cases considering the effect
of a number of tenants in a single building on the general doctrine. In
Emmons v. D. A. Schulte, Inc., 1 the court held that putting advertising
signs on an office building did not constitute waste, the Chancellor
saying:
If it be legally sound to accord to the tenant of a floor or story of a building
the exclusive use of the outside walls for advertising purposes, and the authorities
clearly hold that it is, then there is no logical escape from the conclusion that a
room or rooms should be accorded a similar right.3 2
But in Fuller v. Rose, where tenants were denied the right by the court
to use the walls for advertising purposes although they could use the win-
dows, it was held that tenants could not, in the absence of a showing of
injury to their business, restrain the landlord from painting advertise-
ments on the walls.aa Conceding on the one hand that the lessee of an
entire building acquires the right to use both sides of the wall, the court
maintained that the presence of a number of tenants in a single building
restricts the extent of the devise to each, and the rights and privileges
incident thereto. The court observed:
The right of all must be so curtailed that they will not interfere with each
other. In this building all of the tenants possessed the right to support and in-
29 Leominster Fuel Co. v. Scanlon, 243 Mass. 126, 137 N.E. 271 (1922).
30 Ibid., at 272. (italics added) The court cited as authority for its holding two Eng-
lish decisions: Hope Brothers, Ltd. v. Cowan, 2 Ch. 312 (1913); Goldfoot v. Welch,
I Ch. 213 (1914).
8113 Del. Ch. 336, 120 At. 221 (1923).
81 Ibid., at 226. 3 110 Mo. App. 344, 85 S.W. 931 (1905).
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closure of the south wall including the part thereof claimed by the plaintiffs. It
would lead to absurd conclusions to say that any tenant was vested with title to
any portion of the outer walls. The title to them remained in the owner of the
building, whose duty it was to maintain them for the benefit of all the occupants.
It has been said by some authorities that tenants in buildings of this character,
34
whose rooms are inclosed by an outer wall, have the right to use such portion of
the exterior thereof for the placing thereon of their signs; but such right is a
privilege acquired from ... custom-a mere incident to, not a parcel of, the de-
mised premises, and consequently not derived from title. The landlord may de-
prive his tenants of such privilege by stipulations in the lease, in which case, the
ownership of the walls remaining in him, he may use their outside surfaces for
purposes of revenue.3 5
The court cautioned that the landlord is required not to inflict damages
upon the tenant upon his covenant to give the tenant uninterrupted and
peaceable possession of the respective premises and therefore the landlord
could not erect signs which would injure the business of any of the ten-
ants. It was said that the court would not take cognizance of "aesthetics"
and that "[olffended taste will not support a cause of action."
36
The foregoing decision, qualifying the right of the tenant to the ex-
terior of the wall almost to destroying it, is curious for a number of
reasons. Most of the courts that have considered the problem seem to be
influenced by what was no doubt an ingenious argument of counsel in
the Riddle case, to the effect that if the landlord retained control of the
wall space outside the premises demised to the tenant, the landlord could
rent the space to a competitor which could put the tenant out of busi-
ness.37 The Missouri court collided head on with the same proposition
but chose to approach the problem from a different direction, holding
that the landlord retained ownership of the wall, but could run no adver-
tisements harmful to the business of the tenants. This solution enabled the
court to back out of what would otherwise have been equitably a dead-
end street, but the rationale of the case lacks the semblance of symmetry
intrinsic in the doctrine of Riddle v. Littlefield.
38
An undercurrent of controversy in the wall or sign cases has revolved
around acts of the tenant in using the exterior of the wall, involving pos-
sibility of waste or damage to the landlord's reversionary interest. Be-
cause of the varying factual situations, it is difficult in the extreme to
fashion any sort of general definition as to what constitutes waste in this
34 The building in the instant case was seven stories, had 100 rooms and 50 tenants.
35 110 Mo. App. 344, 85 S.W. 931, 932 (1905).
36 Ibid.
37 See argument of defense counsel in Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N.H. 503, 507, 16 Am.
Rep. 688 (1873).
38 The possibility that a tenant might be eliminated from the market was of course
not the only string in the bow of the New Hampshire court.
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regard. An examination of a few decisions will suffice for purposes of
the question at hand.
In Bee Building Co. v. Peters Trust Co., the issue was whether the les-
see of a building had the right to abandon or change the name of the
building, and in doing so, to partially dismantle a parapet wall for that
purpose.39 Quoting with approval from a leading text writer, the court
said that a lease of part of a building prima facie passes the outer walls
adjacent to the rooms or apartment named as a part of the premises
leased, and consequently the lessee has the exclusive right to use such wall
for advertising purposes.
4 0
In holding that the lessee had the right to partially dismantle and re-
build the parapet wall which held the old name of the building, the court
reasoned that no damage was done to the freehold since it was shown that
the rental value of the building remained unaffected by the changes in
the wall, and that the lessee had the right to change the name so as to in-
dicate its possession of the building.
As noted, the question of waste ultimately hinges on the facts of each
particular case. Thus where the tenant in possession of a boardinghouse
allowed the defendant to paint on a blank wall of the premises a large
sign advertising chewing gum, a decision for plaintiff-owner for damage
to his reversionary interest was affirmed.41 The defendants cited Riddle v.
Littlefield42 as authority for the right of the tenant in possession to allow
the sign to be painted. The court answered the defendants' contention in
the following manner:
[1]t is therefore plain that the tenant in possession is entitled to the use of the
outside of the walls, just as he is entitled to the use of the inside of the walls, and
can delegate that use to a third person.
But the . . . authorities ... clearly establish the rule that the tenant in posses-
sion of the property cannot so use the outer wall as to injure the freehold, nor can
he use them for a purpose inconsistent with the lawful and reasonable enjoyment
of the property.48
It was held that since the tenant could give the defendant no authority
to damage the freehold, the jury having found that the painting of the
sign did constitute such damage, the defendant third party was liable to
the plaintiff-owner.
In the light of the cases, it may be taken as established that the tenant
has the right to possession as a part of the demised premises the exterior
89 106 Neb. 294, 183 N.W. 302 (1921).
40 Ibid., at 303. 1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant 271.
41 Kretzer Realty Co. v. Thomas Cusack Co., 196 Mo. App. 596, 190 S.W. 1011 (1916).
4253 N.H. 503, 16 Am. Rep. 688 (1873).
4a 196 Mo. App. 596, 190 S.W. 1011, 1013 (1916).
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of the wall, and that in the absence of agreements against subletting, he
may allow another to use the wall. The only qualification on this right
is that which exists in relation to every part of the leasehold premises,
namely, that the tenant must not injure the landlord's reversionary in-
terest nor commit waste.
TELEVISION ANTENNA CASES
Having discovered that the cases hold that the tenant has the right to
at least the exterior of the walls, it becomes important to consider a group
of cases that have at least indirectly touched upon the question of ten-
ant's rights to adjacent airspace.
Because New York reports more fully than any other jurisdiction, the
opinions of its inferior courts, and because of the countless apartments in
New York City, most of the cases available for consideration are from
that state. However, there appear to be no cases from the court of last
resort in that state bearing on the issue. Since many of the antenna cases
have gone off on questions of pleading or other collateral issues, only
those which come reasonably close to a discussion of the problem of the
right to adjacent airspace will be considered.
One of the first television antenna cases held that the installation of an
antenna on the roof or exterior walls of a building, without first getting
the landlord's consent in writing, was a violation of a lease provision call-
ing for written consent, but did not constitute a violation so substantial
as to warrant eviction.44 The case appeared to augur well for the rights
of tenants, but the decision must be viewed in the light of the housing
emergency existing in New York at the time. Yet, the language of the
court was certainly favorable to the tenant's position. Witness the follow-
ing bit of obiter dictum:
The advent of television is an incident in the progress of the times. It is un-
necessary to dwell at length upon the comforts, the convenience and the educa-
tional vistas which are opened up by this comparatively new device. Suffice it to
say that its presence in many homes is becoming increasingly common with a
rapidity that resembles the acceptance of the radio when sets for home use were
first made and marketed.... Undoubtedly, when telegraph poles were first
erected with the wires stretching across their heights, many people felt that the
sight was an ungainly one and their presence objectionable. 45
Goldstein v. Alweiss, cited several times later in cases favorable to land-
lords, held in a cryptic and terse opinion that where, without the land-
lord's permission, the tenant attached a television antenna to the outside
frame of a window in his apartment, "the erection and maintenance of
44 Barfur Realty Corp. v. Kaufman, 83 N.Y.S. 2d 847 (Mun. Ct., N.Y., 1948).
45 Ibid., at 848.
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this structure constitute[d] an unauthorized intrusion or squatting on the
landlord's property within the purview of §1411 of the Civil Practice
Act."
4o
In Ruthann Corp. v. Adler, petitioner sought to recover possession of
the outside portion of one of respondent's living room windows, upon
which an antenna had been installed. 47 It was contended that to the ex-
tent to which the arrangement of the bars touched the outside portion of
the tenant's window, there was a squatting or intrusion within the mean-
ing of the statute. Bringing the case under the squatter sections of the
act was a fatal misstep for the petitioner. The court seized upon it to hold
for the tenant, in what was to prove to be the last of the decisions favor-
able to lessees. Landlords' lawyers in subsequent cases took the hint and
brought their cases under different theories. The court in the Ruthann
opinion noted:
The window in question is the usual rectangular opening in the wall of a build-
ing.., the window extends from the outer surface or facade of the building, to
the inner surface of the walls of the tenant's apartment.... Its ordinary, most ob-
vious purpose is to give the tenant immediate access to the easement in light and
air enjoyed by lands in private ownership abutting the public way. To give full
effect to this palpable purpose the tenant must be deemed to have a possessory
right in every part of the window, throughout its length, breadth and depth;
from its inner perimeter to its outer perimeter and all that lies between.48
It was concluded that having come into possession of the entire win-
dow frame, for any purpose the tenant could not be regarded as a squat-
ter or intruder in the sense in which the words were used in the statute.
"A squatter is one who settles on the lands of another without any legal
authority," the court noted.40
Another window frame case, West Holding Corp. v. Cordero, held for
the landlord when he sought an injunction under the theory that the
tenant was guilty of trespass.50 Defendant in that case occupied a sixth
floor apartment in plaintiff's building. Without the plaintiff's permission,
the tenant installed a television antenna consisting of two pipes that ex-
tended out of one of the apartment windows. The antenna was attached
to the window frame. The landlord testified on trial that he offered to
grant the tenant permission to install a television aerial on the roof if the
tenant would execute a lease increasing the present rental by fifteen per
cent. The court observed:
46 196 Misc. 513, 93 N.Y.S. 2d 854 (S.Ct., 1949). The antenna in the case was affixed
to the window frame by bolts and extended outwardly away from the building for a
distance of about a foot and a half. The window was located one flight up and directly
above the entrance to the building.
47 197 Misc. 30, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 20 (Mun. Ct., N.Y., 1950).
48 Ibid., at 21 (italics added).
49 Ibid. 50 114 N.Y.S. 2d 668 (S.Ct., 1952).
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The tenant has no legal right, without the landlord's permission, to erect or
attach a television aerial to the frame of a window in his apartment. .. . Equity is
properly invoked to enjoin a continued trespass. The defendant has refused to
remove the television aerial and threatens to continue its installation and use. Un-
der such circumstances the plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief enjoining the
defendant from the continued maintenance and use of such aerial television.51
Of course, where a lease provided that "no plants, rugs, bedding or
anything of any nature whatsoever shall be placed in the window or out
of the same," the court properly enjoined the tenant from maintaining, by
means of a metal bar braced against the window frame, a television an-
tenna projecting out of the window.
5 2
As to the right to erect an antenna on a roof, the uniform holding of
the cases is against the tenant. Kanon v. Hefgold Realty Corp. held that
where a television aerial erected by the tenant had been removed by the
landlord because of the absence of written consent as required by the
lease, the tenant could not have a temporary injunction restraining al-
leged interference with his peaceful enjoyment of the apartment because
to grant the motion would destroy the status quo and grant plaintiff all
the relief he could obtain by a final judgment. 53 In another roof antenna
case, the court required removal of a roof antenna erected by the tenant
of an apartment in a thirty-nine unit building. 54 The lease provided that
the tenant should not "drill into, drive nails.... or place in any manner any
sign, advertisement, illumination, or projection in or out of the windows
or exterior, or from the said building or upon it in anyplace," except as
approved by the landlord. 5 1 The court felt that there was damage to the
reversion by the affixing of eye screws holding the leading line from the
aerial.56
51 Ibid., at 669.
52 5701 15th Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenberg, 94 N.Y.S. 2d 560 (S.Ct., 1949).
53 194 Misc. 54,85 N.Y.S. 2d 581 (S.Ct., 1949).
54 Scroll Realty Corp. v. Mandell, 195 Misc. 972, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 813 (S.Ct., 1949).
55 Ibid., at 814.
56 The problem became so aggravated in New York, that, like so many other sources
of conflict in a large metropolitan area, it became a political football. Several bills re-
lating to antennas were introduced in the 1949 session of the state legislature. Some of
the bills were designed to guarantee every tenant the right to install and maintain an
antenna or equipment necessary for the operation of television sets and forbade addi-
tional charges for tenants who had television sets. A. Int. 755; S. Int. 100; S. Int. 1089.
Another group would have declared the installation, operation, and maintenance of
antennas or other apparatus an ordinary incident of the tenancy and sought to make it
a misdemeanor to make an additional rent charge. A. Int. 57; A. Int. 1260; S. Int. 1172.
None of the bills were reported out of committee and one observer called them "dema-
gogic."
In 1950, a bill was introduced in the State Assembly providing that: "Every agree-
ment in or in connection with or collateral to any lease of real property denying the
lessee the right to erect or maintain a radio or television aerial or antenna shall be
deemed void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable, provided that the lessee
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In so far as the courts hold that the tenant has no right to erect aerials
on the roof, they appear to be on solid ground. Although the lease of an
entire building includes the roof,57 and a lease of a portion of a building
entirely independent of other sections includes the roof,58 where there
is a common roof over premises occupied by several different tenants, the
portion of the roof covering the premises leased to one tenant is not in-
cluded in the lease.59 It has been said that tenants sharing a common roof
have no easements or rights in the roof except for purposes of shelter.60
As for considerations of policy, hear New Jersey Vice Chancellor
Jayne in holding that a tenant had the right to install a television set, but
not the right to erect a twenty-five foot antenna in the rear-yard to
which the lessee had the right to use in common with other tenants: 61
There are casual and incidental rights and interests which sometimes pass to
lessees by implication arising from reasonable needs, conventional uses, or from
other circumstances manifesting the probable intentions of the parties.
No one, I conjecture, has as yet prepared a written lease or contract so copious
and diffuse as to speak its entire piece.
And so, where the nature of the intended basic and principal use of the prem-
ises is made perceptible, the rights and privileges which habitually and custom-
arily appertain to and accompany such a use are implied, unless clearly negated.
To the trite expression that death and taxes are certain may also be added as of
equal certainty the changes of the customs of life. Must a lessee now find in his
lease the express permission to install a telephone?
Science has bequeathed to humanity the radio, the juke box, air-conditioning,
and the neon sign, all of which may more commonly and generally than else-
where be found at modem cafes, restaurants and places for recreation and enter-
tainment. Was it not evident in February last that television sets would be simi-
larly popular and prevalent in such resorts?
That the law should always be harmonious with the contemporaneous stand-
ards of knowledge and intelligence is a conviction I do not care to defy. Sound
law is the dictate of reason. Lex est dictamen rationis.
62
pays or offers to pay to the lessor any increase in insurance premiums resulting from
the installation of such aerial or antenna." A. Int. 16.
All of the proposed bills were assailed as ignoring property rights, increased insur-
ance costs, damage liability to passersby, fire hazards and matters of size regulation. But
they also indicated that the law, as well as nature, abhors a vacuum.
57 Robinson v. Armstrong, 154 Kan. 336, 118 P. 2d 503 (1941).
5sRayhertz Amusement Corp. v. Fulton Improvement Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 121, 200 At.
557 (1938).
59 Adler v. Sklaroff, 154 Pa. Super. 444, 36 A. 2d 231 (1944); Liberal Clothing Co. v.
Delson Realty Co., 121 W. Va. 721,6 S.E. 2d 236 (1939).
60 Smelser v. Deutsche Evangelische Lutherische Gemeinde der St. Markus Kirche,
88 Cal. App. 469, 263 Pac. 838 (1928).
61 Bellomo v. Bisanzio, 142 N.J. Eq. 363, 60 A. 2d 64 (1948).
62 Ibid., at 6.
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In addition to the problems of television antennas, the courts have re-
cently been called upon to decide just how far air-conditioners may
project into contiguous airspace. Two lower New York courts have
openly split on the question, not yet settled by the highest court in the
state. In the first case, the court dismissed an action to compel removal of
an air-conditioning unit projecting six inches beyond the window sill, no
part of which touched the outside of the building.63 The court said that the
principle underlying a squatter proceeding is that the alleged squatter is
unlawfully trespassing upon and remaining in possession of realty. "The
air-conditioning unit in the instant proceeding," the court noted, "has its
physical origin and attachment on the demised premises and is incidental
to the tenant's enjoyment of those premises, and is, therefore, distinguish-
able from the television antenna cases." 64 Three years later, another court
in the same state, in reversing a final order for the tenant, said simply:
The installation and maintenance by the tenant of an air-conditioning unit
projecting beyond the building wall is an intrusion or squatting upon the land-
lord's property within the purview of... the Civil Practice Act. In so far as Taft
Constr. Corp. v. Bachnoff65 is to the contrary, we must decline to follow it.66
The television antenna and air-conditioning unit cases presented the
courts with an excellent opportunity to define the rights of the tenant to
the area outside the tangible, physical boundaries of the premises. But, as
should be evident from the foregoing discussion, the problem has re-
ceived scant attention. This is in part due to the fact that counsel in most
of the cases have been content to argue the cases on other grounds, or
upon broader theories of landlord and tenant which appeared to meet the
exigencies of the varying situations. The courts likewise have been un-
willing to examine this problem, the solution of which might have rend-
ered more satisfactory results in some of the cases decided. Dudic Hold-
ing Co. v. Reinstein, a masterpiece of terseness and brevity, is typical of
the treatment accorded the problem.6 7
Even within the limits of the issues attempted to be settled, the tele-
vision cases are inconclusive. They hardly define the rights of tenants as
to erection of aerials. With the wall cases as a ready springboard, the
courts might have gone on to settle the problem. As they have not, it is
apparent that only by recurring to the bedrock of landlord and tenant
law can feasible solutions to the question be posited.
03 Taft Constr. Corp. v. Bachnoff, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 898 (Mun. Ct., N.Y., 1950); aff'd
116 N.Y.S. 2d 67 (S.Ct., 1951).
64 Ibid., at 899.
65 Ibid.
66 Dudic Holding Corp. v. Reinstein, 205 Misc. 42, 129 N.Y.S. 2d 401 (S.Ct., 1953).
67bid.
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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND GENERAL THEORIES
Textwriters, theorists and courts have been generous in their statement
of the tenant's rights. Most of the pronouncements have been so broad
that the rights, unless "limited by the neighborhood of principles of
policy," which are other than those upon which the particular rights are
founded, "tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme."' 8
Yet these general statements have value in that they indicate certain poli-
cies in the law which have become maximatic in statement, if not in ap-
plication from case to case.
Taylor declares that a tenant is entitled to the use of "all those privi-
leges, easements, and appurtenances in any way belonging to the premises
under lease, as incident to his grant," unless the landlord restricts the
rights by stipulation.6 9 In another passage in his treatise, he states:
In general, the grant of a thing passes the incident as well as the principal,
though the latter only is mentioned, unless there appears an express reservation.
Thus, the lease of a building passes everything belonging to it which is essential
to its enjoyment.
70
It could hardly be contended, it would seem, that a tenant could lease
an entire building and not have the right to extend into the column of
airspace surrounding the building, various mechanical or structural pro-
jections necessary for the reasonable enjoyment and use of the building.
The conclusion, however, is not so readily drawn where the tenant leases
a relatively small space in a building, along with several other tenants.
Questions of practicality press the rule at every point, competing interests
forcing and compelling compromise at every turn.
71
However, Taylor's statement of the principle seems to be in accord-
ance with the common-law rule, stated by the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama in Senteney v. United Embroidery Co. 72 There, authority was cited
in the jurisdiction to the effect that lessees have by implication, the right
to "possess and enjoy" the premises and "to put it to such use and enjoy-
ment as they please," not materially different from that in which it is
usually employed, "to which it is adapted, and for which it was con-
structed."
7'
68 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holmes.
69 Taylor, Landlord and Tenant (9th ed.), 275.
70 Ibid., at 192.
71 In Adler v. Sklaroff, 154 Pa. Super. 444, 36 A. 2d 231, 233 (1944), the court states:
"[W]here a landlord leases different parts of a building to different tenants he remains
in control of those portions not specifically leased, and as to such portions he retains
the responsibilities of a general owner."
72 230 Ala. 53, 159 So. 252 (1935). 73 Ibid., at 255.
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In Weiland v. American Stores Co.,74 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, holding that a tenant was not liable for injuries due to a defec-
tive sidewalk, quoted with approval from a learned textwriter to the fol-
lowing effect:
The lease of a part of a building carries with it for the benefit of the tenant
everything which is necessarily used with or which is reasonably necessary to
the enjoyment of the particular portion which he occupies.... Under the gen-
eral rule that those rights essential to the enjoyment of the demised premises,
and necessary for the enjoyment thereof, pass as appurtenant thereto, the rights
of ingress and egress pass to the tenant even though they are not specifically
mentioned. 75
The California courts likewise have been liberal in their definitions of
tenant rights. In Bellon v. Silver Gate Theaters, a state appellate court,
holding that whether a basement was part of the demised premises where
a store above was leased to the tenant was a question of fact for the jury,
said that a lease of a part of a building passes with it everything "neces-
sarily used with or reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the part
demised."
76
In Jackson v. Birgfeld, a Maryland court said that in determining what
constitutes the premises, the court, after considering the language of the
instrument itself, considers the nature of the building and surrounding
property and the general purposes of the parties. 77 The court regarded
as settled that a deed, absent qualifications, passes to the grantee every-
thing reasonably necessary to the full beneficial use and enjoyment of the
property. "This principle," the court declared, "is equally applicable to
a lease."
78
Similar considerations as to reasonable use and enjoyment have been
involved in construing the word "appurtenance." In an Illinois decision,
the court held that a lease of rooms on the third floor of a building could
by no reasonable interpretation include as an appurtenance a storage
74 346 Pa. 253, 29 A. 2d 484 (1943).
75 Ibid., at 485. Trickett, Landlord and Tenant (2d ed.), 47, 48. In Martel v. Malone,
138 Conn. 385, 85 A. 2d 246, 249 (1951), citing language in Arpile v. Colonial Trust Co.,
118 Conn. 573, 579, 173 Atl. 237, 239 (1934), the court states: "'In the absence of an
agreement, expressed or implied, the tenant of an apartment acquires an exclusive right
of occupancy and control of that apartment, and as incidental thereto of those parts of
the structure which form an integral part of the tenement. 1 Underhill, Landlord and
Tenant § 3.'" The court held that the landlord was responsible only for structural de-
fects as the tenant has no exclusive control of them. Thus it was held that the landlord
would be liable for structural defects in beams supporting a floor but not for defects
in the floorboards.
764 Cal. 2d 1, 47 P. 2d 462, 467 (1935). See Owsley v. Hamner, 83 Cal. App. 2d 454,
189 P. 2d 50 (1948).
77 189 Md. 552, 56 A. 2d 793 (1948). 78 Ibid., at 795.
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space in the basement of the building, entirely apart from space desig-
nated in the lease itself.79 The court stated that nothing passes by the
word appurtenance except "incorporeal easements, or rights, or privileges,
strictly necessary and essential to the proper enjoyment of the estate
granted."' 0 Mere convenience, said the court, will not create an ease-
ment.
81
How courts balance some of the conflicting claims of right is amply
illustrated by O'wsley v. Hanmer.82 The central point of controversy
there was whether a lease signed prior to the completion of a building
constructed around a central patio, restricted the lessor from closing up
one of the street openings into the patio, converting it from a thorough-
fare between two streets into a narrow cul de sac. The net effect of the
conversion was to interfere with the light, air, visibility and access of
passersby to the tenant's display windows.
After paying the customary homage to the rule that a "lease of part of
a building passes with it, as an incident thereto, everything necessarily
used with or reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the part demised,183
the court reversed and ordered a new trial upon appeal by both parties,
holding that in view of the importance of the patio, the fact that there
was nothing in the lease as to the right of the landlord to close it off made
it mandatory that oral evidence offered to show the intention of the par-
ties be admitted. It was said that whether considered as an easement, or
consideration of a contract, or an incorporeal right, the lessee is en-
titled to "all of that for which he contracted" at the time the lease was
entered into. Thus the intent of the parties with regard to the patio be-
came all important.
84
It may be regarded as settled that a tenant may acquire a right to light
79 Harmony Cafeteria Co. v. International Supply Co., 249 II. App. 532 (1928).
80 Ibid.
81 The word "appurtenance" has undergone a process of deterioration as a concept
of importance. In Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N.H. 503, 508, 16 Am. Rep. 688 (1873), it is
said: "These distinctions are refined, and in the common practice of modem convey-
ancing are not much regarded,-the term appurtenances, in a vast majority of cases in
deeds and leases, having, in fact, I presume, no meaning whatever in the minds of the
contracting parties, who append the unnecessary formula by force of the custom and
example which has for so long a time applied it to grants and leases of a principal thing,
to which no inferior easement or servitude whatever, in fact, belongs."
82 83 Cal. App. 2d 454, 189 P. 2d 50 (1948).
88 Ibid., at 52.
84 The trial court in the instant case found that it was the manifest intention and
agreement of the lessor and lessee that the lessee should have occupancy of the interior
areas described in the lease (the patio) and the right to have it kept open for free access
by the lessee's customers. Curiously enough, however, the trial court concluded that
there was nothing in the lease which required the landlord to keep the building as it
was originally constructed.
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and air from an open space owned by the lessor which is necessary to the
beneficial enjoyment of the premises demised, even though there be no
express agreement to that effect between lessor and lessee.
Some of the cases, even at an early time, have said that a lease, express-
ing nothing as to the way in which premises are to be used, clothes the
lessee with full power and right to use the land in the same manner that
the owner might have used it, subject to the usual qualification as to dam-
age to the reversion. The cases are legion as to this point.8 5 Courts have
continually held that the lessee stands in the position of an owner in fee
with regards to rights of use,8 6 except that the lessee may not commit
waste, and thus where the lessor draws the lease, ambiguities will be
drawn against him most stringently. 7 The Draconian possibilities of such
a doctrine are plain, yet the courts have not, as a statement of principle,
seen fit to narrow it. Treating the lessee as the owner of a possessory es-
tate, the courts have continually said that the lessor may be sued in tres-
pass for unlawful entry,88 or in ejectment where the tenant has been
evicted, or possession has not been delivered to the lessee.8 9
In short, the holding of the courts has been that while the lease is in
force, the tenant is the absolute owner of the premises and the landlord
has only a reversionary interest. Textwriters have assented in this proposi-
tion, Taylor stating:
Upon taking possession the tenant is invested with all the rights incident to
possession and to the use of all the privileges and easements appurtenant to the
tenement. He may maintain an action against any person who disturbs his pos-
session or trespasses upon the premises though it be the landlord himself .... 90
Under the existing principles of landlord and tenant, it would be cau-
tious in the extreme to declare that a tenant's rights do not extend beyond
the exterior of the wall bounding the premises, where an extension would
be necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the premises. Of course, there
are competing claims of right where there are several tenants, as in an
office or apartment building, but this would seem to call for a balancing
of the rights as between the tenants, instead of a restriction of the tenants
rights vis-d-vis the landlord. In view of the fact that the language of the
85 U.S. v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 (1877); Asling v. McAllister-Fitzgerald Lumber Co.,
120 Kan. 455, 244 Pac. 16 (1926).
s 6Columbia R. Gas & E. Co. v. Jones, 119 S.C. 480, 112 S.E. 267 (1922); Stern v.
Sawyer, 78 Vt. 5, 61 Ad. 36 (1905).
87 Grassham v. Robertson, 277 Ky. 605, 126 S.W. 2d 1063 (1939); Carbon Fuel Co. v.
Gregory, 131 W. Va. 494, 48 S.E. 2d 338 (1948).
88 Stanton v. Tapp., 113 Md. 324, 77 Ad. 672 (1910); Winchester v. O'Brien, 266 Mass.
33, 164 N.E. 807 (1929).
89 Walker v. Clifford, 128 Ala. 67, 29 So. 588 (1900).
9o Taylor, Landlord and Tenant (9th ed.), 228.
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courts has been anything but restrictive of tenant's rights, it becomes diffi-
cult to reconcile the holdings in the New York television antenna cases
with the principles enunciated in other decisions.
Because of the intangible nature of rights to airspace, the theorist treads
on thin ground in attempting to define spatial limitations that may, in some
instances, defy limitation, or be inherently incapable of precise delinea-
tion.91 However, there is some degree of comfort in Whitehead's re-
mark that success in practice depends on "theorists who, led by other
motives of exploration, have been there before, and by some good chance
have hit upon the relevant ideas."
'92
CONTIGUOUS LAND, CONTIGUOUS AIRSPACE
While an examination of so-called settled concepts provides an indica-
tion as to the path the courts may follow, there is one rule that, if ap-
plied by analogy, lends great weight to the tenant's right to reasonable use
of the airspace outside the walls of the premises demised.
That rule is that a lease of an entire building, or the grant in fee of a
building, carries with it "so much of the lot on which the building stands
as is necessary to the complete enjoyment of the building for the purpose
for which it was leased. 903 If this principle applies to the lease of an entire
building, why not to the lease of an entire floor, and if to the lease of an
entire floor, why not to a lease of an apartment or room? As the lot sur-
rounding the building may be necessary to its complete enjoyment, simi-
larly, the column of airspace surrounding it may be indispensable to rea-
sonable and full use of the demised premises.
In McDaniel v. Willer, a recent case, there was a lease of a "General
Merchandise store Building and Fixtures therein-The Store building is
located in Village of Coffman, County of Ste. Genevieve, State of
Mo .... -94 The controversy was over admissibility of evidence tending to
show that the parties by their actual agreement, had not intended to limit
the property demised to the store building itself as appeared on the face of
the lease, but on the contrary had intended and agreed that the leasehold
91 Note, for instance, the difficulty courts have had in reconciling the maxim, Cujus
est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, Shep. Touch. 90, with the right of free navigation
of the skies. U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), is a relatively recent and controversial
decision in this regard.
92 Whitehead, The Aims of Education (Mentor ed., 1952), 107.
93 Jackson v. Birgfeld, 189 Md. 552, 56 A. 2d 793, 795 (1948). Whether land in the
rear of a building is necessary to its complete enjoyment is a question for the jury de-
pending upon the facts of the case, the court ruled. Note Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall. 177,
17 L.ed. 822, 826 (1865), where it is said that a deed, in the absence of any language indi-
cating a contrary intention of the grantor, passes to the grantee everything that is prop-
erly appurtenant to the land conveyed, i.e., everything essential or reasonably necessary
to the full beneficial use and enjoyment of the property.
94 216 S.W. 2d 144 (Mo. App., 1948).
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estate should embrace land immediately to the rear of the store upon
which was situated an old barn, previously used for storage by the last
proprietor of the store. Holding that the lease was ambiguous and that
parol evidence was admissable to clear up the ambiguities, the court said:
The authorities are agreed that where, as in this instance, a lease purports on
its face to be no more than the lease of an entire building, and contains no refer-
ence to the land, it will be none the less construed as carrying with it the
lease, not only the land upon which the building actually stands, but also such
adjacent land belonging to the lessor as may be used with the building or may
be necessary to its proper occupation for the purpose for which it was intended.95
The court labeled as "arbitrary" an attempt by the landlord to restrict
the leasehold estate to the lot on which the building was situated where
the language of the lease "would comprehend whatever of his land might
be shown to be incident to the complete enjoyment of the building."9 6
In view of the law's generosity with the landlord's land, why should it
be less liberal with his airspace? An Illinois decision held that "[u]nder the
recognized rules of construction, where property is leased by street num-
ber, the lease will include ... the lot upon which the building itself is situ-
ated. '97 In the Massachusetts case of Ansin v. Taylor, it was held that or-
dinarily a grant of a house carries with it title to all the land under the
house, including that under projecting eaves. 9s In Patterson v. Graham,
it was held that where a lease does not in terms convey any right to a pas-
sageway to buildings in the rear of that leased, or any right to such build-
ings in the rear, the lease conveys so much of the lot on which the build-
ings stand as may be necessary to the complete enjoyment of the leased
building for the purpose for which it is rented. 99
The Illinois Supreme court has said in an early case that the grant of a
steam elevator carries with it, as part of the grant, land upon which the
elevator is located and all that is necessarily used in connection there-
with.10 The court cited Tinker v. City of Rockford' 1' as authority for
the proposition that when property is granted, whatever is necessary to
the enjoyment of the grant is impliedly conveyed as an incident thereto.
Thus, even though the mortgage conveying the elevator was upon a chat-
tel mortgage form, it was held that the land on which the elevator was sit-
95 Ibid., at 144. 96 Ibid.
97 Killian v. Welfare Engineering Co., 328 Il1. App. 375, 387, 66 N.E. 2d 305, 311
(1946). Even where the deed conveyed the "building situated on lot number _," it
was held that the deed passed ten adjoining feet of another lot also occupied by the
building. Wilson v. Hunter, 14 Wisc. 744,80 Am. Dec. 795 (1861). Cf. Gibson v. Brock-
way, 8 N.H. 465, 31 Am. Dec. 200 (1837); Dikeman v. Taylor, 24 Conn. 219 (1855).
98262 Mass. 159, 159 N.E. 513 (1928).
99 140 111. 531, 30 N.E. 460 (1892).
100 Cross v. Weare Commission Co., 153 I11. 499, 38 N.E. 1038 (1894),
101 137 11. 123, 28 N.E. 573 (1894).
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uated passed with the grant of the elevator. Likewise, the Alabama court
of last resort has held that a mortgage on a grist and saw mill and gin,
"together with all the privileges and appurtenances belonging thereto,"
included two acres of land upon which the mill and gin were located, and
which had always been used in connection therewith and were thus "ne-
cessary to the enjoyment thereof.' 10
2
Finally, to adduce one extreme example, perhaps looking the other way
as far as tenant's rights are concerned, there is the Leiferman v. Ostein
case.'0 3 There, the landlord actually moved the building in which the
tenant had rented a floor, to an adjoining lot. The court ruled that the
tenant could have treated the removal as an eviction only by leaving, but
that since he remained, there was no eviction. The court said that by rent-
ing part of a building, the tenant acquired only support rights and enjoy-
ment of easements, but no estate in the land itself. Therefore, the tenant
was only disturbed in the enjoyment of an easement, the court reasoned.
This could constitute eviction only if treated as such by going out. Judg-
ment for the landlord in the action of forcible entry and detainer was sus-
tained. It is enough to say that the case is restrictive of the tenant's rights
and is productive of a result more in keeping with the refinements of evic-
tion law than with the underlying principles of landlord and tenant.
Nevertheless, it is settled that a lease of a building passes the land upon
which the building stands for the duration of the lease, and in some cases
may pass land contiguous or incident thereto necessary to the ordinary use
and enjoyment of such building. It would, then, be obviously inconsistent
to deny the lessee of an entire building necessary adjacent airspace, and
yet grant him necessary adjacent land. And there are no cases so holding.
Whether or not a lessee of a floor of a building, or of a room, has the
right to make use of adjacent airspace necessary for the full enjoyment
of the floor or room is not so obvious. However, consistency would re-
quire that such right be recognized.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Justice Holmes has pointed out that in law, only occasionally can
an "absolutely final and quantitative determination" be reached, because
as he says, "the worth of the competing social ends which respectively
elicit a judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant cannot be reduced to
number and accurately fixed.'
10 4
There are few places in the law where his observation has greater valid-
ity than in assessing the rights of tenants in relation to other tenants and
10 2 Kimbrell v. Rogers, 90 Ala. 339, 7 So. 241 (1890). Accord: Rogers v. Snow, 118
Mass. 118 (1875); Trinity Church v. Boston, 118 Mass. 164 (1875).
103 64 Ill. App. 578, 47 N.E. 203 (1896).
104 Law in Science and Science in Law, Collected Legal Papers, 231 (1921).
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in relation to the rights of the landlord. No doubt many of the decisions
in the future in this regard will be "the unconscious result of instinctive
preferences and inarticulate convictions ... traceable to views of public
policy in the last analysis."'10 5
Yet is is possible to draw certain tentative conclusions. The courts have
early and consistently held that the circle of the tenant's rights is great in
circumference. They have not hesitated in giving him something like un-
bridled dominion over the exterior of the walls. Where an entire building
has been leased, they have held that the lessee also takes by the lease ne-
cessary contiguous land. It is then but a short step to hold that the lessee
of a floor, or of a room, has not only possession of the exterior of the
walls, but also possession and the right to use adjacent airspace essential
to the enjoyment of the lease.
But admittedly, the law here, as elsewhere, is unsettled, indeed unde-
cided. Additional decisions will be needed to more fully clarify the rights
of both landlords and tenants as technological advances continue to create
new difficulties for lawyers and laymen alike. There is, then, reassurance
in the words of Cardozo:
There are topics where the law is still uninformed and void. Some hint or pre-
monition of coming shapes and moulds, it betrays amid the flux, yet it is so
amorphous, so indeterminate, that formulation, if attempted would be the proph-
ecy of what is to be rather than the statement of what is .... [Wlith all our
centuries of common law development, with all our multitudinous decisions,
there are so many questions, elementary in the sense of being primary and basic,
that remain unsettled even now.... What is certain is that the gaps in the system
will be filled, and filled with ever-growing consciousness of the process by a
balancing of social interests, an estimate of social values, a reading of the social
mind.106
105 Ibid. 106 Paradoxes of Legal Science, 76 (1928).
COMMENTING UPON FAILURE OF ACCUSED
TO TESTIFY
At common law, the defendant was incompetent to testify in a criminal
proceeding." As a result of such incompetency, comment by the prosecu-
tion concerning the failure of the accused to testify was of no importance.
Historically, therefore, the problem of whether the prosecution can ef-
fectively comment upon the failure of the accused to take the witness
stand was created by the enactment of the statutes which relieved the ac-
cused of his incapacity to testify.
2
Some of these statutes contained express clauses that no presumption
12 Wigmore, Evidence S 579 (3d ed., 1940).
2 State v. Ferguson, 222 Iowa 1148, 283 N.W. 917 (1939). For a list of the statutory
enactments, see Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of Accused to Testify, 31 Mich. L.
Rev. 40, 41, 42 (1932).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
shall arise from the failure of the accused to testify, whereas others pro-
vided that his silence shall not be subject to comment.3 If all the statutes
contained words of similar import, comment by prosecution would have
been conclusively prohibited. But some states, whether by design or in-
advertence, failed to provide against any comment by the prosecution
and, as a result of such omissions, seven states now allow comment.
4
There is a strong possibility that more jurisdictions will adopt laws al-
lowing the prosecution to comment upon the failure of the accused to
testify. In view of this possibility, an examination of the doctrine as well
as its impact on the furtherance of justice is in order.
I. WHAT IS COMMENT?
The test laid down by the federal courts on what is or is not comment
is "whether the language used is manifestly intended to be, or is of such
character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be com-
ment on accused's failure to testify." 5 In applying the rule the courts have
said that a general comment such as, "certain evidence was uncontra-
dicted" is not objectionable, but that a strong, emphatic, and specific re-
mark directed toward the defendant's failure to testify is objectionable
and reversible error. Generally, the state courts seem to be in harmony
with the federal courts as to what constitutes comment. Pennsylvania has
said, "the statute does not prohibit a mere reference to the fact that a de-
fendant has not taken the witness stand; the prohibition is against adverse
comments on the part of the court or prosecutor."6 The majority of the
courts which do not allow comment appear to use the following criterion:
Under statutes expressly prohibiting comment on the failure of the ac-
cused to testify, and under those providing that his failure to become a
witness in his own behalf shall create no presumption against him, and
under other statutes of similar import, it is generally held that it is imi-
proper and prejudicial for the prosecuting attorney, in the course of the
3 Evidence-Comment on a Defendant's Failure to Testify in a Criminal Proceeding,
28 N.Y.U.L.R. 1049 (1953).
4 Iowa and New Jersey, by judicial approbation, absent a constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination: State v. Stennett, 220 Ia. 388, 260 N.V. 732 (1935); Parker v.
State, 61 N.J.L. 308, 39 Atl. 651 (1898). California and Ohio by constitutional amend-
ment: Cal. Const. Art. 1, § 13; Cal. Pen. Code § 1093 (6), 1127, 1323, 1439; Ohio Const.
Art. 1, § 10, amended Sept. 3, 1912; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 13444(3). Vermont and
New Mexico by statute in spite of a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination:
Vt. Pub. Laws S 2383 (1933), amended by Vt. Laws 1935, No. 52; N.M. 1953 Comp.
§ 41-12-19. Connecticut, by judicial decision in the face of a constitutional privilege:
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6480 (1930) interpreted in State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 146 Ad. 828
(1929).
5 Morrison v. United States, 6 F. 2d 809, 810 (1925).
6 Commonwealth v. Schuster, 158 Pa. Super. 164, 167, 44 A. 2d 303, 306 (1945).
Accord: Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 106 A. 2d 820 (1954).
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trial, to comment on or to make any reference to the fact that the ac-
cused did not testify as a witness in his own behalf. 7 Oklahoma, which
follows the above rule, has said:
It is immaterial what words are used in such circumstances, if they are clearly
calculated to direct the attention of the jury to the fact that a defendant has not
testified in his own behalf, that he might have done so, and that by such failure
some inference might be indulged against him.8
A Mississippi court simply said, "the attention of the jury is not to be
called to the fact that defendant did not testify."9
II. WHEN THE INFERENCE IMtAY BE DRAWN
Having generally determined the definitive meaning of "comment" in
the jurisdictions which do not recognize such a mode of procedure, it
follows that it should be ascertained when such comment is allowed in the
jurisdictions that do recognize such procedure. Even though comment is
allowed in the latter jurisdictions, there are certain specific restrictions as
to its propriety.
In determining at what stage in the proceedings the inference of de-
fendant's failure to testify may be properly drawn, a Connecticut court
declared:
The question immediately arises as to how much evidence the state must pro-
duce before the trier is permitted to apply the inference. Obviously the state
must first produce some evidence of guilt. The state must produce a case where
the evidence, apart from the inference, would be sufficient to go to a jury....
If the state has supported its burden of proof, then the jury, may throw its infer-
ence arising from the failure of the accused to testify in his own defense into the
scale to determine the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. 10
A 1953 New Jersey decision held that if the evidence is only prejudicial
to the defendant and perhaps not inculpative in some degree of guilt, then
silence on his part does not justify a comment by the state." Consequently,
it must necessarily be concluded that in order for the inference to be
drawn: 1) the state must prove a prima facie case and 2) there must be
facts in evidence concerning the acts of the defendant which facts can be
denied by defendant and if not denied will be inculpative in some degree
of guilt.
California, another state which allows comment, takes a somewhat
7 84 A.L.R. 784.
8 Perkins v. Territory, 17 Okla. 82, 87 Pac. 297 (1906). Accord: Presnell v. State, 71
Okla. 158, 109 P. 2d 836 (1941).
9 Gurley v. State, 101 Miss. 190, 57 So. 565 (1911). Accord: Lambert v. State, 199
Miss. 790, 25 So. 2d 477 (1946).
10 State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 484, 29 A. 2d 582, 583 (1942).
11 State v. Christy, 26 N.J. Super. 459, 98 A. 2d 118 (1953).
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broader viewpoint on when such inference is permissible. In People v.
Greenberg12 the California Court of Appeals said that it is the failure
of the defendant to explain or deny evidence of facts against him, when
it appears that he could do so, if innocent, not his mere failure to take the
witness stand, which may be commented upon and taken into considera-
tion.
III. LEGAL EFFECT
In jurisdictions that recognize the defendant's failure to testify as being
adverse to his case, the weight given to that evidence seems to vary
depending upon the state. Connecticut, for example, has repeatedly held
that from the fact that the accused has either neglected or refused to
testify, the jury may draw any inference as to his guilt which is reason-
able under the circumstances.'3 The state of California appears to go
further in emphasizing the failure of the accused to testify. In the famous
case of People v. Adamson14 the California court noted, "if it appears that
the defendant could reasonably be expected to explain or deny evidence
presented against him, the j6ry may consider his failure to do so as tend-
ing to indicate the truth of such evidence, and, as indicating that among
the inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, those unfavor-
able to the defendant are the more probable." Ohio looks upon such fail-
ure to testify as tilting the scale of evidence against the accused. As was
mentioned in State v. Cott," "the failure of the defendant to testify was
therefore effective in supplying any deficiency in degree of the evidence
and with the evidence tended to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt." The legal effect of failing to testify is apparently
given the strongest emphasis in New Jersey. In State v. Marinella, the
New Jersey court observed:
His [defendant's] failure to be a witness in his own behalf is no presumption of
guilt, and does not erase the presumption of innocence, but if facts are testified to
which concern the acts of that particular defendant which he could by his own
oath deny, his failure to testify in his o'wn behalf raises a strong presumption that
be could not truthfully deny those facts.16
Thus, whereas California, under the same circumstances, would hold that
defendant's failure to testify would tend to indicate the truth of certain
evidence, New Jersey holds that a strong presumption of the validity of
such evidence (evidence which he could deny) is raised. It may be con-
1273 Cal. App. 2d 675, 167 P. 2d 214 (1946).
Is State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 18 A. 2d 895 (1941).
14 27 Cal. 2d 478, 165 P. 2d 3, 10 (1946).
15 58 Ohio App. 439, 16 N.E. 2d 788 (1937).
1624 N.J. Super. 49, 93 A. 2d 620, 621 (1952) (italics added).
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cluded, therefore, that the probative legal effect of the defendant's failure
to testify varies in degree depending upon the jurisdiction.
In jurisdictions where comment is not allowed, the misconduct of a
prosecuting attorney in commenting on the defendant's failure to testify
does not result in a miscarriage of justice warranting a reversal, when the
evidence of the defendant's guilt is otherwise clearly established.' 7 How-
ever, where the defendant is not clearly guilty, there is a split of authority
on whether such comment constitutes reversible error. The majority of
these jurisdictions hold that comments of the prosecuting attorney on the
failure of the defendant to testify in a criminal case, though highly im-
proper, may under some circumstances work no injury, where the trial
judge promptly intervenes, excluding the comments and admonishing the
jury to disregard them. In other words, comments of that kind stand on
very much the same footing as other improper arguments, and whether
they call for a reversal or not depends on whether, after a full considera-
tion of all the circumstances, including the action of the trial judge at the
time they were made, the appellate court is of the opinion that no prej-
udice resulted.' 8 However, a minority of the courts hold that remarks by
prosecuting officers, as to the failure of the accused to testify, made in
violation of statute, are so prejudicial that they cannot be cured by in-
struction to the jury, however forcibly given.19
IV. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF COMMENT
1. An inference from the refusal to testify is inevitable; therefore why
try futilely to avoid it?
This line of argument was best expressed in State v. Cleaves, wherein
the court observed:
But the defendant having the opportunity to contradict or explain the incul-
pative facts proved against him may decline to avail himself of the opportunity
thus afforded by the law. His declining to avail himself of the privilege of testi-
fying is an existent and obvious fact. It is a fact patent in the case. The jury
cannot avoid perceiving it. Why should they not regard it as a fact of more or
less weight in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused? All the analo-
gies of the law are in favor of their regarding this as an evidentiary fact....
When the prisoner is on trial, and the evidence offered by the government
tends to establish his guilt, and he declines to contradict or explain the inculpa-
tory facts which have been proved against him, is not that a fact ominous of
criminality? ... The silence of the accused,-the omission to explain or contra-
dict, when the evidence tends to establish guilt is a fact,-the probative effect of
which may vary according to the varying conditions of the different trials in
17E.g., People v. Curran, 207 Mll. App. 264 (1917) aff'd 286 I1. 302, 121 N.E. 637
(1918).
18 E.g., Commonwealth v. Festo, 251 Mass. 275, 146 N.E. 700 (1925).
19 Angelo v. People, 96 I1. 209, 36 Am. Rep. 132 (1880).
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which it may occur,-which the jury must perceive, and which perceiving they
can no more disregard than one can the light of the sun when shining with full
blaze on the open eye.
20
2. An innocent defendant cannot have any reason for refusing to testify.
The Attorney General of Ohio in a speech subsequent to the passing of
Ohio's constitutional amendment21 which allowed comment had this to
say to the argument that an innocent defendant would not wish to be sub-
jected to cross-examination:
Of course it is a well known fact that certain matters that probably could not
be brought out in the trial, in any other way, are possible of disclosure by reason
of the defendant taking the stand.
But why should that not be true? Why should courts exist, and why should
there be criminal prosecution? Is it for the purpose of protecting criminals? Is it
for the purpose of handicapping the state in its efforts to bring about a full dis-
closure of all the facts attendant upon a crime committed, or alleged to have been
committed by the accused.... There are many provisions throughout the coun-
try that make it very difficult for prosecuting attorneys to conduct cases for the
best interests of the state.
22
As an illustration of the contrast between an innocent and a guilty de-
fendant's desire to take the witness stand, it has been said that:
The defendant, in criminal cases, is either innocent or guilty. If innocent, he
has every inducement to state the facts, which would exonerate him. The truth
would be his protection. There can be no reason why he should withhold it, and
every reason for its utterance.
Being guilty, if a witness, a statement of the truth would lead to his convic-
tion, and justice would ensue. Being guilty, and denying his guilt as a witness, an
additional crime would be committed, and the peril of a conviction for a new
offense incurred.
23
3. There is no actual compulsion to testify; for the accused has an op-
tion, and the exercise of this option, by choosing silence, is therefore a
voluntary act of his own.
The statement that there is no actual compulsion to testify is the target
which receives the majority of the attacks by the opponents of comment.
Nevertheless, the advocates of comment steadfastly deny that the consti-
tutional privilege against self-incrimination is vitiated. In State v. Ford,
where the defendant objected to comment by the prosecuting attorney
on the grounds that his privilege against self-incrimination had been vio-
lated, Justice Banks proclaimed:
The constitutional privilege goes no further historically or logically than to
prevent the employment of legal process to compel an accused to incriminate
20 59 Me. 298, 300, 8 Am. Rep. 424 (1871). 21 Ohio Const. Art. 1, § 10.
22 Journal of American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 13, p. 294.
23 State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298, 301, 8 Am. Rep. 425 (1871).
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himself by what he may say upon the witness stand. He cannot be compelled to
testify against his will. The privilege of refraining from testifying, if he so elect,
does not protect him from any unfavorable inference which may be drawn by
his triers from his exercise of the privilege .... There is no actual compulsion
upon the accused to testify, and, when he elects not to do so, he is obviously not
being compelled to give evidence against himself.
2 4
In further support of the concept that comment does not abridge the
privilege against self-incrimination Andrew A. Bruce wrote:
Never, at any time, could the defendant be compelled to testify against him-
self, and we believe that it was only against direct compulsion that the constitu-
tional provision was aimed. He is not asked to testify against himself, but in
favor of himself. All that was in the minds of the framers of the constitutional
provisions was the desire to prevent injustice and direct compulsion.2 5
4. In the jurisdictions where comment is permitted, it has achieved most
satisfactory results.
The American Bar Association Committee in 1938 made a study of the
jurisdictions where comment was permitted and the results of that study
were that 93.65 per cent of the judges regarded comment as an important
and proper aid in the administration of justice, while only 2.65 per cent
considered it definitely unfair to the accused (the others listing it as rela-
tively unimportant). Over 85 per cent said that it seldom if ever causes
the prosecuting attorney to be less diligent in his search for evidence of
guilt.
26
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMMENT
1. Comment is unjust when it results in the situation where the de-
fendant must choose between being subjected to a cross-examination of
past offenses and remaining tacit.
The advocates of comment claim that an innocent defendant cannot
have any reason for refusing to testify, in spite of the fact that in many
states if the accused takes the stand he may be subjected to a cross-ex-
amination which is not limited to the offense for which he is then on
trial. 27 It is not without logic that a defendant, whether because of pre-
vious misconduct or his own personality, may deem it advantageous to
refrain from testifying.2s Yet, if the prosecution can comment on his reti-
24 109 Conn. 490, 146 At. 828, 830 (1929).
25 Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failure of the Defendant To Testify, 31 Mich.
L. Rev. 226,233 (1932).
26 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2272a (3d ed., 1940).
27 For a list of those states, see Reeder, Comment upon Failure of Accused To Testify,
31 Mich. L. Rev. 40, 56 at note 78 (1932).
28 Authority cited note 22 supra. At p. 293 it was said, "Now, on the question of the
defendant taking the stand, one of the strongest arguments that is urged against the right
of the prosecutor to comment rises out of this fact: that many people, innocent or guilty,
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cence, the defendant is placed in not only an awkward but, moreover, a
somewhat unfair position.29 Assuming such a defendant is actually inno-
cent but remains tacit on these grounds, the effect of the prosecutor's
comment is, nevertheless, accepted as evidence adverse to the defendant's
cause. The counter argument that prior acts are not evidence against
the present indictment and that personality quirks can actually work to
the defendant's advantage if he were to testify does not seem to out-
weigh the greater justice that would ensue if defendant were to exercise
his constitutional privilege of not testifying. Consequently, on the one
hand, there is the ideal of searching for the truth by indirectly coercing
the accused to take the witness stand out of fear of damaging comment by
prosecution, and on the other hand, there is the ideal of protecting the ac-
cused from any possible cross-examination of prior offenses. There are
reasons to seek out the truth. There are also reasons to protect the accused
in the obtainment of the truth. The ultimate question that must be resolved
is, does allowing comment so benefit the State as to overcome any injury
to the defendant caused by comment so that substantial justice is achieved?
2. Right of comment would cause prosecutors to become less diligent.
A general practice of allowing comment might tend to bring about the
very evils which the privilege (against self-incrimination) is intended to
prevent, namely, the reliance by the prosecution, for the means of proof,
upon the confessions in court of the accused himself or upon the infer-
ences of guilt which could be drawn from his silence. As a result, there
is a consequent slack and imperfect investigation of other sources of
proof.80
Speaking on the possible evils involved if the prosecution would be al-
lowed to comment, Hugo Pam of the Superior Court of Cook County said:
The point I wanted to make is this: the reason I think such an amendment to
the constitution is dangerous is because of the over-zealous prosecutor. If all
the prosecutors were intellectually honest and weighed questions judicially, I
don't think there would be any danger from them. But we know that prose-
cutors are not all thus, and we know that many prosecutors would take ad-
vantage of such a law, and with very little evidence of guilt would spend an
hour commenting on the fact that the defendant didn't testify, make a great
speech about it and build up a beautiful argument, which would very likely
mislead the jury. In other words, it seems to me, it is wholly immaterial. The
jury knows he didn't testify; the jury makes the argument itself; somebody on
the jury is going to do the arguing when they get into the jury room; and the
state can point out that the evidence has not been disputed.... Possibly it hasn't
caused any great harm, but the opportunities to cause harm are great; it seems
when called to the witness stand are timid, and do not present the best side of their
character."
29 Comment on Defendant's Failure To Take the Stand, 57 Yale L.J. 145 (1947).
ao Authority cited note 26 supra.
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to me they outweigh all the advantages we might get from such a law or such
an amendment.81
3. The effect of comment is in violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination.
The United States Supreme Court has declared that comment does not
violate due process, but has not passed on the specific question whether
comment violates the self-incrimination provision, although in Adamson
v. California the Supreme Court has indicated that the self-incrimination
provision would not be affected.8
2
Since 1936, there have been three important decisions pertaining to the
constitutionality of comment in the face of a provision against self-in-
crimination.
In 1936, the South Dakota Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
statute allowing comment because of a constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination.3 3 Two years later a similar decision was handed down
in Massachusetts, where the court said:
The protection of the Constitution is that no subject shall be ... compelled
to furnish evidence against himself. That shield is positive and unequivocal. It is
subject to no condition.... The proposed bill is not positive and unequivocal.
. .. That which was before certain, clear, and indubitable has become contingent,
clouded, and ambiguous. Positive rights secured to individuals by the Constitu-
tion cannot be thus circumscribed and rendered doubtful. 4
The third important decision was handed down in 1951 by a Louisiana
court wherein it was held:
After a careful and exhaustive study of all the arguments pro and con by
eminent legal scholars and logicians, we are convinced that the better rule pre-
31 Authority cited note 22 supra at page 297.
3 2 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1946), which reaffirmed the Twining v. New
Jersey case, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), and the Palko v. Connecticut case, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
In answering the question whether comment violates due process, the court said at
page 50, "Assuming comment violates the provisions against self-incrimination, there is
still no violation of the due process clause, because the fifth amendment is not made
effective against state action by the fourteenth amendment.'
The court noted that however sound may be the legislative conclusion that an accused
should not be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, and it
saw no reason why comment should not be made upon his silence. On the same point,
Justice Murphy in his dissent, at page 124, remarked: "It is my belief that this guar-
antee against self-incrimination has been violated in this case.... Much can be said
pro and con as to the desirability of allowing comment on the failure of the accused to
testify. But policy arguments are to no avail in the face of a clear constitutional com-
mand. This guarantee of freedom from self-incrimination is grounded on a deep respect
for those who might prefer to remain silent before their accusers .... We are obliged
to give effect to the principle of freedom from self-incrimination. That principle is as
applicable where the compelled testimony is in the form of silence as where it is com-
posed of oral statements."
8 State v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178, 266 N.W. 116 (1936).
84 In re Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 620, 15 N.E. 2d 662 (1938).
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vails in this state, which is in accord with the majority view; that it is not only
sound, but that if such comment were to be permitted, it would, in effect, amount
to an infringement of the constitutional right of the accused to abstain from
taking the witness stand or to give testimony in the trial of his own cause....
We are fortified in this view by the fact that in those states where comment
obtains, experience has shown the defendant is, in fact, pressed to testify....
Allowing comment would indeed make the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination an idle gesture, for everyone accused of crime would be faced
with the dilemma of being forced to either take the stand in his own defense or
have an inference of guilt attach merely because he does not do so. s5
CONCLUSION
It would appear that all the arguments favoring the right of comment
may be distilled into one major proposition, viz., a greater amount of truth
will be obtained in criminal proceedings. This will occur because the pos-
sible effect of comment will cause more defendants to testify, and there-
fore direct evidence will be obtained for the court.
While it is true that the obtaining of direct evidence would aid in pro-
ducing a just result, the fact remains that such a desirable end tends to
reduce the effectiveness of the constitutional privilege against self-in-
crimination since the accused will usually testify out of fear of the prose-
cution's right to comment on his failure to testify.
Therefore, although the choice is technically a voluntary one on be-
half of the accused, in a real sense he is being forced to testify, which is
the exact right which the self-incrimination amendments are designed to
protect. The all-important question, then, is whether the increased obtain-
ment of direct evidence is a great enough benefit to pay for the cost of re-
ducing a constitutional right.
-95 State v. Bentley, 219 La. 893, 54 So. 2d 137, 141, 142 (1951).
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO POLL THE JURY
IN CRIMINAL CASES
Polling the jury-the practice whereby the jurors are asked individually
the findings they have reached, thus creating individual responsibility and
eliminating any uncertainty as to the verdict announced by the foreman'
-is designed to afford the members of the jury an opportunity for free
expression before the court, unhampered by the fears or the errors which
may have attended their private deliberations. 2 A survey of the extent to
which this right exists, if at all, comprises the subject matter of this com-
ment.
Little did Sir Matthew Hale realize, in writing his History of the Pleas
of the Crovm, the extent of the divergence subsequent judicial interpreta-
' State v. Cleveland, 6 N.J. 316, 78 A. 2d 560 (1951).
28 Wigmore on Evidence § 2355 (1940).
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tion was to accord his choice of but one word. In writing, "now touching
the giving up of their verdict, if the jury say they are agreed, the court
may examine them by poll, and if in truth they are not agreed, they are
finable," s he provided the foundation for threee separate and distinct
theories with regard to polling the jury upon the defendant's request,
namely, (I) no such right exists; (2) whether or not a poll will be granted
is solely within the discretion ofthe court; and (3) the defendant has an
absolute legal right to do so.
THEORIES
The rule adopted in three New England states declares that the de-
fendant has no right to poll the jury.4 In Commonwealth v Costley5 the
court said: "In Massachusetts, it has never been the right of a party, in
any case, civil or criminal, to have the jury polled." In State v Hoyt,6 in
affirming a refusal to grant the defendant's request for a poll of the jury,
the Connecticut court declared: "Such a right, under the law and practice
of this state, has never been recognized, and there are no considerations
of justice, expediency, or security to the prisoner, that require its adop-
tion instead of our present practice." Justification for this position is
found in the practice prevalent in these jurisdications whereby the entire
panel is asked whether or not they assent to the verdict, which purport-
edly is substantially equivalent to a poll of the jury.
7
Other jurisdictions, adopting a more literal interpretation of Hale's
choice of words, permit the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discre-
tion, to grant the defendant's request for a poll of the jury.8 Typically,
this result is reached without the aid of any statute, as illusrated by Ryan
v. People, wherein the court remarked:
We have no statute on this subject. The right, if any, which exists respecting
the poll of the jury is from the common law. That the right is absolute may be
well doubted. What little authority we have upon the subject rather points to the
fact that at common law the matter was in the discretion of the court and for it
to exercise if, for any reason, upon return of a verdict there appeared a doubt as
to its entire unanimity.9
3 2 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown (1st Am. ed., Stokes and Ingersall, 1847)
at 299 (italics added).
4 State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, 36 Am. Rep. 89 (1880); Commonwealth v. Costley, 118
Mass. 1 (1875); Fellow's Case, 5 Me. 333 (1828).
5 118 Mass. 1 (1875).
647 Conn. 518, 36 Am. Rep. 89 (1880).
7 Authorities cited note 4 supra.
8 State v. Grierson, 96 N.H. 36, 69 A. 2d 851 (1949); State v. Simon, 126 S.C. 437, 120
S.E. 230 (1923); State v. Sousa, 43 R.I. 176, 110 At. 603 (1920); Ryan v. People, 50 Colo.
99, 114 Pac. 306 (1911).
9 50 Colo. 99, 114 Pac. 306 (1911).
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Circumstances properly motivating the court to exercise its discretion so
as to grant the defendant's request for a poll of the jury have included
those where there exists some doubt as to the unanimity of the agree-
ment upon the verdict'0 or upon a showing of some other reason or justi-
fication for the polling."
The third view-which represents the great weight of authority among
the courts that have litigated the question-permits the defendant, irre-
spective of an statute, to demand as a matter of legal right a poll of the
jury after a guilty verdict. 2 This right is considered absolute in felony
cases,' 8 and has frequently been applied, and expressly declared applica-
ble, in misdemeanor cases as well;14 moreover, the defendant has this
right whether it be an oral or a sealed verdict.' 5 It should be noted, in
addition, that in those jurisdictions according the defendant an absolute
right to poll the jury, there is authority for granting a similar right to the
prosecution. 16
10 Ryan v. People, 50 Colo. 99, 114 Pac. 306 (1911).
11 State v. Wise, 41 S.C.L. 412 (7 Rich, 1854).
12 State v. Schmelz, 17 N.J. 227, 11 A. 2d 50 (1955); State v. Brooks, 59 N.M. 130, 279
P. 2d 1048 (1955); State v. Cephus, 241 N.C. 562, 86 S.E. 2d 70 (1955); Allen v. State,
260 Ala. 324, 70 So. 2d 644 (1954); Carver v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 2d 375 (Ky.,
1953); England v. State, 196 Tenn. 186, 264 S.W. 2d 815 (1953); State v. Thursby, 245
S.W. 2d 859 (Mo., 1952); Gilmore v. State, 229 Ind. 359, 98 N.E. 2d 677 (1951); State v.
Ritchie, 172 La. 942, 136 So. 11 (1931); Webb v. State, 166 Ga. 218, 142 S.E. 898 (1928);
Commonwealth v. Scovern, 292 Pa. 26, 140 AtI. 611 (1927); Watts v. Commonwealth,
129 Va. 781, 106 S.E. 339 (1921); Clemens v. State, 176 Wis. 289, 185 N.W. 209 (1921);
Roney v. United States, 43 App. D.C. 533 (1915); State v. Gorman, 113 Minn. 401, 129
N.W. 589 (1911); Wingfield v. State, 95 Ark. 71, 128 S.W. 562 (1910); Cable v. State,
38 So. 98 (Miss., 1905); Hommer v. State, 85 Md. 562, 37 Atl. 26 (1897); Summeralls v.
State, 37 Fla. 162, 20 So. 242 (1896); Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63, 9 Am. Rep. 78
(1871); Rose v. State, 20 Ohio 31 (1851); Harriman v. State, 2 Greene 270 (Ia., 1849);
People v. Perkins, 1 Wend. 91 (N.Y., 1928); Nomaque v. People, 1 111. 145 (1825), rev'd
on other grounds in People ex rel. Merrill v. Hazard, 361 Ill. 60, 196 N.E. 827 (1935).
13 Commonwealth v. Davis, 17 Pa. D. and C. 488 (1931).
14 Stewart v. State, 147 Ala. 137, 41 So. 631 (1906).
15 State v. Young. 77 N.C. 498 (1877), where the court said: "We think a defendant
on trial in a criminal case .... has the right to have the jury polled, whether it be oral
or a sealed verdict. He has no right to say in what manner it shall be done, nor to pro-
pound any question, but simply to know that the verdict given by the foreman is the
verdict of each juror, and we think it is error in the court to deny it when demanded."
Many jurisdictions, however, permit sealed verdicts in misdemeanor cases only; see, e.g.,
I11. Rev. Stat. (1929) c. 38, sec. 745, which declares: ".... [P]rovided, in cases of misde-
meanor only, if the prosecutor for the people and the person on trial, by himself or
counsel, shall agree, which agreement shall be entered upon the minutes of the court,
to dispense with attendance of an officer upon the jury, or that the jury when they
have agreed upon their verdict, may write and seal the same, and after delivering the
same to the clerk, may separate, it shall be lawful for the court to carry into effect any
such agreement and receive any such verdict so delivered to the clerk, as the lawful
verdict of such jury."
1' Feddern v. State, 79 Neb. 641, 113 N.W. 127 (1907); Cowart v. State, 147 Ala. 137,
41 So.631 (1906).
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Illinois, assuming continued adherence to a remarkably uncontroversial
1825 decision in Nomaque v. People,1" must be included among those
jurisdiction that regard the defendant's right to poll the jury an inviolate
one. In holding that a prisoner has the right to have the jury present in
court when they deliver their verdict in order that they may be polled, the
court relied on prior civil cases, justifying its holding on the theory that
it certainly was of no less importance to grant a similar right to a de-
fendant in a criminal case. This theoretical justification is difficult to un-
dermine; in addition, this position presents no cumbersome procedural
problems regarding a poll of the jury so as to require revision-conse-
quently, an abrupt change in attitude seems highly unlikely.
To dispel any confusion which may exist in their courts, and to pro-
mulgate an affirmative policy, many jurisdictions have enacted legislation
regarding the defendant's right to poll the jury; 8 typically, they permit
the jury to be polled at the instance of either party,'9 which right is re-
garded as a substantial one and an integral part of trial by jury.
20
RESTRICTIONS
Even in the jurisdictions regarding a poll of the jury a matter of right-
whether by interpretation of the common law or by statute-and clearly
in the jurisdictions regarding such a right as merely discretionary, the
court is not bound to poll the jury unless the defendant requests, at the
proper time, that it do so.21 Requests which have been held timely include
those made (1) after the verdict is announced and prior to its filing;
22
17 1 Il. 145 (1825), rev'd on other grounds in People ex rel. Merrill v. Hazard, 361
I1. 60, 196 N.E. 827 (1935).
18 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) S 43-2160; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 44-1912; Cal. Penal
Code (Deering, 1941) § 1163; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) 919.10; Ida. Code Ann. (1946) § 19-
2316; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 9-1811; Ia. Code Ann. (1946) § 785.15; Ky. Crim.
Code of Prac. (Carroll, 1948) § 267; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) § 15.416; Minn. Stat. Ann.
(1943) S 631.16; Mont. Rev. Code (1947) § 94.7416; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) § 29-2, 24;
Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) § 11021; N.Y. Penal Code (McKinney) § 450; N.D. Rev. Code
(1943) § 29-2213; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1948) § 13448.5; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1936)
22.921; Ore. Star. (1941) c. 22, § 921; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (1925) Art. 691; Utah
Code Ann. (1953) §§ 77, 33-10; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) S 10-1401. See also Fed. Rules
Crim. Proc. 31(d).
19 Contra: Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) § 9-1811, which apparently limits the right
to poll to the defendant only.
2 0 Mackett v. United States, 90 F. 2d 462 (1937); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky.
709, 215 S.W. 2d 838 (1948); State v. Callahan, 55 Ia. 364, 7 N.W. 603 (1880).
21 State v. Vaszorich, 13 N.J. 99, 98 A. 2d 299 (1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 900 (1953);
State v. Boger, 202 N.C. 702, 162 S.E. 877 (1932); State v. Simon, 123 S.C. 437, 120 S.E.
230 (1923).
22 State v. Cleveland, 6 N.J. 316, 78 A. 2d 560 (1951); State v. Lewis, 59 Nev. 262, 91
P. 2d 820 (1939).
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(2) prior to the separation or discharge of the jury; 23 and (3) prior to
the pronouncement of sentence.24 A request that the jury be polled when
they first report that they cannot agree on a verdict has been held to be
premature. 2
5
Failure to make a timely request for a poll of the jury, where a reason-
able opportunity to do so has been afforded the defendant, is generally
held to constitute a waiver of the right.26 The defendant's consent to the
separation of the jury prior to the rendition of the verdict,27 and the vol-
untary absence of the defendant or his counsel from the courtroom at
the time the verdict is delivered, 2 similarly may give rise to a waiver
under some circumstances. This is true in spite of statements to the effect
that a waiver of the right to poll should never be implied.29
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, having observed the three different interpretations ac-
corded Hale's statement regarding the defendant's right to poll the jury,
it seems inescapable that the position adopted by the vast majority of
American courts-that the defendant's right to poll the jury, if properly
made, is absolute-is in greater harmony with our traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice; much more so, in any event, than the
rules considering this right as merely discretionary or denying it entirely.
It is submitted for the reader's consideration, however, that perhaps our
traditional notions, as propounded by judges and legislators, are steeped
in precedent rather than reason so as to afford the criminally accused an
unwarranted and unreasonable measure of protection; for in application,
a poll of the jury is requested by the defendant only as a final effort, as
a last resort in the hope of a mistrial resulting from a possible defection
among the jury because of the public declaration required.
2 3 Budges v. State, 154 Miss. 489, 122 So. 533 (1929); Hammond v. State, 166 Ga. 213,
142 S.E. 895 (1928); Joy v. State, 14 Ind. 139 (1860).
24 Webb v. State, 166 Ga. 218, 142 S.E. 898 (1928).
25 Cable v. State, 38 So. 98 (Miss., 1905).
26 State v. Vaszorich, 13 N.J. 99, 98 A. 2d 299 (1953); England v. State, 196 Tenn. 186,
264 S.W. 2d 815 (1953); United States v. Dye, 61 Fed. Supp. 457 (D.C. Ky., 1945).
27 Vaughan v. State, 9 Ga. App. 613, 71 S.E. 945 (1911).
28 Clemens v. State, 176 Wis. 289, 185 N.W. 209 (1922); State v. Waymire, 52 Ore.
281, 97 Pac. 46 (1908); Hommer v. State, 85 Md. 562, 37 Atd. 26 (1897).
29 Carver v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 2d 375 (Ky., 1953); W¥ooten v. State, 19 Ga.
App. 739, 92 S.E. 233 (1917), where the court said: "The right to poll the jury should
never be denied where the right is exercised in time. This right is always exercised in
time when demanded after the verdict is published and before the jury is dispersed and
before sentence. A waiver of the right should never be implied."
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DUTY OF LANDOWNER OR OCCUPIER TO FIREMEN
DISCHARGING THEIR DUTIES
The law places those who come upon the premises of another in three
classes: invitees, licensees and trespassers. Upon such classification depends
the degree of care that must be exercised toward each by the landowner
or occupier.'
In the majority of jurisdictions, the rule is that in the absence of a
statute or municipal ordinance, a member of a public fire department
who, in an emergency, enters a building in the exercise of his duties is a
mere licensee under a permission to enter given by law.2 However, there is
authority to the effect that a fireman, under certain circumstances, may
be considered an invitee.3
As a general rule, a person is a "licensee," as that term is used in the
law of negligence, where his entry or use of the premises is permitted,
expressly or impliedly, by the owner or person in control thereof.4 The
licensee takes the premises as he finds them and the possessor is under no
obligation to make the premises safe for his reception. However, the
possessor must warn him of any latent defects or of any dangerous change
in the condition of the premises of which he actually knows.
5
The "invitee" may be defined as a person who goes on the premises of
another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or
occupant or for their mutual advantage." The invitee is placed upon a
higher footing than is the licensee in that the owner or occupant owes
the invitee the duty of exercising reasonable care to keep the property in
a safe condition. 7
A. RECOVERY DENIED
Firemen have been denied recovery on various bases, perhaps the most
prevalent of which is that they qualify only as licensees and that the facts
I E.g., Haley v. Deer, 135 Neb. 459, 282 N.W. 389 (1938).
2 Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., 158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac. 459 (1910);
Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 Pac. 203 (1910); Gibson v.
Leonard, 143 111. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892).
3 Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co., 243 Minn. 166, 66 N.W. 2d 892 (1954); Clink-
scales v. Mundkowski, 183 Okla. 12, 79 P. 2d 562 (1938); Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery,
229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920).
4 E.g., Christensen v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 16 Wash. 2d 424, 133 P. 2d 797
(1943).
5 Prosser, Torts § 77 (2d ed., 1955).
6 E.g., Wilson v. Goodrich, 218 Iowa 462, 252 N.W. 142 (1934).
7 E.g., Olderman v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 125 Conn. 177, 4 A. 2d 646 (1939).
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of the case fail to support the contention that the defendant has been
guilty of the breach of any common-law duty owed a licensee."
In Anderson v. Cinnamon,9 for example, plaintiff was injured when the
porch of an apartment building owned by the defendants collapsed while
he and other firemen fighting a fire in the building were on the porch.
One of the defendants was on the premises during the fire but did not
know the firemen were going on the porch before they did so. In denying
recovery to the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Missouri said:
... The duty of a possessor of land to firemen is the same as to licensees, who
enter with his permission. Firemen enter under a license given by law, primarily
for the benefit of the public generally, although the possessor may also be bene-
fitted by their work .... [T]he licensee takes the premises as he finds them, ex-
cept for wantonness or some form of intentional wrong as active negligence of
the possessor.'0
The Nebraska Supreme Court referred to a fireman or individual fight-
ing a fire on the premises of an owner or occupant as a "bare licensee" to
whom the owner or occupant owes no greater duty then to refrain from
injuring him by wilful or wanton negligence or a designed injury or by
a hidden danger or peril known to the owner or occupant but unknown
to or unobservable by the fireman in the exercise of ordinary care." The
decedent in this case was a professional, paid fireman who volunteered to
serve with a group of volunteer firemen.
In an earlier Nebraska case, on identical facts and arising out of the same
fire,12 the plaintiff was a member of the volunteer group that the decedent
in the later case had volunteered to help. In other words, the later decision
involved a fireman who volunteered, while the earlier involved a volun-
teer fireman. In any event, the defendant was making a trailer tank de-
livery of gasoline and fuel oil to bulk receiving tanks of an oil association
at the latter's plant when a fire broke out on the truck. The unit was
driven down the road where it continued to burn. The volunteer fire de-
8 Anderson v. Cinnamon, 282 S.W. 2d 445 (Mo., 1955); Wax v. Co-operative Refinery
Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805, 49 N.W. 2d 707 (1951); Mulcrone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478,
4 N.W. 2d 97 (1942); Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E. 2d
1008 (1936); Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 At. 44 (1925); Clark v. Boston &
M.R.R., 78 N.H. 428, 101 Ad. 795 (1917); Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co.,
158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac. 459 (1910); Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316,
110 Pac. 203 (1910); New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Co. v. Anderson,
73 Neb. 84, 102 N.W. 89 (1905); Woodruff v. Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N.E. 1113 (1893);
Gibson v. Leonard, 143 I1. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892); Todd v. Armour & Co., 44 Ga. App.
609, 162 S.E. 394 (1932); Volluz v. East St. Louis Light & Power Co., 210 Il. App. 565
(1918).
9 282 S.W. 2d 445 (Mo., 1955).
10 Ibid., at 447.
t Wax v. Co-operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805, 49 N.W. 2d 707 (1951).
12 Fentress v. Co-operative Refinery Ass'n, 149 Neb. 355, 31 N.W. 2d 225 (1948).
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partment of which the plaintiff was a member was summoned to fight the
fire. The plaintiff, an experienced fire fighter with knowledge of oil fires
and explosions, was injured when the trailer tank exploded. Although the
court made no attempt to assign to the plaintiff a formal status as licensee
or other, it denied recovery on the ground that ". . . in the absence of any
statute or ordinance prescribing a duty on the part of the owner of prem-
ises to members of a public fire department, the owner is not liable for
injuries to such fireman except those proximately resulting from will-
ful or wanton negligence or a designed injury,"13 citing with approval the
case of New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Co. v. Anderson.
1 4
In the Minnesota decision of Mulcrone v. Wagner, a member of the
St. Paul bureau of fire prevention was injured when he stumbled on a
faulty stair tread and fell down a stairway in the defendant's building while
making a fire inspection of the premises. 5 Firemen were held to be
licensees. Following the rule laid down forty-two years earlier in Hamil-
ton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co.,16 the court said that the owner or oc-
cupant of a building owes no duty to keep it in a reasonably safe condi-
tion for members of a public -fire department who might, in the exercise
of their duties, have occasion to enter the building. It is ineresting to
note that both the Hamilton and Mulcrone courts considered the rule
harsh but that they agreed it was up to the legislature and not the judiciary
to change it.
A Worcester fireman, who was injured when he fell from a defective
fire escape on the defendant's building, which fire escape he was using as a
vantage point from which to fight a fire in a nearby building, was denied
recovery on the ground that the entry of a fireman upon a premises is by
virtue of a permission implied by law and constitutes him a licensee. Con-
sequently, the plaintiff could not recover on the ground of ordinary negli-
gence but was required to show wilful, wanton or reckless conduct in
the absence of a violation of a statute.17
In Clark v. Boston & M.R.R.,'18 a fireman injured while fighting a fire
set by the defendant's locomotive was denied recovery. The court con-
strued the plaintiff's connection with the fire to have arisen solely from
his own act in coming into contact with it after it was set, and termed him
an "intervenor" to whom one who created the situation owed no "antici-
patory duty." The court likened the situation to that of a "land owner
and licensee."
13 Ibid., at 227. 14 73 Neb. 84, 102 N.W. 89 (1905).
15 212 Minn. 478, 4 N.W. 2d 97 (1942).
16 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693 (1899).
17 Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E. 2d 1008 (1936).
18 78 N.H. 428, 101 At. 795 (1917).
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Another case where a fireman was termed a licensee and recovery de-
nied was that of Pennbaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co.19 The
intestate was killed while fighting a fire, by contact with wires of the de-
fendant lighting company in the back yard of the burning premises. It did
not appear that the defendants had any exact knowledge of the location
of the fire,20 and the current which killed the decedent was one which
would not ordinarily endanger life. The defendant was held not negligent
so as to make it liable for the decedent's death because it had no actual
knowledge that the fire had felled dangerous wires. The court, in defining
the defendant's duty, said that "[i]n the absence of ordinance or statute
changing the common-law rule in this regard, a fireman entering a build-
ing under imperative public necessity is but a licensee, who assumes the
risks as he finds them, and to whom the owner of the premises owes no
special duty to maintain these premises in a safe condition."
2' 1
Even the fact that the defendant himself turned in the alarm has been
held not to constitute the fireman who responds an invitee.22 In a well-
reasoned decision, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the right of a
fireman to enter the premises is created by law and exists before the alarm
is sounded, and that, "[w]hen the right to enter is dependent upon an in-
vitation, express or implied, that creates the right to enter, and without
the invitation the right does not exist. Hence as an alarm does not create
the right to enter, and the right exists independent of the alarm, it cannot
be an invitation. a23 The court concluded that firemen are only licensees
and that there is ordinarily no duty to a licensee except to refrain from
Wilful or wanton injury to him and to use reasonable care to prevent
injury to him after discovering his danger.
The owner of a building on which twelve firemen were standing while
engaged in extinguishing a fire therein when the roof gave way and car-
ried all of them to their deaths in the basement below was also absolved
of liability on the licensee theory, the court saying that "[tlhe owner
19 158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac. 459 (1910).
20 They knew within a wide area where it was located but the court felt that to re-
uire the defendant to turn off the lights and power in such a wide area during a night
re such as this might cause damage from panic greater than the fire damage it was
sought to prevent.
21 Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., 158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac. 459, 463
(1910). Accord: New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Co. v. Anderson, 73
Neb. 84, 102 N.W. 89 (1905).
22 Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 Pac. 203 (1910). The de-
fendant, on seeing nitric acid fumes resembling smoke emitted from the etching room
of its establishment, turned in a fire alarm and plaintiff's husband, a fireman, went into
the room and there breathed the fumes of the acid causing his ultimate death from trau-
matic pneumonia.
' Ibid., at 206,
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of a building in a populous city does not owe it as a duty, at common
law, independent of any statute or ordinance, to keep such building safe
for firemen, or other officers who in a contingency may enter the same
under a license conferred by law."
'2 4
Members of fire insurance patrols and fire insurance salvage corps units
have been held to share the licensee status of firemen. In Illinois, for in-
stance, a member of the Chicago fire insurance patrol was injured through
the faulty operation of an elevator on the defendant's premises while he
was in the building to spread tarpaulins on the defendant's goods and
thereby prevent water damage to them. The plaintiff was deemed a "mere
licensee" and denied recovery.25 A member of the Fire Insurance Salvage
Corps of Baltimore who, while on the premises where a fire had originated
to save property endangered by fire, fell into an open and unguarded
elevator shaft and was injured, was accorded the same treatment.2 6
Other courts, though often reluctant to clearly define the status of fire-
men have denied recovery on various other grounds.
27
In the recent case of Gannon v. Royal Properties,28 for example, a gaso-
line explosion in a burning garage was held not to be an "unusual hazard"
the knowledge of the existence of which would impose upon the owner
the duty to give warning of the peril to firemen entering the building
to extinguish the fire. Gasoline, said the court, is known by everybody to
be stored about a garage.
"Considerations of public policy" prevented the predication of any lia-
bility of a property owner to a fireman upon negligence causing a fire in
Suttie v. Sun Oil Co.29 The property owner whose own negligence caused
the fire, it was reasoned, may otherwise be tempted to defer calling the
fire department and help himself until perhaps greater danger to the pub-
lic would be threatened. Public policy, said the court, requires firemen to
look to their employer for proper compensation for injuries.
2 4 Woodruff v. Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N.E. 1113, 1117 (1893).
25 Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892).
26 Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 Atd. 44 (1925).
27 Gannon v. Royal Properties, 285 App. Div. 131, 136 N.Y.S. 2d 129 (1954); Fentress
v. Co-operative Refinery Ass'n, 149 Neb. 355, 31 N.W. 2d 225 (1948); Buckeye Cotton
Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646 (1922); Glander v. Milwaukee Elec-
tric R. & Light Co., 155 Wis. 381, 144 N.W. 972 (1914); Litch v. White, 160 Cal. 497,
117 Pac. 515 (1911); Kelly v. Henry Muhs Co., 71 N.J.L. 358, 59 At. 23 (S. Ct., 1904);
Eckes v. Stetler, 98 App. Div. 76, 90 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1904); Baker v. Otis Elevator
Co., 78 App. Div. 513, 79 N.Y. Supp. 663 (1903); Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg.
Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693 (1899); Woods v. Miller, 30 App. Div. 232, 52 N.Y. Supp.
217 (1898); Behler v. Daniels, 19 R.I. 49, 31 Ad. 582 (1895); Suttie v. Sun Oil Co., 15
Pa. D. & C. 3 (1931).
28285 App. Div. 131, 136 N.Y.S. 2d 129 (1954).
29 15 Pa. D. & C. 3 (1931). Actually, the doctrine of assumption of risk as well as con-
siderations of public policy defeated the plaintiff's claim here.
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A city fireman under no duty to look after fires outside city limits, has
been termed an invitee as to a property owner outside the city limits who
requests his aid in fighting a fire.80 The property owner was held bound to
use reasonable care to invitees and warn of latent dangers of which he had
knowledge. However, since the defect involved here was deemed patent
and because of the presence of conjecture as to the exact cause of the
accident, liability was not imposed on the defendant.
The presence of contributory negligence will, of course, preclude re-
covery,3' nor will the defendant be held liable when the plaintiff is injured
where there could be no reasonable expectation of his presence,32 or
where it does not appear that he entered by any way which was reason-
able to anticipate he would take. 3
Where the plaintiff is deemed not one of the class of persons for whose
benefit a statute was passed, he cannot predicate liability for his injury on
violation of that statute;34 nor can one not vested with a remedy by virtue
of a statute bring an action thereon in his own name.3 5
B. RECOVERY ALLOWED
One of the leading cases in the minority group that allows recovery for
firemen is the New York case of Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery,36 an action
for personal injuries by the chief of the Dunkirk, New York, fire depart-
ment. Over its property from the street in front, beside its building, giving
access to a stable in the rear, the defendant had built a paved driveway.
Back, 150 feet, across half of this pavement, ran an unguarded coal hole.
The driveway was used by the defendant and by those who had business
with it. One evening the barn caught fire. The plaintiff walked up the un-
lighted driveway to get to the barn, fell into the hole, and was injured.
The court did not clearly define the status of firemen in that it specifically
denied that the plaintiff was a trespasser or a licensee yet seemed reluctant
30 Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646 (1922).
81 Glander v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co., 155 Wis. 381,144 N.W. 972 (1914).
3s Litch v. White, 169 Cal. 497, 117 Pac. 515 (1911). There was no duty on the build-
ing owner to maintain his awnings strong enough for firemen to walk on. Accord:
Woods v. Miller, 30 App. Div. 232, 52 N.Y. Supp. 217 (1898). The plaintiff, while
groping his way in dense smoke, on the roof of a burning building, stepped over a low
parapet or coping and fell into an opening on the premises of the adjoining owner, the
defendant. Prosser, Business Visitors & Invitees, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 573, 610 (1942).
38 Baker v. Otis Elevator Co., 78 App. Div. 513, 79 N.Y. Supp. 663 (1903).
34 Kelly v. Henry Muhs Co., 71 N.J.L. 358, 59 Atl. 23 (S. Ct., 1904). Elevator shafts
are required to be guarded for the benefit of employees, not firemen; Behler v. Daniels,
19 R.I. 49, 31 Ad. 582 (1895); Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892).
85 Eckes v. Stetler, 98 App. Div. 76, 90 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1904). The remedy was held
to be vested in the board of fire commissioners or in the fire commissioner, but not
in an individual fireman.
36 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920).
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to place its holding on the factor of implied invitation. However, it was
held that the duty of "reasonable care under all the circumstances" existed
and was owing to the plaintiff. The decision was expressly limited to "...
the case of one not a licensee, entering business property as of right over
a way prepared as a means of access for those entitled to enter, who is in-
jured by the negligence of the owner in failing to keep that way in a
reasonably safe condition for those using it as it was intended to be
used." 7
Other cases that have allowed recovery to firemen have proceeded upon
the theory that firemen are invitees and that the defendant has breached
the common-law duty owed an invitee.
38
In Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co.39 the plaintiff, a volunteer fire-
man, was invited upon the defendant's premises to deliver and put into
operation a sump pump which the defendant had purchased from the fire
department with the understanding that the department would deliver
and install the pump in working order. Carbon monoxide gas inhaled by
the plaintiff while he was helping to install the pump caused a heart ail-
ment known as a myocardial infarction. The court held that the plaintiff
was on the premises as an invitee, but more specifically as a "business
visitor."40
In Clinkscales v. Mundkowski4' the deceased, though not a member of
the city fire department, was serving with it when killed while fighting a
fire on the defendant's farm outside the city. The court held that the de-
ceased was an invitee of the defendant and allowed recovery because the
defendant had violated his duty of ordinary care.
Taylor v. Palmetto Theater Co. 42 involved a situation wherein the plain-
tiff, while in the performance of his duties as a fireman and fighting a fire
in buildings adjacent to the defendant's, fell into a pit maintained by the
defendant in a passageway. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged an invi-
tation extended to the general public to use the passageway and that he
entered thereon as a member of the general public, although in the dis-
charge of his duties as a fireman, and was, therefore, an invitee or licensee.
The court sustained the complaint and said that simply because the plain-
tiff was a fireman and in the discharge of his duties as such should not
37 Ibid., at 493.
38 Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co., 243 Minn. 166, 66 N.W. 2d 892 (1954); Clink-
scales v. Mundkowski, 183 Okla. 12, 79 P. 2d 562 (1938).
39243 Minn. 166, 66 N.W. 2d 892 (1954).
4 0 The term is defined in 65 C.J.S. § 43 (1) as "a person who is invited or permitted
to enter or remain on land in the possession of another for a purpose directly or indi-
rectly connected with business dealings between them."
41 183 Okla. 12, 79 P. 2d 562 (1938).
42204 S.C. 1, 28 S.E. 2d 538 (1943).
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limit his cause of action to the right or permission to enter the premises
extended by law. The inference was that if, on trial, the plaintiff could
prove that the general public used the passageway with the defendant's
knowledge and consent, he can recover as an invitee or licensee.43
At least one court felt that firemen should enjoy a status all their own.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Sbypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products
Co. 44 said that firemen, entering upon the premises of another in response
to a call of duty are not trespassers, licensees or invitees. They have a status
sui generis since they enter under license of law to perform a duty owed
to the public and the landowner's consent to entry is immaterial.4 5
Some courts, even though they went along with the majority holding
that firemen are licensees, have allowed them recovery because the de-
fendant was guilty of a breach of the common-law duty owed licensees. 46
In referring to firemen as "gratuitous licensees," the court in James v.
Cities Service Oil Co. 47 held that if a fireman is exposed to a "hidden dan-
ger" of which the owner knows, it is the owner's duty to notify the fire-
man unless the fireman has knowledge of the danger or has had reasonable
opportunity to discover the same. This case involved the explosion of a
gasoline storage tank that occurred after the defendant's employees had
fled, without warning the firemen who arrived on the scene of certain
dangerous conditions that they knew existed therein.
In a separate decision, the city whose firemen responded to that fire was
allowed reimbursement for wages, and medical and hospital expenses paid
the injured firemen on the ground that the same duty was owed by the
defendant to the city as licensees as was owed to the firemen as licensees
and that the doctrine of "hidden dangers" applied equally to both.48
The possession of quantities of flammable liquids in excess of those
allowed by city ordinance has been held to constitute wilful and wanton
conduct that amounts to a violation of the duty owed a fireman, though
only a licensee by operation of law, killed by a flashback of the burning
liquid. 49
Similarly, where a railroad company delivering a freight car containing
fireworks, and with knowledge of its contents and its liability to explode
43 The factual situation and treatment of this case bear a strong resemblance to those
involved in the Meiers case, supra note 36.
44 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W. 2d 549 (1951).
45 Ibid.
4 6 James v. Cities Service Oil Co., 66 Ohio App. 87, 31 N.E. 2d 872 (1939); Bandosz v.
Daigger & Co., 255 Il1. App. 494 (1930); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. O'Leary,
136 S.W. 601 (Tex. Civ. App., 1911).
4766 Ohio App. 87, 31 N.E. 2d 872 (1939).
4 8 City of Youngstown v. Cities Service Oil Co., 66 Ohio App. 97, 31 N.E. 2d 876
(1940).
49 Bandosz v. Daigger & Co., 255 i11. App. 494 (1930).
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from concussion, placed the car at a place in its yards where it would be
subjected to impact from other cars and a fire broke out in the car, the
railroad was held liable for the death of a fireman who responded and was
killed in an ensuing explosion of the car. 50 Though the fireman was
termed a licensee, ..... where a person is rightfully upon the premises of
another, even as licensee, he has the right to require of the proprietor
that he so conduct himself as not to injure him through his active negli-
gence.""' Another case in the same jurisdiction thirty years later was said
to involve similar facts and to be controlled by the same rule of law, ex-
cept that the plaintiff was held not to be a licensee as to the defendant.
However, here too, recovery was allowed.
52
A New Jersey decision that classified the decedent fireman a licensee
nonetheless refused to absolve the defendant of liability because the latter
was not a landowner. 53 The court felt that the exemption of the land-
owner from liability as to trespassers and licensees is necessary to secure
him the beneficial use of his land, but that no reason exists for extending
the exemption to the case where the rights of the defendant have not been
interfered with. The plaintiff was electrocuted when he went up into the
tower of the city hall to extinguish a fire that had broken out there and
came into contact with a metal pipe which, unknown to him, was charged
with a deadly current of electricity that had escaped from wires installed
and maintained by the defendant electric company for the purpose of
furnishing light from its street lighting system to lamps in the tower. The
decedent was not upon property either owned or conrolled by the defend-
ant at the time of the occurrence.
Another fireman electrocuted by coming into contact with wires of the
defendant utility company, here in a public alley, was held entitled to a
"high degree of care" by those operating electric light and power lines.
54
Liability for death or injury of firemen has, on occasion, been success-
fully predicated upon violation of a statutory duty.55
In Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp.,50 the defendant, in violation of a
5o Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. O'Leary, 136 S.W. 601 (Tex. Civ. App., 1911).
51 Ibid., at 602.
52Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Dickens, 156 S.W. 2d 1010 (Tex. Civ. App., 1949). The de-
fendant gas company failed to cut off the gas supply to a burning building in time to
avert an injury to the plaintiff, a fireman directing a hose stream therein from the curb
line.
5 5Barnett v. Atlantic City Electric Co., 87 N.J.L. 29, 93 At. 108 (S. Ct., 1915).
Accord: City of Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., 145 La. 680, 82 So. 785
(1919).
54 Gannon v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 145 Mo. 520, 47 S.V. 907 (1898).
55 Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp., 274 N.Y. 106, 8 N.E. 2d 296 (1937); Drake v.
Fenton, 237 Pa. 8, 85 Ad. 14 (1912).
56 274 N.Y. 106, 8 N.E. 2d 296 (1937).
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New York city ordinance, maintained a paint shop in the subcellar of its
hotel wherein were stored large quantities of paints and other explosive
liquids. A fire broke out in the subcellar and the city fire department was
called. Plaintiff's intestate, a fireman, was killed by an explosion in the
paint room. The court, in allowing recovery for his wrongful death based
on violation of the ordinance, held that the ordinance had been enacted
for the benefit of firemen as well as for hotel guests.
A Pennsylvania statute requiring that elevator shafts be kept closed and
guarded was involved in the case of Drake v. Fenton57 where the plaintiff,
a Philadelphia fireman, was injured when he fell through an open and un-
guarded elevator shaft in a warehouse owned and occupied by the defend-
ant. In holding that there was no liability on the defendant at common
law because the plaintiff was a licensee, the court defined the statute vio-
lated by the defendant as one intended to afford protection to city officers
such as firemen, who at any time may be required to come on the premises.
Where a dangerous condition exists in a building to the knowledge of
the owner or his agent, presenting an "unusual peril" to persons entering
thereon, it is the duty of the owner, if he had the opportunity, to give
warning of the peril to firemen about to enter the building in response to
an alarm of fire therein.58
Similarly, the doctrine of assumption of risk has been held inapplicable
to "hidden, unknown and ultrahazardous dangers" encountered by fire-
men on the premises in response to an alarm, although it is contemplated
that firemen encounter those risks ordinarily incidental to extinguishing
fires.59
The storage of a large quantity of explosive powder within city limits
has been held to represent a "public nuisance" and render the possessor
liable for the death of a city fireman killed by an explosion of the powder
while fighting a fire on the premises.60
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the foregoing decisions leads one to conclude that the
courts, in cases of this type, are striving for a legal and equitable balance
between the rights of the landowner or occupier of land and the rights
of one lawfully upon his premises.
57 237 Pa. 8,85 Ad. 14 (1912).
5s Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., 284 N.Y. 397, 31 N.E. 2d 503 (1940), re-
hearing denied 285 N.Y. 614, 33 N.E. 2d 547 (1941). Gasoline that had seeped into a
sump pit ignited. Accord: Schwab v. Rubel Corp., 286 N.Y. 525, 37 N.E. 2d 234 (1941).
An unenclosed shaft in dense smoke was termed an "unusual hazard."
59 Canmpbell v. Pure Oil Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 723, 194 At. 873 (1937). Accord: Smith
v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 83 N.H. 439, 144 Atl. 57 (1928).
e0 Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. 358 (1899).
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Although the owner is sovereign over his land, he has the duty to con-
sider the safety of all those who, having the right or privilege to enter
his premises, may be expected to enter it. The "commonly accepted form-
ula in America" that divides those to whom this obligation is owed into
"licensees" and "invitees" depends upon whether their right to enter is by
virtue of permission or of invitation.6' If such is the case, it seems illogical
to hold, as most courts have, that a fireman cannot be an invitee because
there has been no invitation, but that he can be a licensee even though
there has been no permission.
62
If we accept benefit to the landowner as the determining factor of the
invitee, it is equally difficult to see on what basis it can be held that a fire-
man is a mere licensee. 63 It is absurd to say that a fireman who comes to
extinguish a blaze in the defendant's building confers no benefit on the
defendant.
64
Perhaps the real reason why firemen seem to be set apart as a class to
whom no duty is owed to inspect and prepare the premises is that they
enter at unforseeable moments, upon unusual parts of the premises, and
under circumstances of emergency, where care in preparation cannot
reasonably be looked for. As Professor Bohlen has stated:
It would be an obviously unreasonable burden to impose on landowners to
require them to keep the whole of their premises in such condition as to make
every part of it safe for those whose unusual and exceptional right of entry may
never accrue.... IT]he balance of social benefits can[not] require such a serious
restriction on the owner's use of his land, or justify the imposition of such a
burden on his exchequer, to prevent so vague a risk of so improbable an injury.65
61 Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of Their
Own Right, 69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 142, 237, 340 (1921).
62 Are Firemen & Policemen Licensees or Invitees?, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1157 (1937).
63 Ibid., at 1160.
64Prosser, Torts § 78 at 461 (2d ed., 1955); Prosser, Business Visitors & Invitees,
26 Minn. L. Rev. 573, 608-611 (1942).
65 Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 61, at 350-51.
EXCLUSIVE SALES RIGHTS GIVEN TO REAL
ESTATE BROKERS
When a real estate broker is employed to sell property, one of two
types of agreement is entered into; the first being a general listing where-
by the broker is given the bare right to sell the owner's property with the
broker receiving a commission for producing a purchaser. The second is
a so-called "exclusive" agreement of one kind or another whereby the
broker is given the exclusive agency to sell, or exclusive right to sell, for
a stipulated period of time- the broker's commission being due when or
if a purchaser is found.
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Upon occasion, an owner who has entered into such an "exclusive"
agreement gets the opportunity to sell the property during the exclusive
period to a buyer not in any way procured by the broker. If the owner
does sell to this person, though the broker has not yet found a purchaser
willing to buy according to the terms of the listing, a suit for a commis-
sion often results. Where only an exclusive agency to sell has been given,
and it appears that the owner sold his own property without the aid of
another broker, the broker's suit will fail in most jurisdictions.' Where,
however, a second broker appears to have sold the property during the
exclusive agency, some courts have allowed recovery. 2 The concern of
the courts for the broker's welfare in that situation and where an exclu-
sive right to sell has been given, has resulted in decisions which blur the
distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts, leaving the law in
a rather confused state. It is this situation primarily which will be ex-
amined here.
THE AGREEMENT-A UNILATERAL CONTRACT
In return for the broker's act of procuring a purchaser, the owner has
promised a commission. The broker's promise to find a purchaser is not
sought, nor is it given in the usual exclusive listing. It seems clear, there-
fore, that the owner has made an offer for a unilateral contract,3 and such
an offer may be revoked, whether it is said to be irrevocable or not, at any
time before performance of the act requested. 4
In Bartlett v. Keith, decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, a broker had an exclusive right to sell certain property.5 The
owner, during the period, sold the property to a buyer of her own find-
ing. In disallowing recovery the court stated:
Here the condition was at least the procuring of a customer who was able,
willing, and ready to buy on the owner's terms. The plaintiff's contention that
1 Manzo v. Park, 220 Ark. 216, 247 S.W. 2d 12 (1952); E. A. Strout Western Realty
Agency v. Gregoire, 101 Cal. App. 2d 512, 225 P. 2d 585 (1951); Lambert v. Haskins,
128 Colo. 433, 263 P. 2d 433 (1953); Bradbury v. Morrison, 93 Ga. App. 704, 92 S.E. 2d
607 (1956); Wozniak v. Siegle, 226 IIl. App. 619 (1922); Des Rivieres v. Sullivan, 247
Mass. 443, 142 N.E. 111 (1924); Keller Corp. v. Cable, 207 Minn. 336, 291 N.W. 515
(1940); Levy v. Isaacs, 285 App. Div. 1170, 140 N.Y.S. 2d 519 (1955), appeal denied 143
N.Y.S. 2d 642 (1955); Ferree v. De Ely, 265 S.W. 2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App., 1954); Baker
v. Skipworth, 244 S.W. 2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App., 1951); Roberts v. Harrington, 168 Wis.
217, 169 N.W. 603 (1918). Contra: eVrner v. Hindle, 129 Pa. Super. 137, 194 At. 754
(1937).
2 Dixon v. Dodd, 80 A. 2d 282 (D.C. Munic. App., 1951); McManus v. Newcomb,
61 A. 2d 36 (D.C. Munic. App., 1948); Schwartz v. Akerlund, 240 111. App. 480 (1926).
3 "A unilateral contract is one in which no promisor receives a promise as consider-
ation for his promise." Rest., Contracts § 12 (1932).
4 1 Williston, Contracts § 60 (Rev. ed., 1936).
5 325 Mass. 265, 90 N.E. 2d 308 (1950).
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by listing the property she fully performed the service required is fallacious.
The writing says nothing of the kind, and the usual rule is to the contrary.
The defendant's objective, like that of any seller, did not stop with the placing
of her property on the plaintiff's list. Nor is the plaintiff's case aided by asserting
that the defendant bound herself for ninety days when she did not bind herself
at all. The acceptance of an offer to a unilateral contract must be by all the acts
contemplated by the offer. There was no fraudulent revocation, and once the
question of consideration is analyzed, this case falls within the usual principles
of brokerage cases. 6
This statement represents proper legal reasoning in requiring considera-
tion be given to make a promise to keep an offer open binding.
7
An Illinois court presented with a similar factual situation refused to
grant a commission to the broker and said: "[Tihe agreement in this pro-
ceeding is not one coupled with an interest and it was revocable at the
will of the principals."
An Ohio court, where the broker sued for a commission when the own-
er sold his own property during the "exclusive sales right" period, stated:
[P]laintiff did not purchase the exclusive right to sell the defendant's property.
There was no consideration flowing to defendants. The plaintiff was not bound
to do anything. He could abstain from any activities in the interest of selling
the property without incurring the slightest legal liability to the defendants.
The offer to contract was unilateral in its effect.9
Where even nominal consideration has been given in fact by the broker
for the owner's promise to keep the offer for a unilateral contract open
for a given period, the offer must be kept open.10 In a state where a seal
is conclusive evidence of consideration, such an offer under seal would
also have to be kept open." These methods for rendering the owner's
offer irrevocable do not often appear in the reported cases as the basis for
decision.
A few courts have applied proper theory. 12 Numerically, courts apply-
6 Ibid., at 309, 310 (omitting court's citations).
7 Rest., Contracts § 19 (1932).
8 Nicholson v. Alderson, 347 Ill. App. 496, 507, 107 N.E. 2d 39, 44 (1952).
9 Davis v. Hora, 63 N.E. 2d 843, 844 (Ohio App., 1944).
10 1 Williston, Contracts S 115, 115B (Rev. ed., 1936).
11 Whyte v. Rogers, 303 Ill. App. 115, 24 N.E. 2d 745 (1940). For a discussion of more
recent developments concerning seals, see An Analysis of Recent Illinois Legislation
Concerning Seals, 1 DeP. L.R. 250 (1952).
12 Cole v. Pursley, 86 Ga. App. 452, 71 S.E. 2d 575 (1952) where factor of payment
of nominal consideration was ignored; Irish v. Fisher, 74 Ga. App. 631, 40 S.E. 2d 588
(1946); Ocean Lake & River Fish Co. v. Dotson, 70 Ga. App. 268, 28 S.E. 2d 319 (1943);
Barrington v. Dunwody, 35 Ga. App. 517, 134 S.E. 130 (1926); Ferguson v. Bovee,
239 Iowa 775, 32 N.W. 2d 924 (1948) but weakened by allowing damages to extent of
"out of pocket" loss to broker.
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ing proper theory are in the minority. The unsound methods by which
the other courts reach their conclusions follow.
POWER TO REVOKE VERSUS RIGHT TO REVOKE
Several courts have spoken in terms of power to revoke versus right to
revoke, admitting the power of the owner to revoke the agreement, but
claiming that he had no right to do so, in that the employment contract
was broken.' 3 Professor Mechem is quoted as follows:
[T]he principal always has the power to revoke: but not ... the right to do so
in those cases wherein he has agreed not to exercise his power during a cer-
tain period ... the authority may be withdrawn at any moment, but the contract
of employment cannot be terminated in violation of its terms, without making
the principal liable in damages. 14
This statement then presupposes a contract, a binding agreement. Later
statements by Professor Mechem concerning the necessity of contract in
the broker-owner relationship make this even more clear:
[T]he principal may agree-for a sufficient consideration-that, during a stated
period, he will not sell except through the broker, or that the broker shall have
his commission whoever makes the sale .... 15
Therefore, it is submitted that the courts that apply the power versus
right to revoke rules have begged the question of whether a contract
exists at all or not. Unless the owner for a consideration has contracted
away his right to revoke, he may do so at any time.1 A contract, then,
has still to be found.
PROMISE TO PROCURE AND PROMISE TO TRY TO PROCURE
It is true that the possible harshness of the rule allowing revocation of
offers for unilateral contracts at any time is the basis for a rule of law
which would construe such offers and assents as bilateral, and therefore, as
contracts, if at all feasible.'7 Few brokers would agree that they have
promised to find a purchaser in return for the owner's promise to pay a
commission, not wishing to risk a suit for damages for not finding a
buyer.'8 Most brokers, however, would agree that they have promised to
try to find a purchaser. Some courts have considered such promise to be
13 E.g., Geyler v. Dailey, 70 Ariz. 135, 217 P. 2d 583 (1950) where the broker found a
purchaser on the day after revocation; Ferguson v. Bovee, 239 Iowa 775, 32 N.W. 2d 924
(1948); Isern v. Gordon, 127 Kan. 296, 273 Pac. 435 (1929) where nominal consider-
ation was given, but not relied on.
14 1 Mechem on Agency 568 (2d ed., 1914) (italics added).
15 2 Mechem on Agency § 2445 (2d ed., 1914) (italics added).
16 1 Mechem on Agency § 563, 565, 566 (2d ed., 1914).
17 Rest., Contracts S 31 (1932).
18 2 Mechem on Agency § 2429 (2d ed., 1914). No case has been found where the
broker promised specifically to find a purchaser.
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part of the consideration requiring that the broker keep the offer open or
be guilty of breach of contract. 19 The courts do not rely, however, on the
promise to try exclusively. In Jones v. Hollander it is stated that: "the
consideration is the agreement of the broker to try to obtain a purchaser
and his actual efforts in that regard .... ,,20
The promise to try is subject to the objection that it is too vague, and
therefore, void.21 However, in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, a
promise to use reasonable efforts was implied and upheld, as being prop-
er.22 A federal court in New York was faced with a situation wherein
the defendant had given plaintiff the exclusive right to sell its wholly
owned subsidiary.23 Defendant then sold the business himself prior to re-
voking plaintiff's authority, and plaintiff sued for a commission. In find-
ing the agreement to be bilateral, the court cited the Lucy case and stated
that: ". . . Braxton's promise to work intensively, since a speedy sale was
desired, and to handle the matter with the utmost discretion may be fairly
implied." 24
But, is it to be supposed that the owner's promise to keep the offer open
was "bargained for and given in exchange" for the broker's promise to
use "efforts" to sell? If the broker were to list the property at all, his ef-
forts would be a foregone conclusion if he hoped to earn a commission.
No real element of bargaining appears-the owner simply holds out a
prize for the broker to take or not, as he is able or chooses. There has been
no case reported where the owner has recovered damages for the broker's
inactivity. The broker's degree of activity is of relatively little importance
to the owner. The only thing that matters to the owner is the production
of a buyer who is ready, willing and able to meet the owner's terms of sale.
If the broker could do this without getting out of his chair or lifting a
telephone, the owner would be satisfied.
However, if the broker did refuse to attempt to sell the property ex-
cept on the condition that he be given an exclusive right to sell, and the
owner, because he wanted this particular broker to sell the property, gave
the broker this right, the owner might properly be said to have bargained
for the broker's efforts, and hence be bound by his agreement to keep the
offer open. 25 This probably is not the usual case. Most businessmen do
not so easily turn away a possible client.
l9 Piper v. Wells, 175 Md. 326, 2 A. 2d 28 (1938); Melzner v. Toman, 57 N.D. 639,
223 N.W. 691 (1929); Jones v. Hollander, 3 N.J.M. 973, 130 At. 451 (1925).
20 3 N.J.M. 973, 130 Ad. 451, 452 (1925).
21 Rest., Contracts § 32 (1932).
22 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
23 Hammond v. C.I.T. Financial Corp., 203 F. 2d, 705 (C.A. 2d, 1953).
24 Ibid., at 708.
25 2 Mechem on Agency § 2453 (2d ed., 1914). This rationale has not been found in
any reported case.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
THE PART PERFORMANCE THEORY
The most popular method, however, of protecting the broker's com-
mission under an "exclusive" agreement involves section 45 of the Re-
statement of Contracts.26 Here it is admitted that the agreement was uni-
lateral to begin with, but by "part performance" the broker is said to ac-
cept the owner's offer for a unilateral contract, rendering the agreement
bilateral and hence irrevocable.
2 7
Baumgartner v. Meek, a California decision which followed this theory,
quoted section 45 and disposed of the contention that there was no con-
sideration to support the contract by stating that is was to be found in the
services to be performed by the broker.28 An Ohio statute referring to
unilateral contracts was as follows:
The contract does not come into existence until one party to it has done
all that is necessary on his part; it is performance by one party which makes
obligatory the promise of the other.
29
The court's interpretation follows:
Conceding that at the time the contract was signed and accepted it was a
mere nudum pactum, when the plaintiff exerted her efforts to find a purchaser
for the property, consideration was supplied. s°
Apparently the statute was taken as meaning "part performance," not
"performance" as it stated. Advertising, phone calls, and showing the
property to prospective purchasers, then, are said to constitute part per-
formance. Theoretically as least, this is not part performance of the act
of producing a purchaser, because purchasers do not come in parts-one
is either found, whole and entire, or he is not. Efforts to find one are mere
preparations to the performance of the act of producing the purchaser.
What is tendered must be part of the actual performance requested in order
to preclude revocation under this Section [45]. Beginning preparations though
they may be essential to carrying out the contract or to accepting the offer is
not enough.81
26 Rest., Contracts § 45 (1932). If "part of the consideration requested in the offer
is given or tendered by the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a con-
tract." For an excellent criticism of this doctrine see Anderson, Mutual Assent in Uni-
lateral Contracts, 1 DeP. L.R. 167 (1952).
27 E.g., Baumgartner v. Meek, 126 Cal. App. 2d 505, 272 P. 2d 552 (1954); Harry H.
Rosin Co. v. Eksterowicz, 45 Del. 314, 73 A. 2d 648 (1950); Hutchinson v. Dobson-
Bainbridge Realty Co., 31 Tenn. App. 490, 217 S.W. 2d 6 (1946).
28 126 Cal. App. 2d 505, 272 P. 2d 552 (1954).
29 9 Ohio Juris. 239, § 5.
30 Bell v. Dimmerling, 149 Ohio St. 165, 78 N.E. 2d 49 (1948).
31 Rest., Contracts § 45, Comment a (1932) (italics added).
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Most conclusive is the fact that the owner did not promise to reward
efforts, but only performance, though the efforts might have been in some
way foreseeable.
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
The theory of promissory estoppel, which does away with the necessity
of consideration, is stated as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
of a definite and substantial character upon the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action, is binding, if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise.32
In Richter v. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati it was said that "whethei
consideration existed upon the making of the promise would be important
if an action for breach of one or the other had been instituted before the
parties had acted upon the promise .... ,.3 The broker had an exclusive
right to sell several lots, had sold all but the last, which the owner sold,
without notice to the broker, on his own. In allowing recovery of the
commission, the court mentioned promissory estoppel and went on to
state:
To now limit his commission to such sales only as he initiated and carried to
fulfillment would operate as an injustice to him.
3 4
Justice to the owner was not discussed.
A Missouri court, in a situation where an owner had granted an exclu-
sive right to sell and then had sold the property during that period, to a
buyer of his own finding, stated:
While the Agreement did not expressly bind plaintiffs [broker] to do any-
thing at all and plaintiffs had no interest in the subject matter of the agency,
plaintiffs, it may be inferred, listed the property and . . .acted [court's italics]
in the endeavor to procure a purchaser, spending considerable time and money
... upon the performance of these stipulated acts in reliance upon the defend-
ants' promise the Agreement became a bilateral one and binding upon the
defendants.,3 5
This court then does not specifically adopt the doctrine, but the rationale
is present, and in some degree controlling.
This analysis, like others, is subject to the criticism that the owner
promised only to reward success, not efforts, and that the nature of a uni-
32 Rest., Contracts S 90 (1932).
s3 82 Ohio App. 421, 80 N.E. 2d 243, 245, 246 (1947).
34 Ibid., at 246.
35 Chamberlain v. Grisham, 360 Mo. App. 655, 230 S.W. 2d 721, 723 (1950) (italics
added).
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lateral contract is such that certain things must be done preparatory to
acceptance. All this is within the contemplation of the parties at the time
of the offer and efforts to accept are entered into with the realization that
they might fail, in the ordinary course of business. The section 90, Re-
statement of Contracts (quoted above), version of the doctrine has had
only slight usage as the actual basis for decision among the courts of last
resort of the commercial states.86
SPECIFIC JURISDICTIONS
In Hutchinson v. Dobson-Bainbridge Realty Co.,37 a Tennessee appel-
late court adopted the 'part performance" rationale in a decision which
was mentioned by many other courts.38 A few year later, in Hood v.
Gillespie, the court allowed a seller, under an exclusive agency agreement,
to withdraw his property from sale without liability.3 9 Apparently the
fact that the owner had not agreed not to take the land off the market
was controlling. The broker's "part performance" availed him nothing.
Then, in Jenkins v. Vaughan, the Tennessee Supreme Court refused a
commission to a broker where the owner had sold the property himself
during the exclusive period.40 The basis for this decision was that the
broker's efforts had been insufficient to warrant a commission. The court
acknowledged the rule of the Hutchinson case, but stated:
The reason for the rule is avoidance of hardship to a broker, who has spent
time and money in an effort to sell and may have created a market or stimulated
a demand for the property.
41
Tennessee, then, would weigh the efforts of the broker, determining
whether they constitute "part performance" or not. This is not a very
certain rule at best, and seems more equitable than legal.
New York, according to decision and dictum in the lower courts, is
committed to the rule that when an exclusive right to sell has been given,
the owner may not revoke without becoming liable for a commission. 42
Two very early cases are relied on as having established this rule. The first
was Moses v. Bierling which stated the rule as follows:
36 Restatement in the Courts § 90 (1945) (supplemented by later editions in 1949 and
1954).
37 31 Tenn. App. 490, 217 S.W. 2d 552 (1954).
38 E.g., Harry H. Rosin Co. v. Eksterowicz, 45 Del. 314, 73 A. 2d 648 (1950);
McManus v. Newcomb, 61 A. 2d 36 (D.C. Munic. App., 1948).
39 190 Tenn. 548, 230 S.W. 2d 997 (1950).
40 197 Tenn. 578, 276 S.W. 2d 732 (1955).
41 Ibid., at 733.
42 Gaillard Realty Co., Inc. v. Rogers Wire Works, Inc., 215 App. Div. 326, 213
N.Y. Supp. 616 (1926); Levy v. Isaacs, 285 App. Div. 1170, 140 N.Y.S. 2d 519 (1955),
appeal denied 143 N.Y.S. 2d 642 (1955) (dictum); 'Werner v. Eurich, 263 App. Div. 744,
31 N.Y.S. 2d 233 (1941) (dictum).
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•.. [W]hen one of the contracting parties prevents or waives the literal per-
formance of a condition precedent, which the other is ready and offers to fulfill,
he cannot avail himself of such non-performance to relieve him from his own
obligation.
A broker, employed to make a sale, under an agreement for the exclusion of
all other agencies, is entitled to his commissions when he produces a party ready
to make the purchase at a satisfactory price. . . .43
In that case the owner had sold four thousand muskets through another
agent, and had, therefore, refused to sell to the buyer found by the plain-
tiff. The other case, Levy v. Rothe, involved a situation where considera-
tion had been paid for a sole agency, the owner sold his own property,
and the broker recovered a commission.
4 4
In the Moses case it appears that the broker probably found a buyer
prior to the revocation of his authority, in which case, he was obviously
entitled to his commission. Were the buyer found after revocation, the
result perhaps would have differed. The offer, in the Levy case, was given
for consideration and therefore binding. These two cases then are not
entitled to their position as establishing a rule allowing the broker to
recover when the owner sells the property himself under the usual "ex-
clusive right to sell" agreement.
Ohio courts have arrived at decisions applying proper theory, 45 prom-
issory estoppel, 46 and the part performance theory. 47 Pennsylvania courts
have allowed the broker a commission where the owner sold the property
himself during the exclusive agency, or right to sell period.
4
8 Vatious
other courts have allowed the broker to recover a commission with no
discussion of the lack of consideration being given for the owner's prom-
ise to keep the offer open.
49
Some jurisdictions have allowed revocation, but have allowed the
broker to recover on a quantum meruit basis.50 This view is criticized in
43 31 N.Y. 462, 464 (1865).
44 17 Misc. 402, 39 N.Y. Supp. 1057 (1896).
45 Davis v. Hora, 63 N.E. 2d 843 (Ohio App., 1944).
46 Richter v. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati, 82 Ohio App. 421, 80 N.E. 2d 243 (1947).
47 Bell v. Dimmerling, 149 Ohio St. 165, 78 N.E. 2d 49 (1948).
4SByme v. Bushkoff, 177 Pa. Super. 101, 110 A. 2d 813 (1955) "exclusive right to
sell"; John Whiteman & Co. v. Fidei, 176 Pa. Super. 142, 106 A. 2d 644 (1954); Werner
v. Hindle, 129 Pa. Super. 137, 194 At. 754 (1937) exclusive agency.
49Piatt & Heath Co. v. Wilmer, 87 Mont. 382, 288 Pac. 1021 (1930); Melzner v.
Toman, 57 N.D. 639, 223 N.W. 691 (1929); Torrey & Dean, Inc. v. Coyle, 138 Ore. 509,
7 P. 2d 260 (1932); Holmes v. Halik, 238 S.W. 2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App., 1951) which
quoted Bell v. Dimmerling, 149 Ohio St. 165, 78 N.E. 2d 49 (1948) at length.
50 Geyler v. Dailey, 70 Ariz. 135, 217 P. 2d 583 (1950) where the commission was
allowed because broker found a buyer the day after the revocation; Ferguson v. Bovee,
239 Iowa 775, 32 N.W. 2d 924 (1948). See Nicholson v. Alderson, 347 ill. App. 496,
107 N.E. 2d 39 (1952).
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John T. Burns & Sons, Inc. v. Brasco where it was stated that whatever
the owner promised, he did not promise to pay the broker the fair value
of his services, nor did he get anything of value for those services. 51 Either
the owner was liable for a commission or he was not liable at all. Allowing
recovery on a quantun meruit basis is prompted by sympathy for the
broker, and not legal theory.
In 1952, an Illinois court, in Nicholson v. Alderson, followed proper
legal theory and refused to grant a broker a commission, where the owner
sold his property after written notice of revocation during the exclusive
period, no consideration being given for the exclusive by the broker.52
Earlier decisions were less astute. In Schwartz v. Akerland (1926) a
broker was allowed to recover a commission where the owner had sold
the property through another broker during the exclusive agency period.5n
The broker's advertisement was held to be consideration for the promise
to keep the offer open. Wozniak v. Siegle, four years earlier, did not al-
low a commission in a similar situation. 54 In 1911, in Pretzel v. Anderson, a
broker was refused a commission under an exclusive agency agreement
where he found a purchaser within the period, but after revocation by
the owner.55 The court stated:
The contract is not under seal, and was not paid for when given. It is uni-
lateral, it is maintained, and without consideration-a nudum pactum, liable to
be revoked at will ... [as to contentions that advertising, etc. constituted con-
sideration, it was said] we do not think, however, this a consideration which
makes the agency irrevocable either generally or for any time specified there-
in.56
CONCLUSION
About forty years ago, a New Jersey court, in allowing a broker to
recover in a situation similar to that discussed here, claimed that the gov-
erning rule was a "doctrine of public policy intended to effectuate justice
between the parties."57 This statement explains all the twisting and turn-
ing done to allow the broker a commission, but does not explain the ne-
cessity for overthrowing the common-law rule requiring consideration for
a promise in order to make it binding. That rule, too, has for its basis the
intention to "effectuate justice between the parties." Consider the mort-
gagor, in 1954, pressed to meet payments, who decided to sell his property,
giving a broker an exclusive right to sell for no consideration.58 Two
51327 Mass. 261, 98 N.E. 2d 262 (1951).
52 347 II1. App. 496, 107 N.E. 2d 39 (1952).
58 240 I11. App. 480 (1926).
54 226 11. App. 619 (1922).
55 162 I11. App. 538 (1911). 56 Ibid., at 541.
57 Stevenson Co. v. Oppenheimer, 91 N.J.L. 479, 104 Atd. 88 (1918).
58 John Whiteman & Co. v, Fidei, 176 Pa. Super. 142, 106 A. 2d 644 (1954),
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months later when the broker had not yet sold the property, this mort-
gagor, under threat of foreclosure, reconveyed to the mortgagee. This
was held to constitute a sale within contemplation of the parties, and the
mortgagor-seller had to pay a commission though he had received no con-
sideration for his irrevocable offer. Suffice to say, the equities are not al-
ways with the broker. A resurgence of the doctrine of consideration to
render a promise binding might better "effectuate justice between the
parties."
The basic fallacy in this area is the supposition that the owner bargained
for the broker's efforts, or that these efforts constitute an acceptance of
the owner's offer. It is submitted that this is contrary to the agreement,
and to the owner's promise, which would reward only success, regardless
of verbiage about "services." "The acceptance of a unilateral contract
must be by all the acts contemplated by the offer."59
59 Bartlett v. Keith, 325 Mass. 265, 90 N.E. 2d 308, 310 (1950).
MATTER OF TOTTEN-AN ANOMALY IN
THE LAW OF TRUSTS
The term Totten Trust' is a familiar one.2 A comprehension of the
meaning of the term exists in the minds of the majority of lawyers to
varying degrees. Yet, the very danger of the Totten Trust lies in this
vague familiarity which leads to various misconceptions.
Many lawyers feel that the Totten Trust is the law throughout the
land, and that it is certainly the law in their particular jurisdiction, though
the question may never have been litigated. There are those who accept
it as a valid trust without question, completely overlooking its transgres-
sion of many of the settled concepts of trust law. Oftentimes, bank ac-
counts for more than a single person are indiscriminately labeled as
Totten Trusts.3
The purpose of this discussion is to dispel the misunderstandings and
doubts concerning the Totten Trust. The analysis of this anomaly 4 in the
' Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
2 The Totten Trust is often referred to as a "tentative trust" also.
3 See footnote 30 for a treatment of the problem.
4 In 1905 the case Matter of Totten was thought to be judicial legislation. For example,
one author said:
"This decision has been widely commented upon by legal journals and, so far as the
writer is aware, has been unanimously disapproved. It is inconsistent with earlier au-
thorities in the State of New York. It introduces a serious anomaly into the law of
trusts; indeed, a trust that is revocable at the will of the creator can hardly be said to be
a trust at all. It impugns the policy of the statute of wills, by permitting a disposition of
property to take effect only after death, without following the testamentary require-
ments. On the other hand, as a piece of constructive legislation the decision could hard-
ly be too highly praised. It effectuates a custom which has grown up among the hum-
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history and law of trusts will involve a complete coverage of the area, in-
cluding an analysis of states adhering to the doctrine, states which have re-
jected it, and states which, have never considered it.
BACKGROUND TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS
I. HISTORY
Uses and Trusts were introduced into England shortly after the Nor-
man conquest." Maitland suggests that the first general employment of
trusts would be as uses in the thirteenth century when lands were con-
veyed to be held to the use of the Franciscan Friars, who by the laws of
their order were not allowed individually or as a community to own
property.6 By the fifteenth century, the custom of conveying land to
uses had become so common that during the reign of Henry V (1413-
1422), it has been said, that the greater part of land in England was held in
use.7 By this method, tenants could avoid the exactions of their lord, for-
feitures and dower could be avoided, creditors could not reach the cestui
que, and religious corporations could hold land in spite of the mortmain
acts.8 At first, these trusts or uses were purely honorary and not enforce-
able in any court of law because of the rigidity of early English law.
bier classes of people who, in placing their money on deposit in trust for other persons,
often intend to retain the right to use it, principal as well as interest, during life, but that
whatever remains at the time of death shall go the cestuis que trust. Under the law as it
stood the estates of depositors, who as trustees had drawn money from accounts, would
be liable to refund the same to the cestuis que trust. The validation of the business cus-
tom in question seems so unobjectionable, indeed so desirable, that the writer has on
various occasions advocated the enactment of a statute on just the lines laid down in the
Matter of Totten. He did not believe that a court would venture upon such a radical
innovation and it is difficult to justify it as an exercise of judicial power." 14 Yale Law
Journal 312, 315 (1905).
5 There has been some conflict among the authorities as to the derivation of the trust.
Some scholars believed that the trust evolved from the Roman fidei-commissum. Story
Eq. Juris. S§ 966, 967 (1918). Pomeroy, Eq. Juris § 976-978 (1918).
More recently however the authorities have agreed that the trust evolved from the
German treuhand or Salmon. Holmes, Early English Equity, 1 L. Quart. Rev. 162
(1885); Ames, Origin of Uses & Trusts, 2 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal
History, 739, 740 (1893); Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 127, 136
(1894). It also has been suggested that the Wakf or WVaqf which is the equivalent
under Moslem law of a charitable trust, gave rise to the English use or trust. Khadduri &
Liebesny, I Law in the Middle East, 212-218 (1955). Consult Newman on Trusts,
4-9 (2nd Ed. 1955) for the trust concept in other legal systems.
6 Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 127, 130 (1894).
7 Digby, History of Law of Real Property, 320 (1950). The words "use" and "trust"
are often employed as synonyms. However there was a distinction at common law.
A, trust which was active or special, that is, one where the trustee had duties to per-
form was properly called a "trust." When the trust was passive and the trustee had
no duties to perform, it was called a "use." Also see Ecclesiastical Origin of the Use,
10 Notre Dame L. Rev. 353 (1935).
8 See I Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, 13 (1951).
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There could be no remedy at law unless a writ could be found to fit your
case and no such writ existed for the beneficiary of a trust or use. Thus,
the trustee of the property could do with it as he wished and the bene-
ficiary was helpless to stop him.9 However, with the development of the
Court of Chancery, the uses and trusts became enforceable, since in
Chancery, equity and fairness ruled and not technicality. 10
In 1535, the Statute of Uses'1 was passed, the object of which was to
convert the equitable interest of the cestui que use into a legal interest.
This was passed to prevent the loss of feudal rights by the landlords; ob-
viate fraud on creditors, alienees, doweresses and tenants by the curtesy;
and injure the religious orders which were the beneficiaries of uses.' 2 The
statute expressly did not apply to personal property and was held, upon
interpretataion, to apply only to passive trusts or uses, thus leaving Chanc-
ery free to enforce active trusts. 8 All these interests which were unaffect-
ed by the Statue of Uses, and which were recognized and enforced by
Chancery, became more commonly known as "trusts" and form the basis
of our modern system of that subject.'
4
11. DEFINITION
The difficulty with defining a trust'5 has led many authors to list its
characteristics rather than to attempt a definition. The following charac-
teristics are to be noticed: (1) a trust is a relationship; (2) it is a relation-
ship of a fiduciary character; (3) it is a relationship with respect to prop-
erty, not one involving merely personal duties; (4) it involves the existence
9 Ames, Lectures on Legal History 236, 237 (1893). Holdsworth IV History of
English Law 407 (1922).
10 Ames, Origin of Uses and Trusts, 2 Select Essays in Aug. 6-American Legal His-
tory, 741, 742 (1893).
1127 Henry VIII (1535), C. 10.
12 Jenks, Short History of English Law 99 (1949). Also see Holdsworth, Causes
Which Shaped The Statute of Uses, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 108, 121 (1912).
13 In Tyrrels' Case, Dyer 155 (1557), the statute was held not to apply to a use on
a use. For a discussion of the effect of the Statute of Uses, see I Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees § 5 (1951).
14 See 17 Mich. L. Rev. 87 (1918) for a discussion of the reasons for the survival of
the trust.
15 The Restatement of Trusts adopts the definition that it is "a fiduciary relation-
ship with respect to property subjecting the person by whom the property is held
to equitable duties to deal withthe property for the benefit of another person, which
arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it." Rest., Trusts S 2 (1935).
Bogert defines a trust as a "fiduciary relationship in which one person holds a
property interest for the benefit of another, Bogert, I Trusts and Trustees S 1 (1951).
Walter G. Hart, after considering and criticizing all the important definitions since
1734, defines a trust as "an obligation imposed, either expressly or by implication of
law, whereby the obligor is bound to deal with the property over which he has con-
trol for the benefit of certain persons, of whom he may himself be one, and any one
of whom may enforce the obligation." What Is a Trust? 15 L. Quart. Rev. 301 (1899).
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of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to
deal with it for the benefit of another; and (5) it arises as a result of a
manifestation of intention to create the relationship. The combination of
these things characterizes the notion of the trust as that notion has been
developed in the Anglo-American law.
III. CLASSIFICATION
Trusts, in respect to the ways in which they arise, are divided into (1)
express trusts, (2) resulting trusts, and (3) constructive trusts.16 Express
trusts come into being because the parties concerned have formed the
actual intent that they shall arise and have expressed that intent in written
or spoken words or otherwise and have made the requisite property trans-
fers. Resulting trusts occur where the courts presume or infer from cer-
tain acts that the parties intended a trust to exist, although the parties ex-
pressed no such trust intent directly and may not actually have it. Con-
structive trusts are imposed by chancery on the holders of legal or equita-
ble titles as means of accomplishing justice and preventing unjust enrich-
ment. The scope of this discussion shall be hereafter limited to the express
trust.
IV. CREATION
The principal methods of creating an express trust are generally treated
according to the following enumeration: (1) a declaration by the owner
of property that he holds it as trustee for another person; (2) a transfer
inter vivos by the owner of property to another person as trustee for the
transferor or for a third person; (3) a transfer by will by the owner of
property to another person as trustee for a third person; (4) an appoint-
ment by one person having a power of appointment to another person as
trustee for the donee of the power or for a third person; (5) a promise
by one person to another person whose rights thereunder are to be held
in trust for a third person.17 These methods of creation shall become im-
portant in a subsequent discussion of the validity of the legal results of
the Matter of Totten.
16This classification is ado ted in the Restatement of Trusts in Section 2 (1935).
I Scott on Trusts § 2.1 (2nd e ., 1956), also adopts the classification. Cf. Bogert 1 Trusts
and Trustees 7 (1951). Bogert classifies trusts into two main groups, express trusts and
implied trusts with two subdivisions under each main heading. Private and charitable
trusts are under the heading of express trusts while resulting and constructive trusts
are subheads under implied trusts. Some authors have classified trusts into four groups,
namely, express, implied, resulting and constructive. They feel that an implied trust
exists because the parties used certain language which does not clearly create a trust,
but is construed by the courts to have that intent. Lewin, Trusts, 16, 82 (14th ed., 1888);
Perry on Trusts S 112 (7th ed., 1889).
17 See Rest., Trusts § 17, (1935); 1 Scott on Trusts § 17-17.5 (2nd ed., 1956); 1 Bogert,
Trusts and Trustees, S 41-80 (1951).
COMMENTS
V. ELEMENTS
The authorities agree that there must be four distinct elements in every
private express trust. They have been enumerated as follows: (1) there
must be an intent to create a trust; (2) there must be a trustee; (3) there
must be a res; (4) there must be a cestui que trust. These are determined
by asking four questions: (1) Is a trust intended? (2) Who is trustee?
(3) Of what is he trustee? (4) For whom is he trustee? 8
VI. REVOCATION OF A TRUST
It is important to note in the discussion of the Totten Trust that the
ordinary trust is irrevocable by the settlor, unless he demonstrates his
desire for a power of revocation. This reservation of a right of revocation
does not invalidate a trust 19 since the exercise of the right to revoke
operates as a condition subsequent.20 Further, it has been said that "unless
it can be gathered from the language used by the settlor or from the cir-





A trust may often involve the post-mortem distribution of property
and, as such, is commonly known as an inter vivos trust.22 In effect, it is
a disposition of property generally accomplished by a will.23 By definition,
a will is "the expression, in the manner required by law, and operative for
no purpose until death." 24 It would seem that an inter vivos trust falls
under this definition and, therefore, to avoid fraud, should comply with
the formalities required by the Statute of Wills. 25 The law here makes a
18 The settlor of a trust is the person who intentionally causes the trust to come
into existence. The trustee is the person who holds the title for the benefit of another.
The trust property is the property interest which the trust holds, subject to the rights
of another. The beneficiary is the person for whose benefit the trust property is held
or used by the trustee. See 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 1 (1951).
19 Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225, 229 (1879).
20 The recognition of the validity of rights of revocation in trusts presents no diffi-
culty when one considers that rights of re-entry for condition broken and rights for
revocation in obsolete deeds are now recognized in England and the United States.
Tiffany, Real Property, S 681 (3rd ed., 1939).
21 3 Scott on Trusts 2393 (2nd ed., 1956).
22 See 1 Scott on Trusts S 56 (2nd ed., 1956).
23 The trust does have two of the three important qualities of a will: It can be rev-
ocable and it has the "hereditative" quality, i.e., it appoints someone to represent the
settlor after his death to carry out his intentions. The trust lacks the ambulatory quality
of a will. II Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 315 (2nd ed., 1903).
24 Gardner, Wills 1 (2nd ed., 1916).
25 "The legislatures have presumably balanced the hardship to the intended benefici-
aries which occurs where there is an intention to create a trust, against the hardship
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distinction. If the transferor succeeded in divesting himself in praesenti of
the interest he wished to transfer, the Statute of Wills is in no way in-
volved. But, if he retained an interest which upon his death was to go to
another, his effort was testamentary and the statute must be complied with.
Therefore, there must be found a valid transfer inter vivos in order to
uphold the trust. It is here that the problem arises, since, in each case,
the court must decide whether or not the combined effect of all the
powers, rights, control and dominion reserved by the settlor is such as to
leave him virtually the owner of the property and the trustee his mere
agent. It must decide what extent of control is sufficient in the settlor
to nullify the purported technical vesting of legal title in the trustee. It
must also draw the line between a valid inter vivos trust and an attempted
testamentary disposition.26 A later discussion of the Totten Trust indicates
that this line is not clearly drawn.
27
THE MATTER OF TOTTEN
I. FACTUAL SITUATION
The factual situation which has created the problems of the Totten
Trust now confronting the courts arises when a person makes a deposit
in a savings bank or in the savings department of a bank or trust company
in his own name "in trust" for another. The depositor simply designates
himself on the deposit card as trustee for the named beneficiary. Some-
what analogous situations arise when the deposit is made in some other
form, but with the intention of giving an interest in the deposit to another.
These situations arise when the deposit is made in the name of the deposi-
tor and he subsequently makes an assignment of it to another,28 when the
which would result from making false claims; and in order to prevent the making of
false claims they have required that the disposition should be evidenced in a certain
formal manner." 1 Scott on Trusts § 55.9, 420 (2nd ed., 1956).
20 The instruments, in the words of Mr. Justice Holmes in Bromley v. Mitchell, 155
Mass. 509, 30 N.E. 83 (1892), have a "testamentary look" and the line must be drawn
somewhere.
27 Because the Totten or tentative trust circumvents the Statute of Wills, dispensing
with the necessitT for probate or administration, it has often been referred to as the
"poor man's will.'Newman on Trusts 77 (2nd ed., 1955).
28 This is a question of the gift of a choses in action which will be incomplete unless
the donor delivers the savings bank book to the donee or delivers a deed of gift. If the
gift is imperfect the courts generally do not declare a trust, Eschen v. Steers, 10 F.
2d 739 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926); Knickerberg v. Hoff, 201 Ark. 63, 143 S.W. 2d 560 (1940);
Noble v. Learned, 153 Cal. 245, 94 Pac. 1047 (1908); Trubey v. Pease, 240 111. 512, 88
N.E. 1005 (1909); First and Tri-State National Bank & Trust Co. v. Caywood, 95 Ind.
App. 591, 176 N.E. 871 (1933); Sinift v. Sinift, 229 Iowa 56, 284 N.W. 91, 293 N.W. 841
(1929, 1940); Frazier v. Hudson, 279 Ky. 334, 130 S.W. 2d 809 (1939); Rock v. Rock,
309 Mass. 44, 33 N.E. 2d 1973 (1941); Detroit Bank v. Bradfield, 324 Mich. 124, 36 N.W.
873 (1949); State ex rel. Union National Bank of Springfield v. Blair, 350 Mo. 622, 166
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deposit is made in the name of another, 29 and when the deposit is made in
the name of the depositor and another jointly.
30
1I. THE PROBLEM
The problem then arises whether the depositor has created a trust, and,
if so, the kind of trust. The answer to this problem will be solved by a
scrutinization of the settlor's intention in setting up the trust. This ques-
tion has been previously referred to in this discussion as the first element
to be considered in the examination of a trust in the determination of its
validity.3 ' The possible intentions of the depositor when he makes the de-
posit "in trust" for another may be (1) to create an irrevocable trust; (2)
not to create a trust; (3) to create a revocable trust. 32 The courts must
determine this intention by examining the evidence of it or by conjectur-
ing in the absence of it. The remainder of the discussion shall be devoted
to an analysis of these possible intentions as presented by the facts of each
case.
1II. THE HISTORY IN NEW YORK
The history of the New York decisions must first be studied if one is to
acquire an intelligent grasp of the situation since it is here that the court
decided The Matter of Totten. The early cases doubted that a deposit in
a savings bank "in trust" for another created a trust if there was no evi-
dence of an intention to create a trust other than the mere form of the
deposit. There was even conjecture whether a trust resulted without a de-
livery of the bank book to the cestui que trust. However, it was held in
Martin v. Funk33 that the depositor's retention of the bank book was not
inconsistent with the creation of a trust since it was only natural to expect
S.W. 1085 (1942); Matter of Solot, 50 N.Y.S. 2d 401 (1944); Hagerott v. Davis, 73
N.D. 532, 17 N.W. 26 (1944); Ratcliff v. Lee, 200 Okla. 253, 192 P. 2d 843 (1948); Alls-
house's Estate, 304 Pa. 481, 156 Ad. 69 (1931); Taylor v. Staples, 8 R.I. 170, 5 Am. Rep.
556 (1865); Mathews v. Drew, 106 Vt. 245, 172 Atl. 638 (1934).
29This is neither a trust nor an assignment of a chose in action. It is consideration
paid to the bank for its promise to pay the amount of the deposit to another party.
I Scott, § 58.6 (2nd ed., 1956).
30This is generally not the creation of a trust but the payment of consideration to
the bank for its promise made to the depositor and the other party. Although no ques-
tion of the law of trusts is involved, the courts sometimes speak in the terminology of
trusts. But it should be noted that there may be the intent to create a trust for a third
person. Jarkieh v. Badagliacco, 75 Cal. App. 2d 505, 170 P. 2d 994 (1946).
31 The other elements for the creation of a trust are obviously present. The de-
positor's claim against the bank is specific trust property. He has communicated his
declaration to a third party. The beneficiary is definite and identified.
32 See Rest. Trusts, S 58, comment a (1935) which adopts the language of the Totten
case.
8375 N.Y. 134, 31 Am. Rep. 446 (1878).
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a trustee to retain it. The court further stated that communication to the
beneficiary is unnecessary to the creation of a trust. It should be observed
that the court concerned itself with the questions of the creation of a trust
and whether it was irrevocable. The case is only authority for the con-
clusion that a trust of a savings bank deposit can be created without de-
livery of the bank book to the beneficiary and without communication to
him of the intention to create a trust if there was evidence of the deposi-
tor's intention to create a trust other than the mere form of the deposit.
The Court of Appeals of New York eleven years later in Beaver v.
Beaver34 held that, when the deposit was in fact made in the name of an-
other and not in the name of the depositor as trustee for another, that even
if the deposit had been made in the name of the depositor in trust for the
other that the mere form of the deposit alone was insufficient to raise an
inference that the depositor intended to create a trust. The court still as-
sumed that it was either a question of no trust or an irrevocable trust.
Then, fifteen years later, the New York Court of Appeals decided the
case of Matter of Totten.35 The court there held that, in the absence of
evidence that an irrevocable trust was intended or that no trust at all was
intended, there arose an inference from the mere form of the deposit that
the depositor intended to create a revocable trust. Thus, the court recog-
nized that there are not merely two possible alternatives, but that there is
a third-a revocable trust.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE
TOTTEN TRUST AT THE STATE LEVEL
The situation of a deposit in the bank by the depositor in trust for an-
other in the absence of other evidence as to the intention of the depositor
has resulted in a division of courts as to the formation of a trust.a0 A num-
34 117 N.Y. 421, 22 N.E. 940 (1889); 137 N.Y. 59, 32 N.E. 998 (1893).
35 "After much reflection upon the subject, guided by the principles established by
our former decisions, we announce the following as our conclusion: A deposit by one
person of his own money in his own name as trustee for another standing alone, does
not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative
trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his life-
time by some unequivocal act on declaration, such as delivery of the passbook or notice
to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary in that revocation,
or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an abso-
lute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor." 179 N.Y.
112, 125, 71 N.E. 748, 752.
36There is even a division of authorities on the conclusion to be drawn from the
cases. "In most states.., the inference is that the depositor intended to create a trust
but to reserve power to revoke it at any time," Scott, § 58.1, 478 (2nd ed., 1955). "The
tendency is to hold that the depositor impliedly intends to reserve a power of revoca-
tion by act inter vivos or by will," Bogert, 1 Trusts and Trustees, § 47, 327 (1951).
"When funds are deposited in the name of the depositor in trust for another person,
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ber of courts, following the decision of the Totten case, have held that
there is an inference that the depositor intended to create a revocable
trust.8 7 There is also some authority for the proposition that there is an
inference of the creation of an irrevocable trust.-s Furthermore, some few
cases hold that there is an inference that the depositor did not intend to
create any kind of a trust.8 9
A problem again results when there is evidence to be considered by the
court. The evidence will be important when it conflicts with the prevail-
ing tendency of the state. The states which follow the theory of the Tot-
ten case and presume a revocable trust from the mere bank account in
trust for another will be confronted by a conflict when the evidence shows
that the depositor either intended no trust or an irrevocable trust. In con-
trast, those states which hold that there is an irrevocable trust, will be pre-
sented with a conflict when there is evidence of either no trust or a rev-
ocable trust. Lastly, those states that hold there is no trust must find evi-
there arises, according to the law of a few states, a trust which, being revocable, is
merely tentative." Newman on Trusts, 76 (1955).
"The weight of authority, however, appears to be in support of the doctrine that the
mere fact ofsuch a deposit, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during
the lifetime of the depositor, but a tentative trust merely, which is revocable at the will
of the depositor until he dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal
act or declaration showing that the creation of a trust was intended." 7 Am. Jur. 438.
37 In the absence of evidence of a different intention of the depositor, the new fact
that a deposit is made in a savings bank is the name of the depositor "as trustee for
another person is sufficient to show an intention to create a revocable trust" Rest.,
Trusts, S 58, Comment a (1935). "... we hold that neither the retention of the passbook,
the absence of notice to the beneficiary, nor the withdrawals from and additions to
the deposit had the effect of disproving an intention on the part of the depositor to
create a trust; and we further hold, in harmony with the overwhelming weight of au-
thority, that the deposit here involved is presumptively a tentative trust, and in the
absence of evidence to rebut this presumption the beneficiary is entitled to the fund."
Wilder v. Howard, 188 Ga. 426, 4 S.E. 2d 199, 202-203 (1939). See also Walso v. Lat-
terner, 140 Minn. 455, 168 N.W. 353 (1918), 143 Minn. 364, 173 N.W. 711 (1919);
Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N.J. Eq. 743, 61 Atl. 267 (1905) aff'd 71 N.J. Eq. 777, 71 Ad. 1135
(1907); Fiocchi v. Smith, 97 At. 283 (N.J.Ch., 1916). Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112,
71 N.E. 748 (1904). "This conclusion is in accord with the doctrine of tentative trusts
which has been developed in New York, where litigation of trust bank accounts has
been much greater than with us." Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 169 Ad. 106, 108 (1933),
noted in 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 413; Banca D'Italia and Trust Co. v. Giordano, 154 Pa. Super.
452, 36 A. 2d 242 (1944); Krewson Estate, 154 Pa. Super. 509, 36 A. 2d 250 (1944).
38 "The rule of the Totten Case does not appeal to us with favor." Cazallis v. Ingra-
ham, 119 Me. 240, 110 Atl. 359, 363 (1920); Rose v. Osborne, 133 Me. 497, 180 Atl. 315
(1935).
39 "In order to make oneself trustee for another of property held by the settlor,
everythng mus be done to end the absolute dominion of the settlor." Mulloy v.
Charetown Fiv Cents Savings Bank, 285 Mass. 101, 188 N.E. 608, 610 (1934); Hogarth-
Swann v. Steele, 294 Mass. 396, 2 N.E. 2d 446 (1926). See Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N.Y.
421, 22 N.E. 940 (1889), 137 N.Y. 59, 32 N.E. 998 (1893).
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dence of an irrevocable trust. This distinction is important and must be
remembered in the analysis of evidence which is to follow.
Evidence which indicates no trust was intended shows that the deposit
was made in his own name as trustee for another merely for a private and
different purpose of the depositor. A depositor's statements at the time
of the deposit that he intended no trust is receivable as part of the res
gestae and carries great weight. 40 The supposed beneficiary's statements
that no trust was intended, made with knowledge of the deposit,41 or that
the deposit was made for the purpose of receiving higher interest rates
and not as a trust 42 is receivable as strong evidence that the depositor
intended no trust. The depositor's act of obliterating the words of trust
from the bank book indicates that he had no intention of creating a trust.I
A deposit subsequent to the death of the named beneficiary indicates no
trust but a mere form of convenience of the depositor. 44 The fact that
the depositor has used the interest accruing upon the deposit for his per-
sonal benefiit has some tendency to show that the depositor intended no
trust, and considered along with other facts has led to a decision that
there was no trust.45 The use by the depositor of the account as his only
active account for the transaction of his business is strong evidence against
a trust.46 Failure to indicate the trust intent by notice, delivery of the
book, or in some other manner, is strong evidence that no trust was in-
tended if this occurs before the death of the named benefiiciary. 47 Further,
40 Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 54 Atl. 994 (1904); Connecticut River Savings
Bank v. Albee's Estate, 64 Vt. 571, 25 Atl. 487 (1893); Malley's Estate v. Malley, 69 R.I.
407, 34 A. 2d 761 (1943). But the testimony is inadmissible if the depositor is dead.
Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, 195 N.Y. 433, 88 N.E. 750 (1909); Matter of Bunt, 96 Misc. 114,
160 N.Y. Supp. 111 (1916); In re Peaman's Estate, 163 N.Y. Supp. 800 (1917); Merigan
v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 54 AtI. 994 (1903); Ray v. Simmons, 11 R.I. 266, 23 Am. Rep.
447 (1875); Connecticut River Say. Bank v. Albee's Estate, 64 Vt. 571, 25 Ad. 487
(1893); Bradford v. Enton Say. Bank of Baltimore City, 186 Md. 127, 46 A. 2d 284
(1946); In re Ryan's Will, 52 N.Y.S. 2d 502 (1944).
41 Barefield v. Rosell, 177 N.Y. 387, 69 N.E. 732 (1904); Devlin v. Hinman, 34 App.
Div. 107, 54 N.Y. Supp. 496 (1898); Moschetti v. De Cubellis, 66 R.I. 463, 20 A. 2d 253
(1941).
42 Matter of Mueller, 15 App. Div. 67, 44 N.Y. Supp. 280 (1897).
48 In re Bulwinkle, 107 App. Div. 331, 95 N.Y. Supp. 176 (1905).
44Ibid.
4 5Mary v. Williams, 83 Hun. 243, 31 N.Y. Supp. 620; aff'd 744 N.Y. 701, 39 N.E. 858
(1895); Garvey v. Clifford, 114 App. Div. 193, 99 N.Y. Supp. 555 (1906); Thomas v.
Newburgh Sav. Bank, 73 Misc. 308, 130 N.Y. Supp. 810; aff'd 147 App. Div. 937, 132
N.Y. Supp. 1148 (1911).
4 6 Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235, 69 Ad. 807 (1908).
47 Cunningham v. Davenport, 147 N.Y. 43, 41 N.E. 412 (1895); Haux v. Dry Dock
Sav. Inst., 2 App. Div. 165, 37 N.Y. Supp. 917; aff'd 154 N.Y. 736, 49 N.E. 1097 (1896);
In re Bulwinlde, 107 App. Div. 331, 95 N.Y. Supp. 176 (1905); Garvey v. Clifford, 114
App. Div. 193, 99 N.Y. Supp. 555 (1906); Matter of United States Trust Co. of New
COMMENTS
the depositor's allowance of the account to stand as a trust account after
the death of the supposed beneficiary 48 or an addition to the account after
his death49 does not show a complete trust. It may also appear from the
evidence that the deposit was made in order to evade a statute or by law
of the bank limiting the amount of the deposits permitted to individual
depositors, or to conceal the true ownership of the deposit.Y°
The evidence may also show that the depositor intended to create an
irrevocable trust. A statement by the depositor to a third person of his
intention to make the trust irrevocable constitutes strong evidence of irrev-
ocability.5 ' A notification by depositor to the beneficiary that the de-
posit has been made in trust form shows a strong indication of an irrev-
ocable trust 52 but this may be rebutted by other facts in the case. 53 A de-
York, 117 App Div. 178, 102 N.Y. Supp. 271 (1907); In re Duffy, 127 App. Div. 74,
111 N.Y. Supp. 77 (1908); In re Smith's Estate, 40 Misc. 331, 81 N.Y. Supp. 1035 (1903);
In re Thompson's Estate, 85 Misc. 291, 147 N.Y. Supp. 402 (1914); Rambo v. Pile, 220
Pa. 235, 69 At. 807 (1908). Contra: Bishop v. Seamen's Bank for Savings, 33 App. Div.
181, 53 N.Y. Supp. 488 (1898). And see In re Kive's Estate, 139 Misc. 273, 248 N.Y. Supp.
677 (1931); In re Vaughan's Estate, 145 Misc. 332, 260 N.Y. Supp. 197 (1932).
4s Garvey v. Clifford, 114 App. Div. 193, 99 N.Y. Supp. 555 (1906). Rambo v. Pile,
220 Pa. 235, 69 Atl. 807 (1908).
49 In re Bulwinkle, 107 App. Div. 331, 95 N.Y. Supp. 186 (1905).
50 Kosloskye v. Cis, 70 Cal. App. 2d 174, 160 P. 2d 565 (1945); Foschia v. Foschia,
158 Md. 69, 148 Ad. 121 (1930); Brabook v. Boston Five Cents Saving Bank, 104 Mass.
228, 6 Am. Rep. 222 (1870); Parkham v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 151 Mass. 218, 24 N.E. 43
(1890), Cleveland v. Hampden Savings Bank, 182 Mass. 110, 65 N.E. 27 (1902); Robert-
son v. Parker, 287 Mass. 351, 191 N.E. 645 (1934); Frank v. Heimann, 302 Mo. 334,
258 S.W. 1000 (1924); Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235, 69 Ad. 807 (1908); Peoples Savings
Bank v. Webb, 21 R.I. 218, 42 Atl. 874 (1899); Malley v. Malley, 69 R.I. 407, 34 A. 2d
761 (1943). See also Stamford Savings Bank v. Everett, 132 Conn. 92, 42 A. 2d 662
(1945); Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 54 At. 994 (1904). Compare Schauberger
v. Tafel, 202 Ky. 9, 258 S.W. 953 (1924).
5' Miller v. Clark, 40 Fed. 15 (C.C.D. Conn., 1889), appeal dismissed 138 U.S. 223
(1891); Sayre v. Weil, 94 Ala. 466, 10 So. 546 (1891); Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512,
16 Am. Rep. 69 (1873); Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 At. 43 (1899); Mucha v.
Jackson, 119 N.J. Eq. 348, 182 Ad. 827 (1936); Eagles Building & Loan Association v.
Fiducia, 135 N.J. Eq. 7, 37 A. 2d 116 (1944), aff'd mem. 136 N.J. Eq. 117, 40 A. 2d 627
(1945); Provident Institution for Savings v. Bolton, 140 N.J. Eq. 1, 52 A. 2d 833 (1947).
52 Kuck v. Raftery, 117 Cal. App. 755, 4 P. 2d 552 (1931), noted in 4 Detroit L.J. 93;
Genish v. New Bradford Institution, 128 Mass. 159, 35 Am. Rep. 365 (1880); Alger v.
North Ed Savings Bank, 146 Mass. 418, 15 N.E. 916 (1888); Scrivens v. North Easton
Savings Bank, 166 Mass. 255, 44 N.E. 251 (1896); McCaffrey v. North Adams Savings
Bank, 244 Mass. 396, 138 N.E. 393 (1923); Burteau v. Lavalle, 284 Mass. 276, 187 N.E.
628 (1933); Matter of Pierce, 132 App. Div. 465, 116 N.Y. Supp. 816 (1909); Matter of
Cohen, 90 N.Y. Supp. 2d 776 (1949); McGary Estate, 355 Pa. 232, 40 A. 2d 350 (1946);
Atkinson, Petitioner, 16 R.I. 413, 16 Ad. 712 (1889); Slepkow v. McSoley, 54 R.I. 210,
172 Ad. 328 (1934). See Matter of Gron, 62 N.Y. Supp. 2d 392 (1936). Cf. O'Hara v.
O'Hara, 291 Mass. 75, 195 N.E. 909 (1925).
58 Peterman's Estate 56 D. & C. 365 (Pa., 1946); Ingels Estate, 372 Pa. 171, 92 A. 2d
881 (1952), noted in 26 Temple L. Q. 468 (1953), 14 U. Pitts. L. Rev. 627 (1953).
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livery of the bank book by the depositor to the beneficiary also indicates
an intention of an irrevocable trust54 but it may be shown that the delivery
was to the beneficiary for safekeeping purposes only.55
V. CONFLICT WITH THE STATUTE OF WILLS
The previous discussion of the effect of the Statute of Wills as an at-
tempted trust which passed no present interest indicated that this at-
tempted trust failed because it did not comply with the wills act. This
law becomes important when a deposit is made in trust for another and
the court has declared that there exists a power of revocation in the de-
positor. There is no problem if the court has held that there is no trust
created by the deposit since the disposition fails on trust principles and
not on those of wills. On the other hand, if there is an inference or evi-
dence of the creation of an irrevocable trust, there is again no question as
to the effect of the Statute of Wills since the disposition is not testamen-
54 Emanuelson v. Delle, 8 Conn. Supp. 180 (1940); Scanzo v. Morano, 284 Mass. 188,
187 N.E. 552 (1933); Harrington v. Donlin, 312 Mass. 577, 45 N.E. 2d 953 (1942); Long
Branch Banking Co. v. Winter, 112 N.J. Eq. 218, 163 Ati. 903 (1933); Trust Company
of New Jersey v. Farawell, 127 N.J. Eq. 45, 11 A. 2d 98 (1940); Hickey v. Kahl, 129
N.J. Eq. 233, 19 A. 2d 33 (1941); Davlin v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 229 App.
Div. 269, 241 N.Y. Supp. 712 (1930), aff'd 255 N.Y. 559, 175 N.E. 312 (1930), Hanigan
v. Wright, 233 App. Div. 82, 251 N.Y. Supp. 651 (1931), aff'd 257 N.Y. 602, 178 N.E.
813 (1931); Matter of Farrell, 298 N.Y. 129, 81 N.E. 2d 51 (1948). Noted in 17 Fordham
L. Rev. 295 (1948), 37 Georgetown L.J. 281 (1948), 47 Mich. L. Rev. 727 (1949), 35
Va. L. Rev. 272. Imperatrice v. Imperatrice, 77 N.Y. Supp. 2d 437 (1947), aff'd mem.
298 N.Y. 549, 81 N.E. 2d 95 (1948); Matter of La Brasche, 301 N.Y. 718, 790, 95 N.E.
2d 404 (1950), aff'g Application of Siverson, 276 App. Div. 1025, 95 N.Y. Supp. 2d 591
(1950); Tibbitts v. Zink, 231 App. Div. 339, 247 N.Y. Supp. 300 (1931); Larkin v.
Greenwich Savings Bank, 241 App. Div. 874, 271 N.Y. Supp. 288 (1934); Matter of
Rosso, 146 Misc. 746, 262 N.Y. Supp. 861 (1933). Matter of Smith, 177 Misc. 601, 31
N.Y.S. 2d 603 (1941); Knast Estate 66 D. & C. 383 (Pa., 1949); Gobeille v. Allison,
30 R.I. 525, 76 Atl. 354 (1901).
55 Greeley v. Flynn, 310 Mass. 23, 36 N.E. 2d 394 (1941), noted in 30 Georgetown L.J.
104 (1941); Johnson v. Savings Investment and Trust Co., 110 N.J. Eq. 466, 160 AtI. 371
(1932); Mathews v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 208 N.Y. 508, 102 N.E. 520 (1913); Matter
of Bowen, 156 Misc. 435, 282 N.Y. Supp. 290 (1935), aff'd without opinion, 247 App.
Div. 708, 774, 286 N.Y. Supp. 1005 (1936); Thomas Brevoort Savings Bank, 275 App.
Div. 724, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 411 (1949); McKeever v. Empire Trust Co., 270 N.Y. Supp. 494
(1934); Matter of Slobiansky, 152 Misc. 232, 273 N.Y. Supp. 869 (1934). Bearinger's
Estate, 336 Pa. 253, 9 A. 2d 342 (1939). But the exclusive possession of the bank book
by the beneficiary, sole heir and next of kin does not show the existence of an irrev-
ocable trust. In re Duffy, 127 App. Div. 74, 111 N.Y. Supp. 77 (1908). Delivery of the
bank book to a third person also may indicate an irrevocable trust. Peck v. Scofield,
186 Mass. 108, 71 N.E. 109 (1904); Martin v. Martin, 46 App. Div. 445, 61 N.Y. Supp.
814, appeal dismissed 166 N.Y. 611, 59 N.E. 1126; Scallan v. Brooks, 54 App. Div. 248,
66 N.Y. Supp. 591 (1900), Robinson v. Appleby, 69 App. Div. 509, 75 N.Y. Supp. 1,
aff'd 66 N.E. 1115, 173 N.Y. 626 (1902). But other facts may also overcome this indi-
cation of irrevocability. Latten v. Van Ness, 107 App. Div. 393, 95 N.Y. Supp. 97, aff'd
77 N.E. 1190, 184 N.Y. 601 (1905).
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tary since the depositor has passed a present interest to the beneficiary.
But the problem does arise in the situation of the revocable trust since the
depositor has not only power to revoke and modify the trust so long as
he lives but also the power to act as he likes with respect to the trust
property.
As might be expected, the decisions of the courts which recognize a
bank account in trust for another as a revocable trust are split on the issue.
New York has decided the question in favor of the trust in a multitude of
decisions, and has awarded the deposit to the beneficiary at the death of
the settlor.56 Following the lead of New York, the decisions of ten other
jurisdictions have upheld the saving bank deposits as valid trusts not in
violation of the Statute of Wills.57
However, a few states have held that the fact that the depositor intends
to retain control over the deposit during his lifetime makes the disposition
testamentary, therefore violative of the Statute of Wills, with the result
that the beneficiary is not entitled to the deposit, even though the settlor
has not attempted to revoke the trust.58
The problem among the states is further complicated by statutes, which
have been passed by the majority of states, providing that whenever a de-
posit is made in a savings bank by one person in trust for another, with
56 Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. 2d 120 (1951), noted in 15 Albany L. Rev.
254 (1952). Matter of Ellis, 178 Misc. 491, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 884 (1942) aff'd mem. 264 App.
Div. 846, 36 N.Y.S. 2d 187 (1942); Mahnken v. Seybolt, 143 Misc. 874, 257 N.Y. Supp.
622 (1932); Estate of Timko, 150 Misc. 701, 270 N.Y. Supp. 323 (1934); Hoppev. Presi-
dent and Directors of Manhattan Co., 154 Misc. 745, 278 N.Y. Supp. 26 (1935); Matter
of McCann, 155 Misc. 763, 281 N.Y. Supp. 445 (1935); Matter of Denison, 157 Misc.
385, 284 N.Y. Supp. 705 (1935); Matter of Loeffler, 97 N.Y.S. 2d 450 (1950); In re City
Savings and Loan Ass'n, 123 N.Y.S. 2d 852 (1953).
57 Kosloskye v. Cis, 70 Cal. App. 2d 174, 160 P. 2d 565 (1945); Brucks v. Home Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n, 36 Cal. 2d 845, 228 P. 2d 545 (1951); Cressy v. Fisher, 16 Conn.
Supp. 391 (1949); Delaware Trust Company v. Fitzmaurice, 27 Del. Ch. 101, 31 A. 2d
383 (1943), aff'd Creemlish v. Delaware Trust Co., 27 Del. Ch. 374, 38 A. 2d 463 (1944);
Wilder v. Howard, 188 Ga. 426, 4 S.E. 2d 199 (1939); Hale v. Hale, 313 Ky. 344, 231
S.W. 2d 2 (1950). Littig v. Mt. Calvary Church, 101 Md. 494,61 At. 635 (1905); Bollack
v. Bollack, 169 Md. 407, 182 Atl. 317 (1935); Greeley v. Flynn, 310 Mass. 23, 36 N.E. 2d
394 (1941). Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn. 455, 168 N.W. 353 (1918), 143 Minn. 364, 173
N.W. 711 (1919); Dyste v. Farmers and Mechanics Savings Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 229
N.W. 865 (1930); Coughlin v. Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272
N.W. 166 (1937); Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 169 At. 106 (1933); Pozzuto's Estate,
124 Pa. Super. 93, 188 Atl. 209 (1936); Krewsen Estate, 154 Pa. Super. 509, 36 A. 2d 250
(1944); Shapley Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A. 2d 277 (1946); Mace v. Fulton County Nat.
Bank, 79 D. & C. 325 (Pa., 1951); Ingels Estate, 372 Pa. 171, 92 A. 2d 881 (1952). See
In re Scott's Estate, 96 F. Supp. 290 (D.D.C., 1951).
5 8 Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N.J. Eq. 743, 61 Ad. 267 (1905), aff'd 71 N.J. Eq. 777, 71 Ad.
1135 (1907). It should be noted that subsequent statutory modifications in New Jersey
place it in general accord with the Totten Case. Fleck v. Baldwin, 141 Tex. 340, 172
S.W. 2d 975 (1943), aff'g Baldwin v. Fleck, 168 S.W. 2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943).
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the bank receiving no further notice from the depositor, that the bank
may pay the deposit to the beneficiary on the death of the trustee. 59 The
interpretation placed upon these statutes by the courts have indicated that
the purpose of the statute is merely to protect the bank if it makes pay-
ment to the beneficiary.60
VI. THE POSITION OF ILLINOIS
There is no question but that the formula of the "Totten Trust" is pres-
ent in Illinois.61 A depositor in a bank or saving and loan association desig-
nates himself on the deposit card as trustee for a named beneficiary. The
depositor still retains complete control over the account so long as he lives
and may withdraw, deposit, or close out the account at will.62 Upon the
death of the depositor-trustee, the named beneficiary receives the funds
so deposited. In effect, this is a Totten Trust and yet, strangely enough,
that case has not been litigated at the appellate level in Illinois courts.6
Therefore, if the issue is placed squarely before the courts in Illinois,
64
they will find themselves confronted with three problems: (1) What is
59 The following states have such a statute: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
60 The Illinois decisions on the subject will be analyzed in detail in a later section of
this comment.
61 The following are some of the banks which issue deposit cards in the Totten Trust
form: (1) Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago. Form 4-C-63;
City National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago. Form NN-6; Harris Trust & Savings
Bank. Form B-373.
62 The typical form provides: "All deposits in this account are made for the benefit
of ... (name of beneficiary) ... (residence) . . .' (relationship) .. .(date of birth) ...
(birth place) to whom or to whose legal representative said deposits or any part thereof,
together with the interest thereof, may be paid in the event of death of the undersigned
trustee . . . [S] Trustee." See the various forms as listed in footnote 61, supra. It is inter-
esting to note that there is no express reservation of revocation by the depositor-trustee
in these forms.
63 In Helfrich's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 143 F. 2d 43 (1944),
there was a savings accounts trust which the commissioner contended was "Totten"
or "tentative" and hence invalid or at best, revocable. The court, in a decision which
we shall consider, rejected the contention and found a valid irrevocable trust. The
Illinois Annotations of Rest. Trusts, S 58 (1941), reveals no cases directly on point in
Illinois. A check with some officers of Chicago banks revealed that there has been some
litigation involving the issue of the Totten Trust. This litigation, however, was minor
and inconsequential and hence is unreported. Also see 23 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 301 (1956).
64 This could most easily occur if a suit arises between the trust beneficiary and a
third person claiming an interest in the estate of the deceased depositor-trustee. There
are many other conceivable situations, i.e., Helfrich's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 143 F. 2d 43 (1944).
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the intention of the depositor in making the deposit? 65 (2) Is the trust in-
vaiid as a testamentary disposition that does not comply with the Statute
of Wills?6 (3) What is the interpretation of the Illinois statutes which
provide that a bank will be protected if it pays the deposit to the benefici-
ary on the death of the trustee.0 7 These problems shall receive separate
treatment in the succeeding paragraphs.
As stated before,0 8 the intention of the depositor when he makes a de-
posit in his own name in trust for another may be: (1) to create an irrev-
ocable trust;09 (2) not to create a trust;70 (3) to create a revocable trust.71
In Illinois, as far back as 1892,72 it was said that "where the deposit is in
the name of a third person, and there is no delivery of the bank book, the
title to the fund does not pass to such person in the absence of any decla-
ration of trust73 or circumstances showing an intention to vest title. ' 74 In a
later case, 75 the court said, "It has been said in many cases, particularly
where the ownership of bank accounts has been in controversy that the
mere form of the account76 will not be regarded as sufficiently establish-
ing the intent of the person making it to create a trust in behalf of an-
other.' 77 These two statements raise the following questions: What is a
"declaration of trust"? What is the "mere form of the account"? The
court, in using the term "declaration of trust," could have intended that
a deposit "in trust" for another would meet this requirement and form a
trust. However, an analysis of the case shows that the court intended that
"declaration of trust" is to have the same meaning as was indicated in a
leading New York case on savings accounts trusts.78 In Beaver v. Beaver7 9
05 This problem is discussed nationally under Matter of Totten, Section IV of the
text supra.
66 This problem is discussed nationally under Matter of Totten, Section V of the text
supra.
67 See footnote 59 for states with similar statutes.
68 See Matter of Totten, Section II of the text supra.
69 Cazzallis v. Ingraham, 119 Me. 240, 110 Atl. 359 (1920).
70 Mulloy v. Charlestown, Five Cents Savings Bank, 285 Mass. 101, 188 N.E. 608
(1934).
7' Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
72 Telford v. Patton, 144 I11. 611 (1892).
73 Italics added. 74 Telford v. Patton, 144 I11. 611, 625 (1892).
75 Bolton v. Bolton, 306 Ill. 473, 138 N.E. 158 (1923). 76 Italics added.
77 Bolton v. Bolton, 306 I11. 473, 485, 138 N.E. 158, 163 (1923).
7 8 Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N.Y. 421, 22 N.E. 940 (1889). Telford v. Patton relies upon
and quotes directly from this case. Beaver v. Beaver, besides holding that no trust was
created by the mere form of the deposit, also held that either an irrevocable trust was
created or no trust was created. The case was subsequently overruled by Matter of
Totten which held a trust was created by the mere form of the deposit and that it was
revocable.
71. Ibid.
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the New York court indicated that, even if a deposit had been in the name
of the depositor in trust for another, the mere form of the deposit was
insufficient to raise an inference that the depositor intended to create a
trust. Thus, the language in the later Illinois decision 80 is completely in
conformity with the earlier case and Beaver v. Beaver."1 This interpreta-
tion of the "mere form of the account" and "declaration of trust" leads
to the theoretical conclusion that Illinois would find no trust created from
the Totten Trust formula alone.
8 2
However, if the court did find a trust created from the mere form of
the account, 3 it would then be faced with the problem of whether, in the
absence of express language, it is a revocable or an irrevocable trust. It
would have to choose between the thought of Beaver v. Beaver,84 which
held that there is either an irrevocable trust created or no trust, and Matter
of Totten, which held there is a third choice, namely, the revocable trust.
Illinois has consistently held that when a trust has been perfectly cre-
80 Bolton v. Bolton, 306 Ill. 473, 138 N.E. 158 (1923). This case relies on two earlier
New York cases which state the rule followed in Beaver v. Beaver, namely, Kelly v.
Beers, 194 N.Y. 49,86 N.E. 980 (1909), and In re Bolin, 136 N.Y. 177, 32 N.E. 626 (1892).
81 117 N.Y. 421, 22 N.E. 940 (1889).
82 The term "theoretical conclusion" is used because the question is open to conjec-
ture on the following grounds: (1) The Illinois decisions which hold that no trust is
created from the mere form of the account relied on New York decisions which have
since been overruled by "Matter of Totten." Thus, it might be argued that since the
cases upon which the Illinois law stands have been overruled, the Illinois cases them-
selves are overruled; (2) In Helfrich's Estate et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 143 F. 2d 43 (1944), a valid, irrevocable trust was created by a savings accounts
instrument. The court quotes from Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 356
I1. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934), as stating the requirements of a valid Illinois trust, "To
constitute a valid trust of personal property, there must be a declaration by a person
competent to create it, a trustee, designated beneficiaries, a certain ascertained object,
a definite fund or subject-matter, and its delivery or assignment to the trustee." The
case merely indicates the form of the deposit alone as the "declaration of trust" and
there is no further evidence of intent shown. If there was no evidence other than the
mere form of the account" no trust should be created under Illinois law. Yet, the ques-
tion was completely ignored in this case and a valid, irrevocable trust was created. The
court does, however, cite a Massachusetts case, Wasserman v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d
778 (1944) where there was other evidence besides the "mere form of the account"
and a trust was created. Albert v. Albert, 334 Ill. App. 440, 80 N.E. 2069 (1948) follows
the reasoning and quotes from Helfrich's Estate as to the creation of a valid irrevocable
trust. There is no question raised as to "the mere form of the account" but the case
indicates more evidence of intention to support the declaration of trust on the deposit
instrument. Whether the issue was missed, ignored, or taken care of by other evidence
of intention in these two cases, is open to conjecture. Thus, there is the possibility in
Illinois that the "mere form of the account" may create a trust; (3) The courts may
interpret the Illinois statutes protecting a bank which pays the beneficiary on the death
of a depositor, as creating a Totten Trust. Ill. Rev. Stats. (1955) c. 16 , § 23 c. 32, S 770
(b); (4) The courts may just adopt the Restatement of Trusts § 58 (1935) viewpoint
which is a codification of the Totten Trust.
s8 This would only be one step in the recognition of the "Totten Trust."
84 117 N.Y. 421, 22 N.E. 940 (1889).
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ated, it is not revocable at the will of the party who created it, unless he
has expressly reserved the power of revocation. 85 Whether Illinois would
make an exception in the cases of savings accounts trusts is hardly prob-
able. In connection with this problem, it would be well to consider two
decisions80 which cast some light upon the situation. Helfrich's Estate v.
Conmnissioner of Internal Revenue87 has the distinction of being the only
case which mentions the Totten Trust in connection with Illinois law. In
this case there were two trustees and several instruments, one of which
provided: "During the lifetime of the trustees and the survivor of them, all
moneys now and hereafter deposited in said accounts may be paid to or
upon the order of the trustees, or either of them, and upon the death of
the survivor of the trustees all moneys deposited in said account shall be
payable to or upon the order of the beneficiary. s88 The commissioner
contended that the trust was "Totten" or "tentative" and therefore in-
valid or at best revocable. 89 The court found a valid irrevocable trust and
not a "Totten" or "tentative" trust. It said: "The present case is dis-
tinguishable from the Totten cases on several grounds. Separate trust in-
struments were executed here and another trustee besides the settlor was
included. Neither practice is common to Totten trusts.. . . Furthermore,
the language of the instrument itself clearly negatives any right of with-
drawal or revocation in the settlor when it provides that "all moneys now
and hereafter deposited in said account may be paid to or upon the order
of the trustees .... No provision is made for the settlor to withdraw in his
own name." 90 In Albert v. Albert,91 there was an instrument purporting
to be a declaration of trust, 2 which provided: "During the lifetime of the
trustee all money now and hereafter deposited in said account shall be
paid to or upon the order of the trustee and, upon the death of the
trustee, all moneys deposited in said account shall be payable to or upon
the order of the beneficiary, or to his legal representative .... The trustee
85 Trubey v. Pease, 240 Ill. 513, 88 N.E. 1005 (1909); Light v. Scott, 88 Il. 239 (1878);
Fry v. Pence, 261 Ill. App. 218 (1931); Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Morse, 238
Ill. App. 232 (1925). This is in accord with the general rule of Trusts. See Historical
Background, section VI of the text, supra. The cases following Matter of Totten make
an exception in the cases of savings accounts. They "imply" a power of revocation.
86 Helfrich's Estate et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 143 F. 2d 43 (1944);
Albert v. Albert, 334 Ill. App. 440, 80 N.E. 2d 69 (1948).
87 143 F. 2d 43 (1944).
88 Ibid., p. 43.
89 The commissioner seems to have felt that the Totten Trust would be invalid under
Illinois law but that there was a possibility of its being recognized. Thus, the wording
of his contention.
90 143 F. 2d 43 (1944).
91 334 Ill. App. 440, 80 N.E. 2d 69 (1948).
9 2 The problem as to whether this "declaration" alone was enough to create a trust
is discussed in footnote 82, supra.
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represents that there is existing no agreement in respect to said account,
except as herein set forth."93 There was, in fact, a separate instrument re-
serving the power of revocation. The court found a valid irrevocable trust.
Though the Helfrich case pays lip service to the Totten Trust and indi-
cates that it might possibly exist under Illinois law, it rather evasively
avoids that question and finds an irrevocable trust. The language of both
decisions in finding that irrevocable trusts were created by the savings
accounts instruments is a very strong indication that Illinois will not recog-
nize a revocable trust without an express reservation of revocation by the
depositor. Thus, it would seem that a "tentative" or Totten Trust could
not exist in Illinois under the theory of an "implied" reservation of a
power of revocation by the depositor-trustee.
But if Illinois were to recognize the doctrine of Totten trust, there
would arise the problem of "testamentary disposition. '94 As a general rule,
the creation of a trust is testamentary if no interest passes to the bene-
ficiary before the death of the settlor.95 As seen before,96 the whole prob-
lem centers around the powers, rights, control and dominion reserved by
the settlor. Are they such as to leave him virtually the owner of the prop-
erty and the trustee his mere agent.97 If these principles are applicable to
savings banks trusts, it is quite arguable that they are testamentary dis-
positions and that, since there is no compliance with the formalities re-
quired by the Statute of Wills, the beneficiary would not be entitled to
the deposit on the death of the depositor.98
Thus, it will be important to determine where Illinois draws the line be-
tween a valid inter vivos trust and an attempted testamentary disposition
in regard to the "control" of the settlor.99 The history of Illinois courts
in this respect indicates a definite liberal tendency in upholding trusts
93334 Ill. App. 440, 445, 80 N.E. 2d 69, 72 (1948).
94As explained before, no question of testamentary disposition will arise if the in-
tention of the depositor is shown to be to create an irrevocable trust or no trust at all.
See Matter of Totten, Section V of text supra.
95 See 1 Scott on Trusts, § 53 (2d Ed., 1956).
96 See Matter of Totten, Section V of text supra.
97 Some authorities feel that the problem of testamentary disposition is largely ignored
by the courts when consideritg savings accounts trusts. See 39 Dickinson L. Rev. 36
(1934); 1 Scott on Trusts, § 58.3 (2d Ed., 1956).
98The customary savings-accounts trust allows the depositor to retain complete con-
trol over the account as long as he lives. He may deposit, withdraw or close out the
account at will and he may change the beneficiary by making out a new deposit card.
See footnote 62 supra.
99 Farkas v. Williams, 5 I11. 2d 417, 25 N.E. 2d 600 (1955). The court, while admitting
that inter vivos trusts have a "testamentary look" and that the "line must be drawn
somewhere," did not feel the point had been reached in that case.
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where the settlor retains a large measure of control.100 The latest and lead-
ing case on this point is Farkas v. Williams.'"° There, Farkas as settlor and
trustee, reserved to himself as settlor the cash dividends of the stock for
his own personal account and use. He reserved the right as trustee to vote,
sell, redeem, exchange or otherwise deal with the stock. He also reserved
the right to revoke the trust or change the beneficiary. However, Farkas
did register the stock in the name of Farkas as trustee for the beneficiary.
This indicated that Farkas intended to assume those obligations set out in
the instrument as well as those fiduciary obligations implied by law. Also,
on the death of Farkas, the beneficiary would become the absolute owner
unless Farkas changed the beneficiary or revoked the trust, which was not
to be effective as to the company until written notice was delivered to it.
These are not the rights of an absolute owner for he can do with his prop
erty as he will without securing the approval of or notifying anyone and
without being held to the duties of a fiduciary while doing so. The court.
in balancing these factors and recognizing the liberal trend of Illinois said:
"It is obvious that a settlor with the power to revoke and to amend the
trust at any time is, for all practical purpose, in a position to exert con-
siderable control over the trustee regarding the administration of the trust.
For anything believed to be inimicable to his best interests can be
thwarted or prevented by simply revoking the trust or amending it in
such a way as to conform to his wishes."' 02 The court then lists some of
the powers a settlor might reserve which could render a trust testamen-
tary and states: "Actually any of the above powers could readily be as-
sumed by a settlor with the reserved power of revocation through the.
simple expedient of revoking the trust, and then, as absolute owner of the
subject matter, doing with the property as he chooses."' 1 3 Finally, the
court looked to the purpose of meeting the formalities required by the
Statute of Wills, namely, to prevent fraud. Here, there was clearly no
fraud since the stock was issued in compliance with the written declara-
tion of trust, in the name of Farkas as trustee for Williams. For these rea-
sons, the court found a valid inter vivos trust, and leave for consideration
the effect of this decision on the testamentary disposition problem of the
Totten Trust.10 4 The Farkas trust is similar to a savings deposit trust in
10OSee Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934); Bear v.
Milliken Trust Co., 336 11. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929); Kelly v. Parker, 181 I11.49, 54 N.E.
615 (1899).
1015 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E. 2d 600 (1955).
0 2Farkas v. Williams, 5 Il. 2d 417, 430, 125 N.E. 2d 600, 607 (1955).
103 Ibid.
104 Though some New York cases speak of the Totten Trust as arising upon the
death of the depositor, this comment shall proceed under the theory that the trust
arises at the time of the deposit. That is, that the trust is subject to a condition subse-
quent of revocation rather than a condition precedent of the depositor's death.
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many ways. The settlor in both instances, besides retaining a life interest,
can destroy the trust by revoking or consuming the corpus. Realistically,
the beneficiary's interest in either case amounts to a mere expectancy.
The formal documents executed in the Farkas trust are more elaborate
and extensive than those customarily used in a savings accounts trust but
theoretically they are the same. Therefore, by analogy, it would seem
that Illinois would follow the theory of the Totten case so far as the prob-
lem of testamentary disposition is concerned. From the language in the
Farkas case, it would seem that Illinois courts would desire to effectuate
the settlor's intent. They do not want to frustrate that intent with techni-
calities. Thus, as long as the courts can find any limitation on the settlor.
they will most probably reject the argument of testamentary disposition
and find a valid inter vivos trust.105 Thus, it would seem that if a Totten
Trust can be created in Illinois, it will not be held invalid as a testamen-
tary disposition.
The final problem to be considered by the Illinois courts in regard to
a Totten Trust is the interpretation of two statutes'0 6 which could con-
ceivably lead to recognition of the tentative trust. As far back as 1921, an
act in relation to the payment of deposits in trust was approved by the
Illinois legislature:
If a deposit is made with any corporation doing a banking or trust business
by one person in trust for another, the name and residence of the person for
whom it is made shall be disclosed, and it shall be credited to the depositor as
trustee for such person; and if no other notice of the existence and terms of a
trust has been given in writing to such corporation, the deposit, or any part
thereof, together with the interest thereon, nay, 0 in the event of the death
of the trustee, be paid to the person for whom said deposit was made, or to his
legal representative.' 0 8
While the wording of this statute could be reasonably interpreted as rec-
ognizing the tentative trust, there has not yet been any litigation in Illinois
concerning this theory. In 1955, another statute, 109 passed as part of the
Illinois Savings and Loan Act, goes a little further and provides:
If one or more persons opening or holding a withdrawal capital account shall
execute a written agreement with the association providing that the account
105 This limitation would probably come in the form of the deposit. By referring to
himself as "trustee," the depositor has bound himself in that fiduciary capacity. One
must also remember that small sums are involved which are easy to identify and there
is no great danger of fraud. Also the public policy behind the "poor man's will" has
to be considered, viz., the elimination of probate.
106 Ill. Rev. Stats. (1921) c. 161, § 23; (1955) c. 32, § 770 (b).
107 Italics added.
108 There has been no litigation at all on this statute since 1936. 111. Rev. Stat. (1921)
c. 161, § 23.
109 I11. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32, § 770 (b).
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shall be held in the name of such person or persons as trustees for one or more
persons designated as beneficiaries, the account and any balance thereof which
exists from time to time, shall be held as a trust account and unless otherwise
agreed between the trustees and the association: (1) Any such trustee during
his life time may change any of the designated beneficiaries by a written direc-
tion accepted by the association; and (2) Any such trustee may withdraw or
receive payment in cash or check payable to his personal order and any payment
or withdrawal shall constitute a revocation of the agreement as to the amount
withdrawn; and (3) Upon the death of the last surviving trustee the person or
persons designated as beneficiaries who are living at the death of the last sur-
viving trustee shall be the holders of the account (as joint owners with right of
survivorship if more than one) and any payment to the holder or any such
holders shall be a complete discharge of the association's obligation as to the
amount so paid.1l ° .
Some states have interpreted similar statutes as merely protecting a
bank if it makes payment to the beneficiary."' In states where a revocable
trust of the deposit is invalid as a testamentary disposition, it has been
held that the statute does not validate the disposition. 112 In states where
the Totten Trust is recognized it has been said that "the principle of law
laid down in Matter of Totten, was later made a part of the banking
law.""u 3 From an analysis of these cases, it would seem that the interpreta-
tion of such statutes protecting banks follows the policy of the particular
state in regard to a tentative trust. Thus, if a state recognizes the Totten
Trust, the banking statute adopts the Totten Trust principle. If a state
does not recognize the Totten Trust, they interpret the statute as being
there solely for the protection of the bank and that the rights of the de-
positor and of the beneficiary are not affected. No state has seen fit to
interpret this type of statute of itself as giving rise to a Totten Trust. Pro-
ceeding under this theory, it would seem that Illinois would not recognize
these statutes as an enactment of the Totten Trust unless such trust was
first judicially recognized in this state.
There is some indication that the legislature may have intended the
latter statute 1 4 to be an enactment of the Totten Trust. The 1921 act"15
states the bank "may" pay the beneficiary. The 1955 act" 6 states the ac-
count "shall" be held as a trust account and that the beneficiaries "shall"
be the holders of the account as joint "owners" and payment to the
"bolder" shall be a discharge. The use of the words "shall," "owners," and
110 Italics added.
" Alger v. North End Savings Bank, 146 Mass. 418, 15 N.E. 916 (1888).
112 Jefferson Trust Co. v. Hoboken Trust Co., 107 N.J. Eq. 310, 152 Ad. 374 (1930).
113 In Hendersons Estate, 198 N.Y. Supp. 799, 800 (1923). See also Walso v. Lattemer,
140 Minn. 455, 168 N.W. 353 (1918).
114 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32 § 770 (b).
11 111. Rev. Stat. (1921) c. 161 § 23.
116 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32 § 770(b).
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"holder" indicate that the intention of the legislature may have been to
enact the Totten Trust. Further evidence of this intention may be gath-
ered from the fact that this act repealed the Savings and Loan Act of
1919117 but did not repeal a portion enacted in 1939118 which specifically
was directed to limiting the liability of the association in paying the pro-
ceeds of trust accounts to fiduciaries and beneficiaries. A second section
whose sole object was to protect the associations from liability would be
redundant.
From the foregoing analysis it can be seen that the Illinois courts can
either follow the standard interpretation of such statutes by other states
and thus find that the Totten Trust is not enacted by this statute or they
can engage in statutory construction to find that the Totten Trust is en-
acted by the statute.119
CONCLUSION
The theory behind trusts as evidenced throughout history 120 is in ap-
parent conflict with the theory behind the Totten Trust. The trustee has
always held the legal title for the cestui que trust who has always enjoyed
the benefits of the trust. The Totten Trust places the legal title and the
benefits in the trustee.12' Therefore, the Totten Trust is in conflict with
the definition of a trust.112 Technically, it cannot be classified as an express
trust, resulting trust or constructive trust. 23 Nor can it be said that it
arises by any of the principal methods of trust creation. 12 4 Further, the
117 See Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32 S 944.
118 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32 S 953.
119 This latter interpretation hardly seems probable when one considers legislative
intent. The legislature would have come out in more positive terms employing the
language of S 58 of the Restatement of Trusts or of the Totten case had such been their
intent. It seems more probable that the real reason for the enactment of this statute
lies in the legislature's knowledge that the "tentative trust" does not exist in Illinois
and that the courts will so hold. In view of the thousands of savings accounts trusts
in Illinois in the form of tentative trusts, they wanted to provide definite and adequate
protection for the banks.
120 See Historical Background, Section I of text supra.
121 It could be argued that the beneficiaries' enjoyment is merely postponed. This is
not true, however, because the beneficiaries' interest in a Totten Trust is little than a
mere expectancy.
122 See Historical Background, Section II of text supra. There is no fiduciary rela-
tionship. There are no equitable duties on the trustee to deal with it for the benefit
of another. It is hard to see how it. arises as a manifestation of intention to create the
relationship.
123 See Historical Background, Section III of text supra. The only conceivable cate-
gory in which to place the Totten Trust is the express trust. Technically the Totten
Trust lacks the requisites of property transfer and express declaration of intention to
create a trust.
124 See Historical Background, Section IV of text supra.
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technical elements of a trust are not present.12 The Totten Trust also
violates the ordinary pr esumption against revocability in the law of
trusts. 126 Finally, it violates the Statute of Wills. 1 27 For these reasons, the
Totten Trust has been called a "serious anomaly" and a piece of "judicial
legislation.'
128
Thus, we are left to consider the total effect of this "fiction," this "poor
man's will," this "tentative" or "Totten" trust.129 Tht first important ob-
servation to be made is that the docrine is law in only a few states.'
8 0
Many states have specifically rejected the doctrine. 13' Many states have
not as yet passed upon the doctrine.132 The total effect of the doctrine
when considering all states may be summarized in the word "confusion."
For example, confusion exists in the states which recognize the doctrine
because it is fiction. This is illustrated if a creditor of the beneficiary at-
tempts to attach the account,13 3 if the depositor disposes of the deposit by
125See Historical Background, Section V of text supra. Though it may be argued
that the depositor is the trustee, that the account is the trust res and that the bene-
ficiary is clearly named, it is hard to satisfy the requirement of intention.
126 See Historical Background, Section VI of text supra. Some authorities feel that
this "implied" power of revocation is not an extreme step. They feel that if the de-
positor intended a trust at all, it seems rather clear that he intended a revocable trust.
See C. W. Leaphart, 78 U. of P. L. Rev. 626 (1930).
127 See Historical Background, Section VII of text supra. Some authorities feel that
the courts tend to ignore this problem in savings accounts trusts. See 39 Dickinson
L. Rev. 36 (1934). One must also consider this issue in the light of the recent liberal
trend evidenced by such cases as Farkas v. Williams, 5 111. 2d, 417, 125 N.E. 2d 600
(1955).
128 Wilbur Larremore in 14 Yale L. J. 312 (1905). Most authorities choose to treat
the Totten Trust as a fiction. The application of the trust idea to bank deposits is
useful in arriving at a final solution of the problem. In other words everybody knows
that the trust deposit is not a trust, but they will treat it as if it were a trust. By this
method they may effectuate the intent of the depositor and realize the object of the
deposit. As has been said, the mind is baffled by conflicting forces and grasps at an
admittedly erroneous conception for the purpose of clarifying its reasoning and
effecting a desired objective." 39 Dickinson L. R. 37, 38 (1934).
129 These are some of the various terms employed by the authorities in describing
the savings accounts trust.
130 The doctrine is law only in California, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Minne-
sota, Pennsylvania, New York and Texas.
131 See footnotes 38, 39, supra.
182 These states are probably in the majority.
133 In Kelly General Finance Co., 16 D. & C 435 (Pa.) the court refused to permit
a creditor of the beneficiary of a trust account to attach the fund: "The case before
the court may be disposed of on the ground that, though the deposit is in form a trust
deposit, it is in fact not so, because the depositor has made withdrawals from time to
time from her funds, treating it as her own; or, if not withstanding her withdrawals
her deposit in the form made could be construed to be a declaration of trust in favor
of the beneficiary, she revokes it by her claim to it filed in this case." This case indi-
cates that the equitable and legal title are in the depositor and also shows the confused
thinking of the courts in trying to solve a problem of reality. It should also be noted
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a will,134 or if the beneficiary dies before the depositor. 135 This same con-
fusion arises among those courts which hold that the trust arises upon the
making of the deposit, 3 6 while others hold that it does not arise until the
death of the depositor. 37 The tentative trust theory has led to intermina-
blt litigation, as shown by the New York cases.'1 8 Further speculation
exists in states like Illinois'" which have not as yet passed upon the issue.
The existence of a savings account trust in this unpredictable situation
forces the legislature to pass statutes protecting banks,'1 40 places the de-
positor in a precarious position in regard to his account,14 ' and generally
jeopardizes the law of trusts.
42
Against this confusion one must weigh the advantages of the Totten
Trust:
1. An avoidance of inheritance taxes.
2. There are no formalities connected with its creation in contrast to a will.
3. The incompetency of the creator of a trust is not subject to as great an
attack as the incompetency of the testator of a will.
4. The trust does not incur the great expense and delay that is connected with
the administration of estates.
The advantages are ostensibly beneficial to a great number of depositors
and banks. But so long as social policy is held to be inferior to the settled
that a creditor of the depositor may attack the fund. In Re Reich's Estate 146 Misc. 616,
262 N.Y. Supp. 623 (1933).
134 See Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 169 Atl. 106 (1933). In Re Mannix Estate 147
Misc. 479, 264 N.Y. Supp. 24 (1933). In these cases the court held that a contrary will
revoked the tentative trust. It would seem that the "fiction" always yields to reality.
'35 Rambo v. Pyle, 220 Pa. 235, 69 At. 106 (1908). The executor of the cestui que
trust and the administrator of the trustee both claimed the fund. It was awarded to
the latter.
136 Coughlin v. Farmers and Mechanics Savings Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272 N.W. 166
(1937); Pozzuto's Estate, 124 Pa. Super. 93, 188 Atl. 209 (1936). Under this theory the
trust is initiated at the time of the deposit subject to a condition subsequent of revo-
cation.
137 Matter of Slobiansky, 152 Misc. 232, 273 N.Y. Supp. 869 (Surr. Ct., 1934); Matter
of Kelly, 151 Misc. 277, 271 N.Y. Supp. 457 (Surr. Ct., 1934). Under this theory the
beneficiaries' rights remain inchoate until the depositor's death. It has been suggested
that the Restatement of Trusts adopts this theory. See 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 852 (1939).
Under this theory it must be clearly seen that the deposit is testamentary since the
depositor's death is a condition precedent to the creation of the trust.
138 See cases cited 1 Scott on Trusts, 477-510 (1956).
139 See Matter of Totten, Section VI of text supra.
140 See footnote 59 supra.
141 For example the depositor may deposit his money thinking he has established
a revocable trust and have the courts decide it is irrevocable. The beneficiaries' creditors
may be able to reach the account. Various difficulties may be envisioned.
142 Unnecessary use of anomalous fictions such as the Totten Trust may prove in
the long run to be detrimental in that it opens the door for further erosions of some
of the settled doctrines upon which the stability trust law depends.
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principles of trust law the courts will continue to remain divided as to
acceptance of the Totten Trust theory.
TAXABILITY OF ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED FUNDS
Does illegally obtained money or property constitute taxable income to
the person so obtaining it? This area of the income tax law has been a
source of great discomfort to the federal courts and has been the subject
of considerable judicial divergence.
The initial consideration is, simply stated, whether or not illegally re-
ceived funds meet the requirements of "gross income," according to the
Internal Revenue Acts-as that term is interpreted by the federal courts.
The decisions further raise a question at times at to the motivation of the
government; that is, does the federal government seek to tax a given type
of receipt as a matter of policy, to punish those who participate in illegal
activities? This discussion, however, will center mainly on the question
first presented, that is, are illegal gains taxable?
EARLY DECISIONS (1919-27)
In a 1919 case, Rau v. United States,1 the defendant insurance agent em-
bezzled moneys which were delivered to him to be paid as insurance pre-
miums, and the court held that defendant had committed a larceny, and
therefore, the money so received was not subject to taxation under the
Revenue Act.
2
In 1926, there were two cases in which the decision in the Rau case was
attacked. Steinberg v. United States3 held that profits from the sale of
liquor in violation of the law were taxable income. The court, in discussing
the applicable provision of the Internal Revenue Act,4 said that since the
phrase, "gains and profits from any source whatever," was used in the
statute, as contradistinguished from the term 'income," there was no
doubt that Congress meant to include all species of gain, no matter how
immoral or vicious the method of acquiring the same might be.
The case of United States v. Sullivan,5 in opposing the Rau case, presents
a concise and persuasive argument, by showing the trend in the history of
national income tax legislation. The court quoted from the first income
tax law to be passed under the Sixteenth Amendment of the federal Con-
situation, 6 where it was provided that the net income of a taxable person
1260 Fed. 131 (C.A. 2d, 1919).
2 Revenue Act referred to here was the Act of 1916.
3 14 F. 2d 564 (C.A. 2d, 1926).
4 Internal Revenue Act, 1921, at S a, 42 Stat. 238 (1921).
5 274 U.S. 259 (1927). 6 Internal Revenue Act, 1913, at S b, 38 Stat. 167 (1913).
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should include income from "the transaction of any lawful business ... "
The court went on to explain that the word "lawful" has been omitted
from the corresponding sections of all subsequent revenue acts,7 thus
clearly showing the legislative intent to make illegally obtained funds
taxable income.
The argument is often advanced that Congress is being totally incon-
sistent by prohibiting an activity, then proceeding to collect taxes on the
gains made from the same activity. The court in the Steinberg case, in
answering this objection, quoted Justice Holmes' opinion in United States
v. Stafoff,8 where he said, "Of course Congress can tax what it also for-
bids," and went on to say that such was the regular procedure, and prop-
erly so, in regard to prohibited liquor. The Steinberg court then con-
cluded that if the Legislature could tax the liquor which it forbids, then it
can also tax the gains made by dealing in that which is prohibited.9
INTERMEDIATE DECISIONS (1932-42)
The decisions from this period lean quite heavily toward the proposi-
tion that money illegally obtained constitutes taxable income. However,
some diversity of authority was still in evidence.
A 1932 case, North-American Oil v. Burnet,10 took the position that
without some bona-fide legal or equitable claim, even though it be con-
tingent or contested in nature, the taxpayer cannot be said to have re-
ceived any gain or profit within the reach of the income tax law.11 This
contention received support in the case of McKnigbt v. Coinnissioner of
Internal Revenue,12 where the defendant had embezzled the funds in ques-
tion. The court in this case conceded that profits made from the use of
embezzled funds are income, and taxable as such. However, the court
went on to declare that no taxable gain arose from the embezzlement itself
under Section 22(a) of the 1936 Revenue Act.
The North-American Oil and McKnigbt cases must be considered the
minority in deference to the great number of cases taking a contrary view
during this period. In a prosecution for the failure to pay income tax or to
file a return, it was held, in 1933, that bribes accepted by the defendant
from unions seeking admission to the association of which defendant was
vice-president, constituted taxable income.' In a 1935 prosecution against
7 E.g., Internal Revenue Act, 1928, at S 22, 45 Star. 797 (1928).
8 260 U.S. 477 (1923).
9 Steinberg v. United States, 14 F. 2d 564 (C.A. 2d, 1926).
10 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
"Internal Revenue Act, 1928, at § 22, 45 Stat. 797 (1928).
12 127 F. 2d 572 (C.A. 5th, 1942).
18 United States v. Commerford, 64 F. 2d 28 (C.A. 2d, 1933).
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a county commissioner for attempting to evade income tax, it was stated
that, "because the part of the net income omitted from the income tax re-
port was income derived from unlawful transactions was no defense to
the charge of attempting to evade income tax.' 1 4 A 1942 case held that
the receipt of $50,000.00 as a ransom payment for a kidnapping consti-
tuted taxable income. 15
In specific refutation of the argument, as advanced in the Nortb-Ameri-
can Oil and the McKnight cases that illegally received money is not tax-
able because the taxpayer does not have good title to it, it must be stated
that there are several cases, besides those already cited, in which persons
have been taxed upon property which could have been recovered from
them. For example, if a lender takes usurious interest (on an accrual basis),
he must include his apparent profit on his return.16 When a railroad col-
lects too-large fares, the excess is income, although the passengers have a
theoretical right of restitution.' 7 An unlawful bonus acquired by a direct-
or at his company's expense was held to be income.' 8
Justice Learned Hand, in National City Bank of New York v. Helver-
ing, said of the Rau case:
We are disposed to overrule it, because, although the decisions are not, as we
have shown, entirely harmonious, the weight of authority is against it, and it
seems to us wrong in principle. Although taxes are public duties attached to the
ownership of property, the state should be able to exact their performance with-
out being compelled to take sides in private controversies .... Collection of the
revenue cannot be delayed, nor should the Treasury be compelled to decide
when a possessor's claims are without legal warrant. If he holds with claim of
right, he should be taxable as an owner, regardless of any infirmity of his title;
no other doctrine is practically possible, and no injustice can result.19
RECENT DECISIONS (1946-55)
In a 1946 case, Conmissioner v. Wilcox, wherein the defendant em-
bezzled money and dissipated it in gambling houses, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that the proceeds of the embezzlement did not
constitute taxable income. In the language of the court, "Not every benefit
received by a taxpayer from his labor or investment necessarily renders
him taxable. Nor is mere dominion over money or property decisive in all
cases.20 The court went on to say that the reason that embezzled money
14 Chadick v. United States, 77 F. 2d 961 (C.A. 5th, 1935).
15 Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125 F. 2d 340 (C.A. 7th, 1942).
16 Magruder v. Barker, 95 F. 2d 122 (C.A. D.C., 1938).
17 Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. 2d 990 (C.A. 7th, 1931).
18 Board v. Commissioner, 51 F. 2d 73 (C.A. 6th, 1931).
19 98 F. 2d 93 (C.A. 2d, 1938).
20 Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 407 (1946).
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does not come under the definition of taxable income in the Internal Rev-
enue Code is obvious upon the face of the statute, which says, "A tax-
able gain is conditioned upon (1) the presence of a claim of right to the
alleged gain, and (2) the absence of a definite unconditional obligation to
repay or return that which would otherwise constitute a gain."'21
North-American Oil v. Burnet22 was cited in support of this conten-
tion that money cannot constitute income to an individual unless he holds
it under some bona fide legal or equitable claim. The court in the Wilcox
case felt that the situation was analogous to that of a lender-borrower re-
lationship, when they said: ". . . nor can taxable income accrue from the
mere receipt of money or property which one is obliged to return or re-
pay to the rightful owner .... -23 In commenting on the commissioner's
contention that the defendant's dissipation of the money in gambling
houses rendered the money taxable, the court held that such dissipation
could no more create taxable income to the embezzler-dissipater than the
insolvency or bankruptcy of an ordinary borrower causes the loans to be
treated as taxable income to the borrower.
In Rutkin v. United States,24 the United States Supreme Court was
faced with the decision of whether or not $250,000.00, extorted by Rutkin,
should be deemed taxable. A five to four decision ruled that the extorted
funds were subject to the income tax.
The majority of the court first pointed out, as has already been dis-
cussed herein, that the first Revenue Act 25, contained the phrase ". . . from
the transaction of any lawful business"; while the revised Act of 1916 ex-
cluded the word la'wful.26 This, they said, demonstrated the congressional
intent to tax illegally gained funds. Secondly, the majority opinion de-
clared that the administrative and judicial recognition of the taxability of
unlawful gains of many kinds is widespread and settled, citing many of
the cases already discussed herein. 27 Concluding, the five concurring jus-
tices said:
We think the power of Congress to tax those receipts as income under the
Sixteenth Amendment is unquestionable. The broad language of section 61(a)
supports the declarations of this court that Congress in enacting that section
exercised its full power to tax income.28 We therefore conclude that section
61(a) reaches these receipts.
29
21 Ibid., at 408. 28 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946).
22 286 U.S. 417 (1932). 24 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
25 Internal Revenue Act, 1913, at § b, 38 Stat. 167 (1913).
26 Internal Revenue Act, 1916, at 5 2(a), 39 Stat. 757 (1916).
2 7 E.g., Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125 F. 2d 340 (C.A. 7th, 1942).
28 Internal Revenue Act, 1954, at 61 (a), 26 U.S.C. Supp. III 678, says: "Except as other-
wise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income, from whatever source
derived...."
29 United States v. Rutkin, 343 U.S. 130, 138 (1952).
COMMENTS
The dissent of the Rutkin case was based on two lines of reasoning. The
first is substantially the same rationale underlying most of the previous
decisions of this nature, that is, one who extorts money not owed him has
neither legal nor equitable claim to the extorted money and is under a
continuing obligation to return it to its rightful owner. The Wilcox case
is cited for support. The other basis for dissent is different from any judi-
cial approach yet taken, and one which is extremely interesting. It can
best be conveyed by quoting from the dissenting opinion, written by
Justice Black:
To all intents and purposes, gamblers and bootleggers are engaged in going
businesses and make regular business profits which should be taxed in the same
manner as profits made through more legitimate endeavor. However in my
judgment, it stretches previous tax interpretations too far to classify the sporadic
loot of an embezzler, an extortioner, or a robber as taxable earnings derived
from a business, trade or profession. I just do not think Congress intended to
treat the plunder of such criminals as theirs.
30
Now that the line has been drawn between the Wilcox case (along with
the dissent in the Rutkin case) on one side, and the majority opinion of
the Rutkin case on the other, a few 1955 decisions will be examined to see
which line of reasoning they chose to follow. Where the business man-
ager of a labor welfare organization arranged with a painting contractor
to overstate his bills to the organization, then approved and paid the bills,
and finally received the amount of the overpayment from the contractor,
such receipts constituted taxable income.3' Where defendants, in the
course of their employment as traffic managers and solicitors of bids for
subsidiaries of steel company, used their position to extract personal gains
in the form of kickbacks from companies interested in doing business with
their employers, the kickbacks constituted income to the defendants-de-
spite the fact that the kickbacks constituted the proceeds from embezzle-
ment required to be restored to the employer.3 2 In a case where a corpo-
ration president embezzled money from corporate bank accounts, it was
declared that Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilcox governs and
that Rutkin v. United States does not apply. The court here was of the
opinion that Rutkin did not completely obliterate Wilcox.33 The court
then cited Marienfield v. United States, where it was said:
Since the court in the Wilcox case flatly held that embezzled funds were not
taxable income to the embezzler and in the Rutkin case has unequivocally held
that extorted funds were taxable income to the extortionist, the line of demar-
30 Ibid., at 140.
31 Berra v. United States, 221 F. 2d 590 (C.A. 8th, 1955).
32 United States v. Bruswitz, 219 F. 2d 59 (C.A. 2d, 1955).
33 Dix v. Commissioner, 223 F. 2d 436 (C.A. 2d, 1955).
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cation lies between those rather closely related factual situations and must be
determined by the facts in the individual case.
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The conclusion was then drawn that the facts in the instant case were
closer to those of Wilcox, so that case was followed.
A casual inspection of the above-mentioned recent decisions will reveal
the considerable amount of judicial "fencing" which has been carried on
in this area. For example, Justice Black, in the Rutkin case, drew a con-
clusion which meant, in effect, that the determining factor of taxability is
the incidence of occurrence of the activity from which the illegal funds are
derived. Thus, a distinction is made between the steadier, more efficient
crimes, such as bookmaking and bootlegging, and the sporadic-type
crimes, such as embezzlement and extortion-for the purpose of determin-
ing which criminals should have their receipts taxed. The court in the
Marien field case then proceeded to "split the hair" a bit finer by making a
distinction between embezzlement and extortion, so far as taxability is
concerned; and it ruled that while money derived from the latter is tax-
able, one deriving funds by the former method has no income tax liability.
There remains one aspect for consideration. That is, is the federal gov-
ernment using its taxing power to punish those who participate in il-
legal activities? In other words, there are those who feel that some courts
are first deciding that criminals should have their monetary intake taxed,
and then, in seeking legal justification for such decision, proclaiming that
such intake represents income under the Revenue Act. To lend support to
the fact that this problem exists, we quote from Justice Black's dissent in
the Rutkin case, wherein he was joined by three of the other justices:
Since it seems pretty clear that the government can never collect substantial
amounts of money from extortioners, there must be another reason for applying
the tax law to money they extract from others ... the only other reason that
occurs to me is to give Washington more and more power to punish purely
local crimes such as embezzlement and extortion.3 5
Numerous legal as well as ethical considerations arise in connection
with this theory of federal "encroachment" on state jurisdiction. It is not
to be argued whether or not this theory is correct, nor to deal with these
collateral considerations. Suffice to say, that in considering the state of
the law in this area, one should be cognizant of the possibility that some
of the decisions declaring illegal gains to be taxable may have been moti-
vated by these "extraneous" factors. In other words, the court may be
trying to prevent a wrongdoer from accomplishing something which an
honest man, in most instances, cannot, that is: acquiring money and not
surrendering a portion of it to the government.
34 214 F. 2d 632, 637 (C.A. 8th, 1954).
35 E.g., Internal Revenue Act, 1936, at § 22, 49 Star. 1657 (1936).
COMMENTS
CONCLUSION
In summary, it can be seen that the split of authority which developed
shortly after the passage of the 1916 Revenue Act is in existence, even at
the present time; but it can be safely concluded that the weight of au-
thority is made up of the cases holding illegally obtained money to be tax-
able income. The rationale usually relied upon is that since Congress saw
fit to revise the 1913 Revenue Act to omit the word "lawful" from the
definition of gross income, it manifested an obvious intent to tax the
profits of crime. The primary legal contention of the minority is that
since the taxpayer does not have good legal or equitable title to the unlaw-
fully-acquired funds (in other words, he is under a continuing obligation
to return them to their rightful owner), they should not be considered
taxable to him. 6
Aside from the legal issues involved, there are strong policy aspects to
consider. The arguments for both sides are presented in United States v.
Sullivan, where it was explained, in essence, as follows.37 The minority
felt that Congress could not have intended to include the gains from
crime within the meaning of the income tax code, because the effect
would be to place legitimate and illegitimate transactions on the same
footing. It is argued that strong reasons of public policy require that the
gains of commercial dealings, which are also criminal, be regarded as be-
neath the contempt of the law for purposes of taxation. The inconsistency
of the government in prohibiting an act, and at the same time subjecting
it to taxation for purposes of revenue is obvious. On the other hand,
argues the majority, it certainly does not satisfy the standard concept of
justice to tax those who are engaged in legal enterprise, and allow those
who thrive by violation of the law to escape. It seems doubtful that Con-
gress should intend that an individual set up his own wrong to avoid tax-
ation, and thereby increase the burden on those who are lawfully em-
ployed.
It becomes apparent that either a future revision of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, or a broad, yet well-defined judicial interpretation of the pres-
ent code is necessary to clarify this area of the tax law where confusion
and inconsistency have reigned for four decades. Whether or not one of
these reform measures is forthcoming is a matter for conjecture; but it
would certainly be most welcome.
86 Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
37 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
